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Chapter 1 
Critical reconstruction in jurisprudence 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In 2000 and 2001, a father of a child born in Leipzig filed petitions for custody and 
access rights at the Wittenberg district court in Germany. In the district court’s final 
decision of 2001, the court ordered that the applicant, Mr. Görgülü, should have sole 
custody of his child. German authorities filed an appeal following this decision. 
Contrary to the district court, the court of appeal decided against Mr. Görgülü and 
ordered that the child should remain with his foster parents. After a number of 
further proceedings and the German Federal Constitutional Court’s 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) decision not to hear Mr. Görgülü’s constitutional 
complaint, the father turned to an international court, the European Court of Human 
Rights.1 In 2004, The European Court of Human Rights decided in favor of Mr. 
Görgülü. The Strasbourg Court held that Germany had failed to respect its 
obligations under article 8 of the Convention, which secures a right to family life.2 
However, Mr. Görgülü’s claim to custody and access rights was only partly awarded 
in the German courts system following the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights.3 Unable to accept this outcome, the father turned to the Federal 
Constitutional Court to file a constitutional complaint. The Federal Constitutional 
Court decided that the German constitution, the Basic law, had been violated 
because the court of appeal had failed to take into account the case law of the 
                                                 
1 See BVerfGE 111, 307 (2004) (Görgülü), paras 2-12 on these decisions.  
2 Görgülü v Germany App no 74969/01 (ECtHR, 26 February 2004). 
3 See BVerfGE 111, 307 (2004) (Görgülü), paras 13-19 on these decisions. 
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European Court of Human Rights.4 The Federal Constitutional court also considered 
the following about the relation between the German legal order and international 
law: 
 The Basic Law is intended to achieve comprehensive commitment to 
 international law, cross-border cooperation and political integration 
 in a gradually developing international community of democratic 
 states under the rule of law. However, it does not seek a submission 
 to non-German acts of sovereignty that is removed from every 
 constitutional limit and control. Even the far-reaching supranational 
 integration of Europe, which accepts the order to apply a norm, when 
 this order originates from Community law and has direct domestic 
 effect, is subject to a reservation of sovereignty, albeit one that is  greatly 
 reduced (see Article 23.1 of the Basic Law). The law of international 
 agreements applies on the domestic level only when it has been 
 incorporated into the domestic legal system in the proper form and in 
 conformity with substantive constitutional law.5 
 The case of Mr. Görgülü illustrates that in European liberal democracies a 
plurality of legal orders exists. Given the existence of a plurality of legal orders, 
individuals may appeal to legal norms of different legal orders. Mr. Görgülü, for 
example, relied on German family law, international human rights law and the 
German constitution in his pursuit for custody and access to his child. Moreover, 
                                                 
4 See Hartwig 2005 for a detailed account of these decisions. On the significance of the Görgülü case in the 
field of European human rights law, see Krisch 2010, 110-113. 
5 BVerfGE 111, 307 (2004) (Görgülü), para 36 [unofficial English translation issued by the Federal 
Constitutional Court]. The official decision in German reads as follows: ‘Das Grundgesetz will eine 
weitgehende Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit, grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit und politische 
Integration in eine sich allmählich entwickelnde internationale Gemeinschaft demokratischer 
Rechtsstaaten. Es will jedoch keine jeder verfassungsrechtlichen Begrenzung und Kontrolle entzogene 
Unterwerfung unter nichtdeutsche Hoheitsakte. Selbst die weitreichende supranationale europäische 
Integration, die sich für den aus der Gemeinschaftsquelle herrührenden innerstaatlich unmittelbar 
wirkenden Normanwendungsbefehl öffnet, steht unter einem, allerdings weit zurückgenommenen 
Souveränitätsvorbehalt (vgl. Art. 23 Abs. 1 GG). Völkervertragsrecht gilt innerstaatlich nur dann, wenn 
es in die nationale Rechtsordnung formgerecht, und in Übereinstimmung mit materiellem 
Verfassungsrecht inkorporiert worden ist.’ 
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officials of different legal orders may claim authority over a citizen. German district 
and appellate courts, the European Court of Human Rights and the German Federal 
Constitutional Court have heard Mr. Görgülü’s arguments. The case of Mr. Görgülü 
also illustrates that legal orders may be highly intertwined. A norm from one legal 
order may be considered legally relevant in another legal order. For example, the 
rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights have been invoked 
by Mr. Görgülü in the German legal order. Officials may also take into account the 
exercise of authority by officials of other legal orders. Some German courts, for 
example, relied on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in their 
decision. In some cases, the intertwinement of legal orders may be perceived as 
problematic. Legal norms of different legal orders may conflict and an official may 
contest the authority of officials of other legal orders. In the case of Mr. Görgülü, 
some German courts gave restricted effect to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. German courts and 
the Federal Constitutional Court had opposing views on the question whether and 
under which conditions the European Convention on Human Rights should have 
priority over German law, and in particular the German constitution. 
 My aim in this study is to make sense of the intertwinement of legal orders 
in European liberal democracies from the perspective of jurisprudence.6 Theories of 
jurisprudence may provide answers to theoretical questions that arise from the 
intertwinement of legal orders. For example, in the case of Mr. Görgülü the question 
may be posed how German officials determine whether the European Convention 
on Human Rights should be applied in the German legal order. These theoretical 
questions also concern the potential conflict and contestation that is inherent to the 
intertwinement of legal orders. For example, why did some German courts contest 
the authority of the European Court of Human Rights? Many legal theories do not 
provide an adequate account of the complex relations between legal orders. A 
critical reconstruction of theories of jurisprudence may yield a more promising 
account of the intertwinement of legal orders. Answers to theoretical questions that 
                                                 
6 In this study, I focus on the intertwinement of legal orders in European liberal democracies. However, 
the intertwinement of legal orders is not a distinctively European phenomenon. See Twining 2009. 
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arise from the intertwinement of legal orders may be formulated by critically 
reconstructing theories of jurisprudence. 
 In this introductory chapter, I will first provide an outline of the central 
characteristics of the intertwinement of legal orders in European liberal democracies. 
Building on Paul Schiff Berman’s theory of global legal pluralism, I will argue that 
legal orders should be considered relatively autonomous in light of the 
intertwinement of legal orders (section 2). Interconnections between legal orders 
exist when legal norms from one legal order are incorporated or given effect in 
another legal order and the exercise of power by officials from other legal orders is 
accepted. Frictions between legal orders emerge when conflicts between legal norms 
arise or the authority of officials of other legal orders is contested. I will illustrate 
what pressing theoretical questions are raised by the intertwinement of legal orders 
on the basis of three examples from positive law (section 3). I will claim that these 
theoretical questions center on the notions of validity and authority. Theories of 
jurisprudence should help us to make sense of these theoretical questions. However, 
Berman’s theory of global legal pluralism lacks a convincing legal theoretical 
framework from which the complex relations between legal orders can be 
understood. Moreover, many available theories of jurisprudence do not provide an 
adequate account of the interconnections and frictions between legal orders. Critical 
reconstructions of positivist, interpretive and pragmatist legal theories may yield 
more promising accounts of the intertwinement of legal orders (section 4). 
Moreover, a novel theoretical account of the intertwinement of legal orders in 
European liberal democracies may be constructed by synthesizing the relative 
strengths of positivist, interpretive and pragmatist legal theories. On a 
methodological level, I will argue that John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium 
can be used to critically reconstruct theories of jurisprudence and to formulate a 
novel theoretical account of intertwinement of legal orders (section 5). Finally, I will 
provide an outline of the arguments made in subsequent chapters (section 6). 
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2 The intertwinement of legal orders 
 
An insightful account of the intertwinement of legal orders can be found in Paul 
Schiff Berman’s theory of global legal pluralism.7 His theory of global legal pluralism 
provides a descriptive and normative framework to explain and normatively assess 
the complex relations between legal orders. From a descriptive point of view, 
Berman argues that a jurisdictional hybridity exists in which numerous domestic 
and international legal orders overlap. He defines jurisdictional hybridity as: 
‘normative overlap among international, state, and nonstate entities. This overlap 
includes instances when two different communities wish to assert jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a dispute as well as instances when a decision maker in one place is asked 
to apply the norms of a different community – what is sometimes called jurisdiction 
to prescribe or (especially in the Anglo-American system) choice of law.’8 On this 
view, legal norms of different legal orders may be legally relevant and officials of 
different legal orders may claim to exercise legitimate power. For example, different 
domestic and international legal norms may be considered legally relevant in a 
particular legal order.9 Jurisdictional hybridity may also lead to frictions between 
legal orders as legal norms of different legal orders can conflict, and officials may 
contest the authority of other officials. 
 From a normative point of view, Berman disagrees with two common 
responses to the frictions between legal orders that arise from jurisdictional 
hybridity. He calls these sovereigntist and universalist responses.10 Sovereigntists 
argue that frictions between legal orders may be resolved by giving priority to legal 
norms and officials of domestic legal orders. Berman maintains that the sovereigntist 
responsive is unconvincing for a number reasons. Firstly, sovereigntists are 
mistaken to argue that the authority of the state is the ultimate source of legal 
                                                 
7 Berman 2012. See also Berman 2013; 2016.  
8 Berman 2012, 23. 
9 Berman 2012, 25-44. 
10 Berman 2012, 10. 
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obligation, and legal norms and officials are inherently tied to a terrority.11 Secondly, 
sovereigntists incorrectly assume that states are the only legitimate source of legal 
obligation.12 Numerous actors, such as, for example, the Council of Europe and the 
European Union, create legal norms and claim to exercise legitimate power vis-à-vis 
states. Thirdly, sovereigntists are unable to acknowledge that states do not always 
pursue consistent policies. International law empowers individuals to challenge 
these state policies.13 Universalists maintain that the frictions between legal orders 
that arise from jurisdictional hybridity should be prevented by harmonization. On 
this view, a legal framework, such as, for example, centered on free trade or human 
rights, may be used to harmonize legal norms across different legal orders. 
Nonetheless, Berman considers that a legal framework to harmonize legal norms is 
objectionable. There are inherent differences between legal orders that should not be 
erased on the basis of harmonization. Moreover, legal harmonization may also 
introduce an undesirable power dynamic in which actors are able to impose their 
legal norms at the expense of weaker actors.14 
 In light of these objections Berman claims that sovereigntist and universalist 
responses to the frictions between legal orders that arise from jurisdictional 
hybridity are unpersuasive. Sovereigntists incorrectly assume that frictions between 
legal orders may be resolved by giving priority to domestic law and officials, while 
universalists wrongly believe that frictions may be overcome through legal 
harmonization. Berman claims that frictions between legal orders are unavoidable 
and should be mitigated through procedures and institutions. Procedures and 
institutions may help to articulate and further structure the intertwinement of legal 
orders. For example, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the principle of 
subsidiarity or policies of mutual recognition may help to mitigate the frictions 
                                                 
11 Berman 2012, 63-96 
12 Berman 2012, 96-113. 
13 Berman 2012, 113-121. 
14 Berman 2012, 131-132. 
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between legal orders without abolishing the complex relations between legal orders 
altogether.15 
 Although I agree with Berman that sovereigntist and universalist responses 
to jurisdictional hybridity are unconvincing, I maintain that his descriptive account 
of global legal pluralism is unpersuasive for two reasons. Firstly, Berman’s theory 
of global legal pluralism lacks a convincing legal theoretical framework from which 
the complex relations between legal orders can be understood. He maintains that 
global legal pluralism can be understood on the basis of a conventionalist legal 
theory. In a conventionalist legal theory, law is what people generally accept as law. 
Or as Berman explains: ‘[i]n any event, the important point is that scholars studying 
the global legal scene need not rehash long and ultimately fruitless debates (both in 
philosophy and in anthropology) about what constitutes law and can instead take a 
nonessentialist position: treating as law that which people view as law.’16 However, 
a conventionalist legal theory does not provide a convincing legal theoretical 
framework from which the intertwinement of legal orders can be understood. 
Firstly, in a conventionalist legal theory no clear distinction can be drawn between 
law and other social practices.17 For example, what people generally consider as law 
may be similar to their understanding of other social norms. Therefore, a theoretical 
account of law is needed that distinguishes law from other social practices. Secondly, 
people may disagree on how law should be understood.18 For example, people may 
conceptualize law differently. However, a conventionalist legal theory does not 
explain how this disgreement may be overcome. Therefore, a more adequate 
theoretical account of the intertwinement of legal orders is needed, one that can 
overcome the drawbacks of a conventionalist legal theory.  
 The second reason why Berman’s descriptive account of global legal 
pluralism is unpersuasive is because it overemphasizes the frictions between legal 
                                                 
15 Berman 2012 152-189. 
16 Berman 2012, 56. [footnotes omitted] Berman refers to Brian Tamanaha’s work on a conventionalist 
understanding of law. See, for example, Tamanaha 2001.  
17 Halpin 2014, 181.  
18 Cotterrell 2018, 85. 
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orders. Berman’s focus on conflicts between legal norms and contestation between 
legal officials, and the procedures and institutions to articulate and mitigate them, 
reinforces the view that legal orders should be considered autonomous. A view he 
actually wishes to dispel: ‘[u]sing pluralism, we can conceive of a legal system as 
both autonomous and permeable; outside norms (both state and nonstate) affect the 
system but do not dominate it fully.’19 However, when legal orders are relatively 
autonomous, their relations are not solely defined by friction. Legal norms of 
different legal orders do not necessarily conflict when they are considered legally 
relevant in multiple legal orders and the authority of officials is not always 
contested. Building on Berman’s theory of global legal pluralism, I maintain that the 
intertwinement of legal orders should be approached in terms of both 
interconnection and friction. Interconnections between legal orders exist when a 
legal norm is incorporated or given effect in other legal orders. Interconnections 
between legal orders also exist when officials accept the authority of officials of other 
legal orders. Frictions between legal orders arise when legal norms of different legal 
orders conflict, or when the authority of officials of other legal orders is contested. 
In the following subsections, I will discuss these characteristics of the 
intertwinement of legal orders in more detail.  
 It should be highlighted that the intertwinement of legal orders is a 
multifaceted phenomenon. In this study, I explore the intertwinement of legal orders 
in European liberal democracies. EU law and the European Convention on Human 
Rights have a profound impact on the domestic legal orders of European liberal 
democracies.20 Therefore, I will examine the complex relations between EU law and 
the European Convention on Human Rights on the one hand, and domestic legal 
orders on the other hand. I will also explore the intertwinement of EU law and the 
European Convention on Human Rights. However, I will not explore the 
interconnections and frictions between different regimes of international law as 
                                                 
19 Berman 2012, 25. 
20 See Weiler 2017 on the impact of EU law on domestic legal orders of European liberal democracies. See 
Keller and Sweet 2008 on the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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such.21 For example, the complex relations between international trade law and other 
regimes of international law, such as, environmental law and human rights law, and 
the institutions that deal with these complex relations may also be explored from the 
perspective of jurisprudence. In this study, I wil focus on the relations between EU 
law and the European Convention on Human Rights. I will also not explore the ways 
in which domestic law is intertwined with international law as such. Numerous 
international institutions, such as, for example, the United Nations Security Council 
and the World Bank, exercise public authority.22 Some legal scholars have argued 
that public law notions may therefore be used to explore and normatively assess 
how these international institutions exercise their public authority.23 However, in 
this study, I will only touch upon how domestic human rights law is intertwined 
with the European Convention on Human Rights. Nevertheless, my focus on 
European liberal democracies provides an interesting test case for theories of 
jurisprudence. The intertwinement of legal orders in European liberal democracies 
concerns the complex relations between domestic and international legal orders, and 
the relation between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights as 
such. 
 
2.1 Reception and conflicts of legal norms 
 
In legal orders that are intertwined, norms of one legal order may be considered 
legally relevant in another legal order. Firstly, a legal norm may be incorporated in 
a legal order. For example, a treaty provision may be incorporated in a domestic 
legal order through national legislation. Legislatures may take additional measures 
when a norm is incorporated in a legal order. EU directives, for example, leave room 
for EU member states to decide on how the goals set out in these directives should 
                                                 
21 See, for example, the contributions in Young 2012; Alter and Raustiala 2018. 
22 See, for example, Krisch 2017; Zürn 2018. On the global dimensions of law and legal institutions, see 
Walker 2014. 
23 See, for example, Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart 2005 on global administrative law; Von Bogdandy, 
Goldmann and Venzke 2017 on public international authority. 
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be achieved.24 Secondly, reception includes giving effect to a norm of another legal 
order. For example, courts may apply legal norms of other legal orders in their 
decisions. Thirdly, the reception of a legal norm may concern the interpretation of 
that norm in another legal order. For example, a national court may accept a 
particular interpretation of a legal norm that has been developed in the case law of 
an international court. In some cases, the reception of a legal norm may seem 
obligatory from the perspective of another legal order. Again, EU law may be used 
as an illustration here. In the field of EU law, the doctrine of supremacy stipulates 
that primary and secondary EU legislation should trump domestic law in the legal 
orders of the member states.25 The relation between EU law and domestic law in the 
domestic legal orders of the member states depends on how EU law is incorporated 
or given effect and how these legal norms are interpreted. This means that officials 
in the member states may fail to take the necessary steps to secure the reception of 
EU law. 
 Given the intertwinement of legal orders, legal norms of one legal order may 
conflict with norms of other legal orders. Conflicts may arise when a norm is 
incorporated in a legal order. For example, conflicts between domestic and 
international law may emerge when treaty provisions are implemented through 
national legislation without due regard for consistency with domestic law. 
Legislatures may therefore need to enact new law or amend existing law in order to 
resolve norm conflicts. Conflicts may also arise after a legal norm has been 
incorporated in the new legal order or when a norm is given effect. When these 
conflicts arise, courts may consider which decision best resolves inconsistencies 
between these norms. Executive officials may disregard some legal norms in their 
decision in order to avoid a conflict between legal norms. Lastly, conflicts may arise 
on the interpretation of a legal norm. For example, the interpretation of an 
international human rights norm by an international court may conflict with how 
national courts and legislatures understand that human right as enshrined in the 
constitution. It may be the case that legal norms stipulate how conflicts should be 
                                                 
24 Art 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
25 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
11 
 
avoided or resolved within a legal order. For example, many constitutions contain 
provisions that stipulate under which conditions international law should trump 
domestic law.26 
 
2.2 Accepted and contested authority of officials 
 
Officials apply, enact or amend legal norms. In intertwined legal orders, officials 
may rely on the authority of officials of other legal orders in their exercise of power. 
For example, a legislature may incorporate EU law into national legislation 
following an extensive legislative process in the European Union, and courts may 
rely on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union when giving effect 
to EU law. A distinction should be made between acceptance of authority in a strong 
and weak sense. Acceptance in a strong sense entails that officials defer to the 
authority of officials of other legal orders. For example, an official may incorporate 
legal norms for the overriding reason that they have been enacted in another legal 
order. Acceptance in a weak sense signifies that officials do not always defer to the 
authority of officials of other legal orders in their exercise of power. Officials may 
rely on the authority of other officials but their exercise of power is not solely 
dependent on deference. For example, officials may accept decisions of courts from 
other legal orders as authoritative. Nevertheless, in many cases the authority of these 
officials does not solely rely on deference to case law of other courts. More 
considerations play a role when officials exercise their power. An example 
concerning the authority of the European Court of Human Rights may serve as an 
illustration of acceptance in a strong and weak sense. Members to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are obligated to protect the rights that are 
laid down in the treaty and its additional protocols.27 Citizens who claim that the 
rights of the Convention have been violated can turn to the European Court of 
                                                 
26 For example, article 94 of the Dutch Constitution reads as follows: ‘Statutory regulations in force within 
the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or of 
resolutions by international institutions that are binding on all persons.’ 
27 Art 1 ECHR. 
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Human Rights to submit a complaint.28 An extensive body of case law has developed 
in which the European Court of Human Rights assesses individual complaints of 
Convention violations. Strong acceptance would require officials in the member 
states to defer to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Acceptance 
in a weak sense entails that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is 
not an exclusive consideration in the exercise of power by officials in the member 
states. 
 The authority of officials of other legal orders may be contested. For 
example, courts in domestic legal orders may outright reject the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. However, in most cases the authority of an 
official is contested because its claim to authority is only partly accepted. The 
relation between the European Court of Justice and high courts in the EU member 
states may be used as an example here.29 Following the landmark case of Costa/ENEL, 
it can be argued that legal norms enacted by EU officials should have supremacy 
over domestic law.30 However, high courts in the domestic legal orders of the 
member states have not always fully accepted the supremacy doctrine of EU law.31 
In Germany, for example, the Federal Constitutional court has argued that EU law 
should not trump the fundamental rights enshrined in the German constitution.32 
This illustrates that officials may not always fully accept the authority of officials in 
other legal orders. 
 
3 Three examples from positive law 
 
In order to illustrate what theoretical questions are raised by the intertwinement of 
legal orders, I will discuss three examples from positive law concerning EU law, the 
                                                 
28 Art 34 ECHR. 
29 When I refer to the European Court of Justice, I mean to denote the Court of Justice as described in 
Art 19 of the Treaty on European Union. 
30 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
31 Alter 2001. 
32 BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) (Solange I). 
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European Convention on Human Rights, and the relationship between EU law and 
the European Convention on Human Rights. My claim in this section is modest. I do 
not wish to assert that these examples provide a comprehensive descriptive account 
of the intertwinement of legal orders in its doctrinal context. Instead, I wish to make 
explicit what theoretical questions are raised by the intertwinement of legal orders 
in European liberal democracies. In my view, theoretical questions that are raised by 
the intertwinement of legal orders center on the notions of legal validity and 
authority. The notion of legal validity explains under which conditions a norm is 
legally valid in a legal order. Conflicts between legal norms bring to light that the 
validity of a legal norm may be challenged. The notion of legal authority clarifies 
under which conditions the exercise of power by an official is considered legitimate. 
In intertwined legal orders, the contestation of the authority of officials signals 
disagreement on the conditions of legitimate exercise of power by officials.  
 Lawyers in intertwined legal orders may occasionally be confronted with 
theoretical questions associated with the intertwinement of legal orders. A lawyer 
may be faced with questions that touch upon the validity of a legal norm or the 
authority of an official. Theories of jurisprudence may help to clarify and provide 
answers to these theoretical questions. In the following section, I will argue that 
many theories of jurisprudence are unable to provide answers to the theoretical 
questions that are raised by the intertwinement of legal orders.  
 It should be noted at the outset that the three examples from positive law 
that I discuss in this section all focus on courts and their decisions. More generally, 
in this study I do not discuss how the intertwinement of legal orders affects 
legislative and executive officials. It could therefore be argued that these examples 
from positive law reinforce a court-centric view that is prevalent in many theories of 
jurisprudence.33 However, many of the legal theories I explore in this study are 
                                                 
33 On this bias, Waldron notes: ‘[t]he fact is that modern legal philosophers in Britain and America are not 
really interested in legislatures and legislative structure at all. Those things, we tend to say, are for 
political science or public choice theory, not for philosophy. Tell a legal philosopher about legislative 
structure, and he will say, impatiently, ‘When do we get to talk about the Supreme Court and how judges 
should decide cases?’ And so we rest lazily content with an image of legislation – Rex’s law – that was 
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focused on courts and judicial decision-making. In this study, my aim is to assess 
whether these theories of jurisprudence can be critically reconstructed to provide a 
more promising account of the intertwinement of legal orders. The examples from 
positive law that I discuss in this section will be used to critically reconstruct these 
legal theories and to illustrate their strengths and weaknesses. Future research may 
determine whether these legal theories can explain how the intertwinement of legal 
orders affects legislative and executive officials. Moreover, although my examples 
from positive law focus on courts and their decisions, the theoretical questions that 
touch upon legal validity and authority are also of relevance to legislative and 
executive officials. For example, decisions of executive officials should be based on 
valid legal sources and legislatures claim authority as rule-making institutions by 
enacting legislation. Nevertheless, further research may explore to what degree the 
intertwinement of legal orders raises similar questions about validity and authority. 
 
3.1 EU law 
 
In intertwined legal orders, a legal norm may be considered supreme over other 
forms of law partly in virtue of it being enacted by an official of another legal order. 
For example, from the perspective of the EU legal order, norms of EU law should 
trump domestic law in the member states. Or as the Court of Justice argued in the 
landmark decision Costa/ENEL: ‘the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent 
source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by 
domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character 
as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called 
into question.’34 On this view, officials in the legal orders of the member states 
should accept that EU law should trump domestic law.  
                                                 
already being called in question six hundred years ago by jurists who took their vocation a little more 
seriously than we do.’ Waldron 1999, 67. 
34 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. The doctrine of supremacy has been further developed in Case 
106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 
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 However, in the EU member states, the doctrine of EU supremacy has not 
always been fully accepted.35 The German Federal Constitutional Court has been a 
determined critic of the doctrine of supremacy. In its decisions, the Federal 
Constitutional Court has argued on the basis of three grounds that the supremacy 
of EU law may be restricted.36 The Federal Constitutional Court has argued that the 
supremacy of EU law may be restricted on the basis of fundamental rights, the 
competences of EU institutions, and the constitutional identity of the German 
constitution.37 In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the Court of Justice explicitly 
denied that the supremacy of EU law may be restricted on the basis of fundamental 
rights enshrined in a constitution.38 However, in its Solange decisions the Federal 
Constitutional Court maintained that EU law may not trump fundamental rights 
norms in the German legal order. In Solange I, the Federal Constitutional Court 
argued that EU law should be supreme over German law only insofar as EU law 
respects the fundamental rights enshrined in the German constitution.39 This would 
enable the Federal Constitutional Court to review EU law on the basis of the German 
constitution. However, in Solange II, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that it 
would only review the constitutionality of EU law if the European Union fails to 
respect the requirements of fundamental rights protection as laid down in the 
German constitution.40 In a subsequent decision, the Federal Constitutional Court 
affirmed Solange II. Moreover, it considered that a constitutional complaint that 
challenges the constitutionality of EU law on the basis of fundamental rights is 
admissible if the fundamental rights protection of the European Union has fallen 
below the level of protection of the German constitution.41 Therefore, challenging 
the supremacy of EU law on the basis of fundamental rights has become less feasible.  
                                                 
35 See Alter 2001. 
36 On the constitutional nature of these grounds, see, for example, Kumm 1999; Von Bogdandy and Schill 
2011. 
37 For an overview of the case law on these three grounds, see Payandeh 2011; Faraguna 2017. 
38 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. 
39 BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) (Solange I). 
40 BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986) (Solange II). 
41 BVerfGE 102, 147 (2000) (Bananas). 
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 The supremacy of EU law has also been challenged by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court on the basis of two other grounds. In the Maastricht decision, 
the Federal Constitutional Court maintained that it has the authority to review 
whether EU institutions have exercised their authority on the basis of the 
competences that have been set out in the foundational treaties of the EU.42 The 
Federal Constitutional Court argued that EU institutions should respect the 
democratic principles that are enshrined in the German constitution. On this view, 
EU law may be disregarded when EU institutions have not exercised their authority 
according to their assigned competences. For example, a decision of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union or regulations adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council may be disregarded when these EU institutions have acted ultra 
vires. Nevertheless, in its Honeywell decision, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court has decided that it will only subject EU law and its institutions to an ultra vires 
review when the Court of Justice of the European Union has given a preliminary 
ruling on the subject matter.43  
 Lastly, the Federal Constitutional Court has challenged the supremacy of 
EU law on the basis of the constitutional identity of the German constitution. In the 
Lisbon decision, the Federal Constitutional Court considered that EU law and its 
institutions should respect the German state in its exercise of authority in areas of 
constitutional importance.44 Areas of constitutional identity include, for example, 
criminal law and fiscal policy. Recently, in its first ever request for a preliminary 
ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court has requested a preliminary ruling on the 
legality of the Outright Monetary Transactions program that was adopted to combat 
the Euro-crisis. In its request, the Federal Constitutional Court asked the Court of 
Justice of the European Union whether EU institutions exceeded their competences 
and whether Outright Monetary Transactions program violated the constitutional 
                                                 
42 BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993) (Maastricht). Currently, the foundational treaties of the European Union are the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
43 BVerfGE 126, 286 (2010) (Honeywell). Courts may request a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union on the interpretation of EU law or the validity of acts of EU institutions. See Art 267 
TFEU. In practice, the European Court of Justice gives preliminary rulings. See also Art 256 TFEU. 
44 BVerfGE 123, 267 (2009) (Lisbon). 
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identity of the German constitution. In Gauweiler, the European Court of justice 
affirmed the legality of the Outright Monetary Transactions program.45 Following 
this preliminary ruling, the German Federal Constitutional Court concluded that 
Outright Monetary Transactions program was not ultra vires, nor that it conflicted 
with the constitutional identity of the German constitution.46 
 These decisions raise more general questions concerning the validity of EU 
law in domestic legal orders and the authority of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union vis-à-vis high courts in the member states. What are the validity criteria of EU 
law in the domestic legal orders of the member states? Do these conditions follow 
purely from legal norms internal to the domestic legal order, such as, for example, 
the constitution, or are there other requirements that need to be fulfilled? It could 
also be argued that the German constitution protects moral rights.47 This would 
entail that the conditions under which a legal norm should be considered valid in 
the German legal order, are moral in nature. Thus, the resistance of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court to the doctrine of EU supremacy raises theoretical 
questions on the validity of EU law in the legal orders of the member states. 
Theoretical questions can also be posed about the relations between the Court of 
Justice of the European Union and courts in the member states. For example, what 
is the nature of the relations between national courts and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union if officials in the member states claim sole authority to determine 
their relation with the EU legal order? It could also be argued that neither the 
German Federal Constitutional Court nor the Court of Justice of the European Union 
has the ultimate authority to determine the validity of EU law or the competences of 
EU institutions. What does this entail for the relation between the Court of Justice of 
the European Union and officials in the member states? Therefore, further reflection 
is needed on how the relations between national courts and the Court of Justice of 
the European Union should be conceptualized. 
 
                                                 
45 Case C-62/14 (Gauweiler) [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. 
46 BVerfGE 142, 123 (2016) (OMT). 
47 See, for example, Dworkin 1978. 
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3.2 The European Convention on Human Rights  
 
The European Court of Human Rights has become an important human rights court 
in European liberal democracies. An extensive body of case law has developed on 
the basis of the individual complaints procedure, which many, but not all, courts in 
the legal orders of the signatory states follow.48 Between the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and national courts relatively harmonious relations have 
emerged. Or as Krisch describes: ‘in spite of this divergence on fundamentals, the 
interplay between the different levels of law has been remarkably harmonious and 
stable. There have hardly been open clashes; instead, mutual accommodation and 
convergence have been the norm, facilitated by the flexible and responsive strategies 
of the courts involved, and especially of the ECtHR itself.’49 Thus, the European 
Court of Human Rights has considerable influence in the domestic legal orders. 
 Despite the relatively harmonious relations between the European Court of 
Human Rights and national courts, these relations may be strained. The relation 
between the European Court of Human Rights vis-à-vis the Dutch Council of State 
may serve as a striking example.50 In a number of decisions, the European Court of 
Human Rights has been highly critical of the constitutional role of the Dutch Council 
of State (Raad van State).51 In the Dutch legal order, the Council of State has two 
functions, an advisory and adjudicative function. The Council has an advisory 
function in the legislative process, but also reviews government decisions in its 
adjudicative function. Currently, the advisory and adjudicative functions of the 
Council of State are reflected in its two divisions: the Advisory Division and the 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division. In the Benthem case, the Strasbourg Court 
criticized the administrative appeal procedure in Dutch administrative law. In this 
                                                 
48 In some signatory states general compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights is absent. 
For an overview, see Keller and Sweet 2008. 
49 Krisch 2010, 152. 
50 On the authority of the Strasbourg Court in the Dutch legal order, see Huls 2012; Oomen 2016. 
51 On the reception of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the Dutch legal order, see 
De Wet 2008. 
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procedure the Council of State issues an advisory opinion for the Crown. The Crown 
takes a decision on administrative appeal by royal decree based on the advisory 
opinion of the Council of State.52 The European Court of Human Rights argued that 
this procedure violated the right to a fair trial because an advisory opinion of the 
Council of State may be set aside by the Crown. Following this case, the 
administrative appeal procedure was abolished. Measures were taken by the Dutch 
government to ensure that the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Dutch 
Council of State decides on appeal in these cases.53  
 In the Procola case concerning the Luxembourg Council of State, the 
European Court of Human Rights highlighted the importance of an institutional 
separation between the advisory and adjudicative functions.54 The advisory and 
adjudicative functions should be separated to ensure that the Luxembourg Council 
of State is an independent and impartial tribunal as defined in article 6 of the 
Convention. In Procola, the Strasbourg Court considered: ‘[i]n the context of an 
institution such as Luxembourg's Conseil d'Etat the mere fact that certain persons 
successively performed these two types of function in respect of the same decisions 
is capable of casting doubt on the institution's structural impartiality.’55 Following 
this decision, measures were taken by the Dutch government in order to ensure that 
members of the Council of State who have given advice in the legislative process on 
draft legislation do not review cases that concern legislation that they have 
previously assessed.56 
 In Kleyn, the Strasbourg Court affirmed that the Administrative Jurisdiction 
Division of the Dutch Council of State is an independent and impartial tribunal as 
defined in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.57 Nevertheless, 
the European Court of Human Rights warned that the co-existence of the two 
functions of the Council of State could lead to a violation of the Convention in some 
                                                 
52 Benthem v The Netherlands App no 8848/80 (ECtHR, 23 October 1985). 
53 De Wet 2008, 239. 
54 Procola v Luxembourg App no 14570/89 (ECtHR, 28 September 1995). 
55 Procola v Luxembourg App no 14570/89 (ECtHR, 28 September 1995) para 45. 
56 De Wet 2008, 239. 
57 Kleyn and others v The Netherlands App no 39343/98; 39651/98; 43147/98; 46664/99 (ECtHR, 6 May 2003). 
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cases. Therefore, legislation was adopted in order to ensure an institutional 
separation between the advisory and adjudicative functions of the Dutch Council of 
State. The legislation stipulates that members of the Council of State should not carry 
out advisory and adjudicative tasks concurrently.58 Finally, in the Salah Sheekh 
decision, the Strasbourg Court found a violation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights because the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Dutch 
Council of State failed to commit to a full review of asylum cases on appeal.59 The 
European Court of Human Rights argued that no adequate assessment had been 
made by national authorities to ensure that the applicant would not be subjected to 
torture following expulsion. Moreover, the applicant maintained that an appeal to 
the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Dutch Council of State would have 
been pointless. The European Court of Human Rights agreed with the applicant and 
argued that: ‘the Administrative Jurisdiction Division may in theory have been 
capable of reversing the decision of the Regional Court, in practice a further appeal 
would have had virtually no prospect of success.’60 Therefore, in the Salah Sheekh 
decision, the Strasbourg Court criticized national authorities and the Council of State 
for their failure to adequately take into account the Convention. 
 These decisions raise the question why the Strasbourg Court and the 
Council of State have opposing interpretations of what Convention rights entail. In 
these decisions, the European Court of Human Rights scrutinizes the Council of 
State for its exercise of authority in the Dutch legal order. In the Benthem and Kleyn 
decisions, the Strasbourg Court scrutinizes the dual function of the Council of State 
in light of article 6 of the Convention. Over a number of years, legislative reforms 
have been enacted to secure a stricter separation of functions for the Council of State 
in the Dutch legal order. Although the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the 
Dutch Council of State is now considered an independent and impartial tribunal, its 
role in the Dutch legal order was criticized again in Salah Sheekh. In the Salah Sheekh 
decision, the European Court of Human Rights criticized the Council of State on the 
                                                 
58 De Wet 2008, 239-240. 
59 Salah Sheekh v The Netherlands App no 1948/04 (ECtHR, 11 January 2007). 
60 Salah Sheekh v The Netherlands App no 1948/04 (ECtHR, 11 January 2007) para 123. 
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basis of article 3 of the Convention. These decisions raise the question why the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Council of State have opposing normative 
views on how authority should be exercised in relation to fundamental rights, even 
though measures have been taken to ensure that the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights is given effect. Adams and Van der Schyff raise a similar point in 
relation to the Salah Sheekh case: 
 To its credit the government of the day responded quickly by adjusting its 
 asylum policy to meet the requirements as set out in the Salah Sheekh case. 
 However, this does not address the cultural and institutional issue of 
 constitutional checks and balances when it comes to realising constitutional 
 and rule of law values in the Netherlands. Although the Salah Sheekh case 
 might not be evident of everyday adjudication in the Netherlands, it does 
 pose the question whether the courts are not too reticent in adjudicating 
 sensitive matters such as asylum practice and policy. Treaty review might 
 exist, but its exercise must not be allowed to fade into the sunset if it is to 
 fulfil any role in helping to maintain the rule of law.61  
Thus, the Benthem, Kleyn and Salah Sheekh decisions bring to light that further 
clarification is needed to explain why the Strasbourg Court and the Council of State 
diverge in how authority should be exercised in relation to fundamental rights. And, 
moreover, why did the Dutch government take measures following the decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights? 
 
3.3 The relationship between EU law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
 
In the previous examples, I have illustrated how domestic legal orders are 
intertwined with EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
However, the intertwinement of these legal orders also touches upon the 
                                                 
61 Adams and Van der Schyff 2017, 374. [footnote omitted] 
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relationship between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Obligations under EU law and the Convention may overlap. EU member states are 
obligated to take the necessary measures to give effect to EU law. For example, states 
may need to enact new legislation or amend existing legislation in order to give 
effect to an EU directive. Currently, all EU member states are signatories of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This means that EU member states should 
also respect the fundamental rights as enshrined in the Convention. Obligations 
under EU law and the Convention may conflict in some cases. The European Court 
of Human Rights has paid close attention to the frictions that could therefore arise 
between the human rights regimes of the Council of Europe and the European 
Union.62 In the Matthews case, the European Court of Human Rights emphasized 
that states should fulfill their obligations under the Convention, even when they 
have transferred competences to international organizations, such as, for example, 
the European Union.63 However, in Bosphorus, the Strasbourg Court also maintained 
that it would not review whether EU member states have violated the European 
Convention on Human rights in giving effect to obligations under EU law, as long 
as the European Union provides equal protection to human rights.64 Thus, Bosphorus 
limits the indirect review of EU law on the basis of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.65 
 Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) creates an obligation for 
the EU to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights: ‘[t]he Union shall 
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as 
defined in the Treaties.’66 Moreover, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU 
                                                 
62 For an overview of the extensive case law, see Douglas-Scott 2006; Glas and Krommendijk 2017. 
63 Matthews v United Kingdom App no 40302/98 (ECtHR, 15 July 2002). 
64 Bosphorus v Ireland App no 45036/98 (ECtHR, 30 June 2005). 
65 It should be noted that in Michaud v France App no 12323/11 (ECtHR, 6 December 2012) the European 
Court of Human Rights argued that the presumption of equal human rights protection does not apply 
when states have discretion in how they give effect to EU law or have failed to request a preliminary 
ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union on the interpretation of EU law.  
66 Art 6 para 2 TEU. 
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Charter) stipulates that the human rights enshrined in the Charter should have the 
same meaning and scope as the corresponding rights in the European Convention 
on Human Rights.67 This suggests that frictions between the human rights regimes 
of the Council of Europe and the European Union are unlikely. However, in advisory 
opinion 2/13 on the Draft Agreement on Accession the European Court of Justice 
argued that accession would violate the supremacy of EU law.68 Firstly, EU accession 
could entail that member states guarantee a higher level of fundamental rights 
protection than EU law.69 Secondly, EU accession would impede on the mutual trust 
of member states to give effect to EU law.70 Thirdly, the European Court of Justice 
argued that EU accession could undermine the preliminary ruling procedure.71 
Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights is unlikely in the near 
future in light of advisory opinion 2/13. Nevertheless, the European Court of Human 
Rights has upheld the presumption of equal human rights protection after advisory 
opinion 2/13. In Avotiņš, the Strasbourg Court affirmed the Bosphorus presumption. 
The European Court of Human Rights argued that states should presume that EU 
member states provide an equal level of protection of human rights when they give 
effect to EU law.72  
 The relationship between EU law and the European Convention on Human 
Rights raises the question why frictions between these legal orders emerge, even 
when legal norms are harmonized to a great degree. The advisory opinion of the 
European Court of Justice suggests that EU accession to the European Convention 
on Human Rights would violate the supremacy of EU law and the authority of the 
European Court of Justice to interpret EU law. Can the European Court of Human 
                                                 
67 Art 52 para 3 EU Charter. 
68 Opinion 2/13 EU EU:C:2014:2454. On the relation between EU supremacy and accession, see Gragl 2013. 
69 Opinion 2/13 EU EU:C:2014:2454, para 189. See also Case C-399/11 Melloni ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. In this 
case, the Spanish Constitutional Court requested a preliminary ruling on the implementation of the 
European Arrest Warrant. The Spanish Constitutional Court argued that the execution European Arrest 
Warrant should not violate fundamental rights enshrined in the Spanish constitution. However, the 
European Court of Justice opposed this line of reasoning in Melloni. 
70 Opinion 2/13 EU EU:C:2014:2454, para 194. 
71 Opinion 2/13 EU EU:C:2014:2454, para 199. 
72 Avotiņš v Latvia App no 17502/07 (ECtHR, 23 May 2016). 
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Rights exercise its authority in such a way that this would not impede on the 
authority of the European Court of Justice? It could be argued that more 
harmonization between these human rights regimes would reduce the chance that 
contestation between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Court would arise. However, 
this depends on how the authority of these courts is understood. If the authority of 
the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights depends 
solely on the correct application of legal norms, no frictions between legal orders 
would arise when the legal norms in question are harmonized. If the authority of the 
Luxembourg and the Strasbourg Court depends on other factors, frictions between 
the human rights regimes of the Council of Europe and the European Union can still 
emerge. Thus, clarification is needed on the conditions under which officials may 
exercise legitimate power in relation to each other and how their authority is related 
to the interpretation and application of legal norms. 
 
4 Making sense of the intertwinement of legal orders 
 
Legal theories help us to make sense of the theoretical questions that are posed in 
the discipline of law. On this view, the discipline of jurisprudence offers us insight 
into notions fundamental to law. As Cotterrell explains:  
 Jurisprudence is not an application to law of the protocols of 
 disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, economics, or  anthropology. Its 
 orientation is not a focusing down from one or more of the disciplines to the 
 special topic of ‘law’. It has to be a projection up from law as a regulatory 
 practice and experience into any realms of theory that can support that 
 practice or make sense of that experience.73 
                                                 
73 Cotterrell 2018, 55. See also Van Hoecke 1986. Building on Cotterrell’s view on jurisprudence, I 
understand jurisprudence as the discipline engaged in conceptualizing law in order to explain law’s 
central characteristics. Therefore, when I refer to legal theories or theories of jurisprudence, I mean 
theories that aim to provide an account of the central characteristics of law. Jurisprudence and its theories 
should be distinguished from the discipline of philosophy of law. In philosophy of law, theoretical 
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Unfortunately, many legal theories do not account for the interconnections and 
frictions between legal orders. This blind spot can be partly explained because some 
theories of jurisprudence do not treat international law as an integral part of their 
account of law.74 Even when theories of jurisprudence conceptualize international 
law, they often provide a distorted account. Take, for example, H.L.A. Hart’s claim 
on international law in the last chapter of The Concept of Law.75 Hart maintains that 
norms of international law create obligations but that we cannot determine under 
which conditions norms of international law are valid, how they should be created, 
and how disputes concerning these norms should be resolved. In chapter 2 of this 
study, I will argue that this claim is unconvincing, even in light of Hart’s own legal 
theory.76 Hart’s treatment of international law is a paradigmatic example of how this 
area of law is treated in legal theories.77 Consequently, because theories of 
jurisprudence have a blind spot for international law the intertwinement of legal 
orders remains largely unexplored. 
 Theories of jurisprudence that do not account for the intertwinement of legal 
orders are confronted with a problem. If they do not explain the complex relations 
between legal orders, they cannot make sense of a central characteristic of law in 
these legal orders. Moreover, the theoretical questions that are raised by the 
intertwinement of legal orders remain ambiguous. However, legal theories that do 
not account for the intertwinement of legal orders should not be abandoned 
                                                 
questions about law are posed that do not arise in legal practice itself. On this distinction, see also 
Robertson 2017 and Cotterrell 2018.  
74 Twining 2009.  
75 Hart 1994. 
76 Hart maintains that valid legal norms can be identified with rules of recognition, created on the basis 
of rules of change, and enforced with rules of adjudication. These are called secondary rules. In chapter 
2 of this study, I will argue that from the perspective of Hart´s positivist legal theory these secondary 
rules can be identified in international law. 
77 On Hart’s treatment of international law Waldron notes: ‘One can’t help thinking that the feel of this 
chapter – it seems like an afterthought, it departs quite markedly from the flow of the main argument of 
the book’s later chapters, and it is not revisited at all in the 1994 Postscript – has contributed to a sense 
among analytic jurists in the positivist tradition that jurisprudential issues associated with international 
law are issues of marginal significance, mostly not worth the attention of serious legal philosophers.’ 
[footnote omitted] Waldron 2013, 209-210. See also Murphy 2017.  
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outright. A critical reconstruction of theories of jurisprudence may remedy this 
problem by providing new and improved explanations of international law and the 
intertwinement of legal orders. A critical reconstruction of legal theories may also 
yield answers to the theoretical questions that are raised by the complex relations 
between legal orders. In this study, I seek to incorporate new elements in theories of 
jurisprudence to offer a more convincing understanding of the intertwinement of 
legal orders, while maintaining the central insights of these theories. A critical 
reconstruction of these legal theories will enable me to assess how these theories can 
make sense of the intertwinement of legal orders. Therefore, the central research 
question that I seek to answer in this study is the following: 
How may a critical reconstruction of theories of jurisprudence help to make better 
sense of the intertwinement of legal orders? 
 Central in this study are H.L.A. Hart’s positivist legal theory, Ronald 
Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory, and Karl Llewellyn and Philip Selznick’s 
pragmatist legal theories. They are legal theories from the three main traditions of 
jurisprudence. Following Tamanaha, a distinction can be made between analytical, 
normative and socio-legal traditions of jurisprudence.78 Hart’s positivist legal theory 
is usually situated in the analytical tradition of jurisprudence. Analytical legal 
philosophers maintain that a legal theory should provide conceptual clarity. A legal 
theory should clarify the meaning of legal notions and ought to provide insight into 
how these notions structure our social life. Legal philosophers in the normative 
tradition of jurisprudence maintain that a legal theory should construct a 
justification of law. Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory is generally perceived as part 
of this tradition of jurisprudence. He maintains that a legal theory should present 
law in its best light. Legal philosophers committed to socio-legal jurisprudence 
maintain that a legal theory should provide an account of the social practice of law. 
Llewellyn and Selznick’s pragmatist legal theories are often situated in this tradition 
of jurisprudence.79 They incorporate insights from sociology and anthropology to 
                                                 
78 Tamanaha 2017. 
79 It should be noted that Philip Selznick was a sociologist. However, the inclusion of Selznick is justified 
in light of the interdisciplinary approach of theorists in the socio-legal tradition of jurisprudence. I 
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reach a sociologically informed understanding of law. The first sub-question that I 
aim to answer in this study is:  
How can theories from the analytical, normative and socio-legal traditions of 
jurisprudence make sense of the intertwinement of legal orders? 
 It should be noted that critics could object to my claim that legal theories 
should be able to make sense of the intertwinement of legal orders. Two objections 
may be raised at this point. Firstly, critics may disagree with my claim that theories 
of jurisprudence face a problem when they cannot account for the intertwinement 
of legal orders. Secondly, critics may argue that I overstate my claim that theories of 
jurisprudence should be able to make sense of law’s central characteristics. In my 
view, both objections are unpersuasive. 
 Some legal philosophers in the analytical tradition of jurisprudence 
maintain that legal theories should make sense of law’s universal characteristics.80 
On this view, legal theories should be able to explain law in all societies, of past, 
present and future. Legal philosophers engage in conceptual analysis in order to 
reach a clear understanding of the universal characteristics of law. Conceptual 
analysis may be defined as: ‘reflection on the application of familiar concepts or 
categories to particular cases by appeal to intuitions, until something like necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the application of those concepts or categories 
emerge.’81 The interconnections and frictions between legal orders may not be 
considered a universal characteristic of law because it is only a central characteristic 
of law in contemporary legal orders. Analytical legal philosophers may therefore 
argue that theories of jurisprudence do not face a problem when they cannot account 
for the intertwinement of legal orders. The interconnections and frictions between 
legal orders are merely contingent characteristics of law. 
                                                 
develop this argument in chapter 4. In this chapter, I also discuss Lon Fuller’s typology of enacted and 
interactional law to explain how legal norms should be understood from a legal pragmatist perspective. 
Although Fuller is often associated with the normative tradition in jurisprudence, there is a close kinship 
between his legal theory and American pragmatist philosophy. See Winston 1988; Rundle 2012, 46-47. 
80 See, for example, Dickson 2001; Raz 2009a; Shapiro 2011; Gardner 2012. 
81 Giudice 2015, 18. 
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 The claim that theories of jurisprudence should only account for law’s 
universal characteristics of law is highly problematic. Firstly, the idea that universal 
characteristics of law may be identified is unconvincing. Law is a social concept and 
its characteristics are dependent on time and place. Some concepts have universal 
characteristics. For example, the atomic structure of water, H2O, is a universal 
characteristic of the concept of water. However, law is a product of human action 
and thus its characteristics do not exist independently from human existence.82 Or 
as Tamanaha explains: ‘[w]ater has a fixed chemical structure independent of what 
humans think, whereas law is constructed through the meaningful actions of 
humans; the features of law are contingent on and shaped by human subjectivity 
and purposes while the essential properties of water are not.’83 Moreover, social 
concepts like law are essentially ambiguous. No single legal theory is able to make 
sense of every characteristic of law. This entails that theories of jurisprudence 
provide different insights on the central characteristics of law.84 Secondly, the idea 
that legal philosophers may gain insight into law’s universal characteristics through 
conceptual analysis should also be considered problematic. Legal philosophers 
cannot engage in conceptual analysis without relying on prior beliefs on law.85 For 
example, the intertwinement of legal orders will not be considered an important 
topic in the field of jurisprudence if the autonomy of legal orders is considered the 
appropriate starting point of a legal theory. However, given the interconnections 
and frictions legal orders, a more fruitful starting point of a legal theory is the 
relative autonomy of legal orders. 
 Does this mean that legal theories from the analytical tradition should be 
abandoned altogether? In my view, this is unwarranted. Following Giudice, I 
maintain that legal theories in the analytical tradition should be understood as 
constructive conceptual explanations of law. Or as Giudice explains the move from 
conceptual analysis to constructive conceptual explanation: ‘conceptual analysis 
                                                 
82 Tamanaha 2017, 58-62. 
83 Tamanaha 2017, 59. 
84 Van der Burg 2014, 42-45. 
85 Giudice 2015, 27-30; Tamanaha 2017, 62-65. 
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concerns itself with elucidating or making explicit what is already implicit in some 
particular culture’s self-understanding of law, constructive conceptual explanation 
attempts to correct, revise or improve on what might be mistaken, distorting or 
parochial in that self-understanding when tested against observable social reality.’86 
On this view, law is a social concept and its characteristics are dependent on time 
and place. Therefore, when critically reconstructing Hart’s positivist legal theory, I 
will understand his theory as a constructive conceptual explanation of law’s central 
characteristics.87 
 Critics may also argue that I overstate my claim that theories of 
jurisprudence should be able to make sense of law’s central characteristics. Critics 
may argue that the validity of a legal theory depends primarily on the quality of the 
arguments it provides to support its philosophical claims. However, this objection 
wrongly assumes that the argumentative force of a legal theory can be seen in 
isolation of the conception of law it aims to explain. In my view, the philosophical 
claims of a legal theory are inherently linked with a particular conception of law’s 
characteristics and thus these two domains cannot be fully distinguished. Legal 
theories put forward philosophical claims about law and arguments to support these 
claims. These philosophical claims about law are made in light of an often implicit 
understanding of law’s central characteristics. On this view, debates in the field of 
jurisprudence revolve around a continuing mutual adjustment of philosophical 
claims about law and their conception of the central characteristics of law. Postema 
captures this point well when he characterizes the discipline of jurisprudence as a 
sociable science: ‘legal theory, which makes reflective understandings explicit, and 
seeks critical self-awareness of practice-shaping understandings of law, must 
acknowledge not only that reflective understandings change over time, but also that 
such changes, reflecting changes in the practice in response to changes in its social 
and political context, are intrinsic to the nature of the practice.’88 Thus, legal 
philosophical claims and arguments are inherently linked to a particular conception 
                                                 
86 Giudice 2015, vi. 
87 On Hart’s positivist legal theory as a constructive conceptual explanation, see Giudice 2015, 67-89. 
88 Postema 2016, 23. See also Cotterrell 2003 and Coyle 2017. 
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of law.89 A critical reconstruction of a legal theory may yield a more promising 
understanding of law, while maintaining its central insights and arguments. 
 Following my critical reconstruction of these theories of jurisprudence, I will 
identify relative strengths and weaknesses for my positivist, interpretive and 
pragmatist accounts of the intertwinement of legal orders. I will maintain that a 
novel account of the notions of validity and authority may be constructed that can 
make better sense of the intertwinement of legal orders by synthesizing the relative 
strengths of these legal theories. I will argue that a novel account should overcome 
two challenges. Firstly, this account should be able to explain how valid legal norms 
of other legal orders are identified, even when lawyers persistently disagree under 
which conditions these norms should be considered valid. Moreover, this account 
should be able to conceptualize the authority of officials even when officials of 
different legal orders diverge on how legitimate power should be exercised. 
Secondly, a novel account of the intertwinement of legal orders should be able to 
explain the interconnections between legal orders without abandoning the notion of 
legal order as such. Thus, in the last part of this study, I seek to answer a second sub-
question:  
What theoretical account of legal validity and authority is best justified in light 
of the intertwinement of legal orders? 
 My account of the intertwinement of legal orders means to provide a more 
convincing legal theoretical framework to understand the complex relations 
between legal orders when compared to Berman’s theory of global legal pluralism.90 
Berman relies on a conventionalist legal theory. In a conventionalist legal theory, 
law should be understood as what people generally accept as law.91 My account of 
the intertwinement of legal orders can overcome the shortcomings of a 
conventionalist legal theory that I have discussed earlier. Firstly, conventionalist 
                                                 
89 In the next section, I explain in more detail the tension between the argumentative soundness of a legal 
theory and its ability to provide an insightful account of law’s central characteristics. 
90 Berman 2012. 
91 Tamanaha 2001. 
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legal theories are unable to provide a precise account of what law is.92 By 
synthesizing the relative strengths of my positivist, interpretive and pragmatist 
accounts of the intertwinement of legal orders I will develop an account of law in 
intertwined legal orders. Secondly, conventionalist legal theories cannot explain 
what understanding of law is most convincing when we disagree on how law should 
be understood.93 I will formulate a convincing account of law in intertwined legal 
order by confronting my positivist, interpretive and pragmatist accounts of the 
intertwinement of legal orders with each other. Therefore, my theoretical account of 
legal validity and authority in intertwined legal orders can overcome the 
shortcomings of a conventionalist legal theory. 
 
5 Critical reconstruction 
 
In the following chapters, I use the method of reflective equilibrium to critically 
reconstruct legal theories and to formulate a theoretical account of the notions of 
validity and authority. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls introduces the method of 
reflective equilibrium to explain how a moral theory should be justified.94 For Rawls, 
the aim of the method is to justify general moral principles by finding a balance 
between considered judgments about what we deem morally right and the general 
principles that justify these considered judgments. Reflective equilibrium refers to 
the balance that is reached by mutually adjusting considered judgments and general 
principles. Although originally introduced by Rawls as a method to justify a moral 
theory, I will use the method of reflective equilibrium to critically reconstruct legal 
theories. The justification and critical reconstruction of a theory both revolve around 
the mutual adjustment of the claims of a theory and the central characteristics of a 
                                                 
92 Halpin 2014, 181. 
93 Cotterrell 2018. 85. 
94 Rawls 1999a. See also Daniels 1996; Van der Burg and Van Willigenburg 1998. 
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practice it aims to explain. Therefore, the method of reflective equilibrium may also 
be used to critically reconstruct theories of jurisprudence.95 
 When justifying a moral theory on the basis of the method of reflective 
equilibrium a distinction is often made between narrow and wide reflective 
equilibrium.96 Reflective equilibrium in a narrow sense is aimed at the justification 
of general moral principles in light of considered judgments. For example, narrow 
reflective equilibrium is reached when a set of deontological moral principles is 
formulated against the background of considered judgments. This type of reflective 
equilibrium is narrow in two respects. Firstly, narrow reflective equilibria, such as, 
for example, a set of deontological or teleological moral principles, are formulated 
in isolation from each other. These sets of moral principles are not confronted with 
each other. Secondly, reflective equilibrium in a narrow sense does not touch upon 
the underlying justification of moral principles. For example, a broader reflective 
equilibrium is needed to evaluate whether deontological moral principles are more 
convincing than teleological moral principles. Wide reflective equilibrium is aimed 
at the justification of general moral principles in light of considered judgments and 
background theories. Under wide reflective equilibrium a balance is reached 
between considered judgments, general moral principles and background theories. 
For example, different narrow reflective equilibria and their backgrounds theories 
may be confronted with each other to assess whether deontological or teleological 
principles are more convincing. Or as Rawls explains the broader scope of wide 
reflective equilibrium: ‘we investigate what principles people would acknowledge 
and accept the consequences of when they have had an opportunity to consider 
other plausible conceptions and to assess their supporting grounds.’97 
 In this study, I follow a three-step approach to the critical reconstruction of 
theories of jurisprudence. In the first step, I examine what the most coherent account 
is of the central claims of each legal theory when considered in light of its 
                                                 
95 My understanding of the method of reflective equilibrium is deeply influenced by Dworkin’s 
constructive account of the method of reflective equilibrium. See Dworkin 1978, 160. 
96 Rawls 1999b, 288-291.  
97 Rawls 1999b, 289. 
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methodological background. For example, Hart’s rule-centered account of law 
should be understood in light of his commitment to conceptual clarity and his aim 
to understand law in a general and descriptive sense. This first step can best be 
compared to reflective equilibrium in a narrow sense because my aim is to present 
the most coherent account of each legal theory. For Rawls, narrow reflective 
equilibrium is aimed at finding a balance between considered judgments and moral 
principles. In this first step, considered judgments are equivalent to the central 
claims of a legal theory, while the moral principles are equivalent to the 
methodological background in which these claims should be situated. 
 In the second step, I critically reconstruct three contrasting accounts of the 
intertwinement of legal orders based on the work of Hart, Dworkin, Llewellyn and 
Selznick. My aim in this step is to formulate three accounts of the intertwinement of 
legal orders by reaching a balance between the revision of positivist, normative and 
pragmatist legal theories and the continuation of their central claims that I have 
identified in the first step. International law and the intertwinement of legal orders 
are introduced as elements in a balance that is reached between these theories and 
the practice they aim to explain. I will use the three examples from positive law as 
concrete illustrations of the intertwinement of legal orders that these legal theories 
should address. This second step can best be seen as an intermediate position 
between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium. By incorporating international law 
and the intertwinement of legal orders a new balance is reached between theory and 
practice. In this step, I do not confront my positivist, interpretive and pragmatist 
accounts of the intertwinement of legal orders accounts with each other. Thus, wide 
reflective equilibrium is only partly reached. In this step, I will also identify the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of each account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders. I will evaluate how each account conceptualizes the reception and conflicts 
of legal norms, and the acceptance and contestation of authority of officials. When 
evaluating these accounts, I will use the three examples from positive law to 
illustrate their strengths and weaknesses. 
 The third step is to formulate a novel theoretical account of the notions of 
validity and authority. In this final step, I will formulate a more convincing account 
of the complex relations between legal orders by synthesizing the relative strengths 
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of my positivist, interpretive and pragmatist accounts of the intertwinement of legal 
orders that I have identified in the second step. I will argue that a synthesis may be 
reached by constructing a theoretical account of the notions of legal validity and 
legal authority in intertwined legal orders by confronting my positivist, interpretive 
and pragmatist accounts of the intertwinement of legal orders with each other. I will 
develop my account of legal validity by amending the common view that valid law 
can be identified on the basis of conventional criteria. My account of legal authority 
will be constructed on the basis of a critique of a content-independent understanding 
of authority.98 In this step, the three examples from positive law will be used to 
illustrate how my account of the notions of validity and authority can make better 
sense of the intertwinement of legal orders. My novel theoretical account of the 
notions of validity and authority signals a wide reflective equilibrium because 
competing accounts of the intertwinement of legal orders will be confronted with 
each other. The notion of middle-range theories may be used to illustrate my point. 
Robert Merton has used the notion of middle-range theories to criticize sociologists 
who construct macro-theories of society.99 In the third and final step, my aim is not 
to construct a general legal theory. Instead, I will construct a middle-range legal 
theory on legal validity and authority that holds for intertwined legal orders.  
 It should be emphasized that the use of the method of reflective equilibrium 
in this study excludes a number of potential candidates for critical reconstruction. 
Reflective equilibrium cannot be reached for theories of jurisprudence that consider 
the autonomy of legal orders a central characteristic of law. Legal theories that give 
center stage to the autonomy of legal orders are, for example, Hans Kelsen’s 
positivist legal theory and Niklas Luhmann’s socio-legal theory.100 Critical 
reconstruction of these legal theories based on the method of reflective equilibrium 
will lead to the rejection of the intertwinement of legal orders as such or to a theory 
that is reconstructed beyond recognition. This point may be illustrated with Hans 
                                                 
98 In this study, my aim is to understand the intertwinement of legal orders in European liberal 
democracies from the perspective of jurisprudence. Therefore, I will not explore the authority of officials 
from the normative point of view of legal and political philosophy. 
99 Merton 1968. 
100 Kelsen 1945; Luhmann 2004. 
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Kelsen’s positivist legal theory. Kelsen conceptualizes law in terms of a hierarchical 
system of legal norms that is constituted by a foundational norm, called the basic 
norm.101 From the perspective of Kelsen’s positivist legal theory, the relations 
between legal orders are regulated by this basic norm. However, the claim that law 
should be understood as a hierarchical system of legal norms that is constituted by 
a foundational norm is antithetical to the subject matter of this study. A positivist 
account of the intertwinement of legal orders based on Kelsen’s positivist legal 
theory would reduce the relations between legal orders to a system of hierarchy. 
However, if the notion of a foundational norm is abandoned, a central insight of 
Kelsen’s legal theory is lost. Given my aim to make sense of the intertwinement of 
legal orders, I will not critically reconstruct legal theories that regard the autonomy 
of legal orders a central characteristic of law. 
 
6 Outline of this study 
 
In the remaining chapters of this study, I will develop the following arguments. In 
chapter 2, I critically reconstruct a positivist account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders based on Hart’s positivist legal theory. I will argue that a central claim of 
Hart’s legal theory is that law should be understood in terms of a rule-governed 
practice. In my positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders, I will 
introduce the notion of a secondary rule of external recognition to explain why 
primary rules of other legal orders are applied. The strength of a positivist account 
of the relations between legal orders is that it is able to clarify why legal norms of 
other legal orders are applied and how conflicts between norms arise. However, 
how relations between officials of different legal orders exist remains 
underexplored. 
 In the next chapter, I will discuss Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory to 
critically reconstruct an interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders. 
Dworkin maintains that officials should apply legal norms in light of a consistent 
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and coherent justification that support these norms. In my interpretive account of 
the intertwinement of legal orders, I will introduce the notion of integrity as a 
constructive filter to explain how rules and principles of different legal orders can 
be made part of a consistent and coherent justification. On this view, officials of 
different legal orders may be part of a joint project in which they exercise their 
authority in light of their own understanding of integrity. The main strength of an 
interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders is its ability to clarify the 
interconnections and frictions between legal orders by how integrity is constructed. 
Nonetheless, the focus on integrity entails that persistent frictions between legal 
orders cannot be articulated. 
 In chapter 4, I explore Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories to critically 
reconstruct a pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders. Legal 
pragmatists understand law as a social practice. Based on Fuller’s typology of 
enacted and interactional law, I will maintain that legal norms emerge from the 
interactional expectations that are central to the social practice of law. In my 
pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders, I will argue that the 
relations between legal orders should be understood in terms of intersecting sub-
practices. On this view, legal norms and officials may be considered authoritative in 
light of the interactional expectations of citizens and officials. The main strength of 
a pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders is its contextual focus. 
Whether a legal norm or official of another legal order is considered authoritative 
depends on a contextual argument that takes into account the interactional 
expectations of citizens and officials. However, in my pragmatist account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders the interconnections between legal orders remain 
largely implicit. Only when frictions arise will the boundaries between different 
legal orders become clear. 
 At the outset of chapter 5, I sum up the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of my positivist, interpretive and pragmatist accounts of the intertwinement of legal 
orders. On the basis of these relative strengths and weaknesses I will identify two 
challenges that a novel account of the interconnections and frictions between legal 
orders should overcome. My critical reconstruction of the notions of validity and 
authority moves away from a positivist understanding of law, and presents a non-
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positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders that integrates Dworkin’s 
interpretive legal theory and Fuller and Selznick’s pragmatist legal theories. The 
starting point of my argument on validity is the common view that valid legal norms 
may be identified on the basis of generally shared criteria. I will locate this view in 
Hart’s positivist legal theory. However, I will argue that this view of legal validity 
is untenable. Instead, I will maintain that validity criteria are best understood as 
inherently contestable. My argument of authority will be formulated against the 
common view that authority is best understood as content-independent. This entails 
that the legitimate exercise of power by officials is not dependent on substantive 
reasoning. This view can be located in Hart’s positivist legal theory too, but will be 
discussed more extensively in relation to Joseph Raz’s conception of authority. I will 
defend the claim that a content-dependent account of authority can better explain 
the authority relations between officials of different legal orders. Lastly, I will sketch 
out possible lines of future research based on this study.
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Chapter 2 
H.L.A. Hart’s positivist legal theory: rules of 
external recognition 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
H.L.A. Hart’s positivist legal theory provides insights on diverse topics such as the 
relation between law and morality, coercion and sovereignty. The most 
comprehensive insights of Hart’s legal theory concern the nature of rules and the 
role of officials in identifying valid legal rules. In this chapter, I will critically 
reconstruct a positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders based on Hart’s 
positivist legal theory. Central to Hart’s legal theory is the idea that law should be 
understood in terms of primary and secondary rules. In each legal order primary 
rules exist that constitute obligations. Officials follow secondary rules to identify 
valid primary rules, adjudicate disputes and enact new primary rules. 
 This chapter starts out with situating Hart’s legal theory in the analytical 
tradition of jurisprudence (section 2). Legal philosophers in the analytical tradition 
maintain that a legal theory should clarify notions that are central to law and explain 
how these notions structure social life. Hart also argues that law is best understood 
in a general and descriptive sense. Central to his positivist legal theory is the idea 
that law should be understood in terms of rules and officials. In each legal order, 
primary rules are followed by citizens. Officials follow secondary rules of change, 
adjudication and recognition (section 3). Hart maintains that secondary rules are 
absent in the field of international law. However, I will argue that international law 
should be understood as a legal order because secondary rules of rules of change, 
adjudication and recognition can be identified (section 4). Moreover, some regimes 
of international law are best considered distinct legal orders that are embedded in 
the general legal order of international law. In my positivist account of account of 
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the intertwinement of legal orders, I will introduce the notion of a secondary rule of 
external recognition to explain why primary rules of other legal orders may be 
considered valid (section 5). Finally, I will address the strengths and weaknesses of 
my positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders. 
 
2 The analytical tradition: Hart’s positivist legal theory 
 
Hart’s legal theory is usually considered part of the analytical tradition in 
jurisprudence. Analytical legal philosophers maintain that a legal theory should 
elucidate notions such as rules and obligations and provide insight into how these 
notions structure social life.1 It is also important to highlight the general and 
descriptive aims of Hart’s theory. Hart maintains that a legal theory should account 
for all legal orders and should take the point of view of participants of legal practice.  
 In this section, I will explain why Hart’s positivist legal theory should be 
situated in the analytical tradition of jurisprudence. With his legal theory, Hart aims 
to provide conceptual clarity by elucidating notions that are central to law and by 
showing how these notions provide the normative structure of social relations. 
 
2.1 Conceptual clarity 
 
Hart’s aim as a legal philosopher is to provide conceptual clarity. Conceptual clarity 
can be reached by elucidating the meaning of legal notions and by reflecting on how 
these notions structure social life.2 Hart emphasizes that linguistic definitions alone 
do not bring us much closer to answers to philosophical questions related to law.3 
He maintains that legal philosophers should also show how these notions structure 
                                                 
1 Giudice 2015, 2-3. 
2 Hart 1994, 13-14. On the role of linguistic philosophy in Hart’s legal theory, see MacCormick 2008, 23-
29. 
3 Hart 1983b; 1983d; Hart 1994, 13-14. 
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social relations. Important in this respect is the performative nature of language.4 
The language we use is performative in nature in that legal notions create a web of 
meaning that regulate social relations. Or as Hart explains, ‘[h]ere, against the 
background of social conventions, words are used not as they most frequently are to 
describe the world, but to bring about certain changes.’5 Thus, conceptual clarity can be 
reached by elucidating the meaning of legal notions and by making clear how these 
notions structure social life. However, Hart’s commitment to conceptual clarity may 
be misunderstood in light of his claim that The Concept of Law can be understood ‘as 
an essay in descriptive sociology’.6 In my view, this does not entail that his legal 
theory is sociological in nature. Hart’s claim should be understood in light of his 
commitment to conceptual clarity. By reflecting on the linguistic use of legal notions, 
legal philosophers do not merely provide us with definitions. Clarifying legal 
notions also enables legal philosophers to explain how these notions regulate social 
relations.7 
Hart often makes distinctions in order to achieve conceptual clarity. This 
may be illustrated with an example on rule following.8 Hart maintains that there is 
a difference between being obliged and having an obligation.9 For example, one 
could argue that one is generally obliged to follow a rule. Hart compares this to a 
situation in which a person is held at gunpoint. Someone who is held at gunpoint 
will consider himself obliged to follow every instruction of the gunman. We 
intuitively do not consider such a situation a convincing example in which rules are 
being followed. Instead, we generally think that to have an obligation entails that 
one is following a rule.10 Following a rule implies that there is a standard for 
evaluation of individual behavior. Hart calls this standard the internal aspect of a 
                                                 
4 Hart 1983a, 4. 
5 Hart 1983d, 276. 
6 Hart 1994, vi. 
7 Hart 1994, 14. 
8 Hart 1994, vi. 
9 Hart 1994, 82. 
10 Hart 1994, 85. 
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rule.11 Having an obligation means that you follow a rule in light of its internal 
aspect, and not because you assume that non-compliance will be sanctioned, as, for 
example, in the gunman situation. Thus, conceptual clarity can be reached by 
elucidating the distinction between being obliged and having an obligation, and by 
showing how this distinction explains rule following in general.  
 
2.2 General and descriptive aims 
 
Hart’s positivist legal theory follows from its general and descriptive aims.12 A legal 
theory is general, in Hart’s view, if it holds for all legal orders. His legal theory does 
not only hold for the English legal order, but for any legal order where rules play a 
central role.13 Some legal philosophers in the analytical tradition of jurisprudence 
maintain that a legal theory should be universal in scope. On this view, a legal theory 
should hold for all legal orders, independent of time and place.14 For example, Scott 
Shapiro argues that a general legal theory also holds for extraterrestrial legal orders 
if the citizens in these legal orders, “aliens”, are able to follow legal rules.15 Following 
Giudice, I maintain that Hart’s positivist legal theory should not be considered 
universal in scope. Hart’s legal theory should be considered a constructive 
conceptual explanation of law that is dependent on time and place.16 This means that 
Hart identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for law of our time. For example, 
Hart maintains that a legal order exists when citizens generally follow primary rules 
and officials follow secondary rules.17 This is an important necessity claim because 
he argues that no secondary rules can be found in international law.  
                                                 
11 Hart 1994, 56. 
12 Hart 1994, 239-240. 
13 Hart 1994, 239. 
14 See, for example, Dickson 2001; Raz 2009a; Shapiro 2011; Gardner 2012. 
15 Shapiro 2011, 406-407. 
16 Giudice 2015, 67-89. 
17 Hart 1994, 116. 
43 
 
 Next to the general scope of his legal theory, Hart claims that law is best 
understood in descriptive terms, without recourse to moral arguments. This point 
can be illustrated with his distinction between the internal and external point of 
view. Hart introduces this distinction to clarify two different ways of understanding 
law.18 Hart claims that from an internal point of view law should be conceptualized 
in terms of rules because individuals who follow the law will justify their behavior 
in terms of following legal rules. Law can also be understood in terms of individual 
behavior, external to how individuals view themselves when they follow the law. 
For example, from an external point of view one can investigate how individuals 
generally stop before red traffic lights.19 Hart takes a moderately external point of 
view.20 He maintains that legal philosophers should describe law from the point of 
view of individuals who follow the law, but without morally justifying this 
perspective. 
 
3 Hart on legal rules and officials  
 
Hart presents his legal theory in The Concept of Law against the background of his 
critique of Austin’s positivist legal theory.21 Austin claims that law should be 
understood in terms of general commands that, if necessary, are enforced by 
authorities. In Austin’s positivist legal theory general commands issued by a 
sovereign authority should be followed in order to avoid sanctions. However, Hart 
maintains that law cannot be fully captured in terms of general commands because 
this does not properly explain why individuals actually follow the law. Instead, he 
highlights the role of legal rules and in particular, what he calls the ‘internal aspect 
                                                 
18 Hart 1994, 89-90. On the internal/external distinction in legal theories, see Tamanaha 1999, 175-183. 
19 Hart 1994, 90. 
20 See, for example, Van Hoecke and Ost 1993, 42. 
21 Austin 1995. Hart’s critique is presented in chapters II, III and IV of The Concept of Law (Hart 1994, 18-
78). 
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of rules’.22 Hart argues that we follow the law because inherent to legal rules are 
standards of behavior that we generally accept as authoritative. 
 Hart’s positivist legal theory will be explored in this section. I will first 
examine Hart’s distinction between primary and secondary rules. Primary rules 
create obligations. These primary rules can be changed, disputes concerning these 
rules can be adjudicated, and valid primary rules can be identified when secondary 
rules of change, adjudication and recognition are followed. I will then explore the 
role of officials in a legal order. If officials do not follow secondary rules a legal order 
ceases to exist. 
  
3.1 Primary and secondary rules 
 
Central to Hart’s positivist legal theory is the idea that law is best understood in 
terms of rules and officials. Hart contrasts habits with rules to explain why rules 
create obligations.23 Firstly, habits are common patterns of behavior that individuals 
can diverge from without disapproval, while noncompliance with rules will 
generally be condemned. Secondly, a majority of individuals will generally accept 
the standard of behavior inherent to a rule. Thirdly, and most importantly, Hart 
stresses the ‘internal aspect of rules’ or the standard inherent to a rule on the basis 
of which individuals are held accountable.24 Rules are not simply patterns of 
behavior, but rules also provide a standard on the basis of which individuals are 
held accountable for their behavior. Rules inform us what behavior is appropriate 
whereas habits do not entail such standards. To illustrate the difference between 
habits and rules Hart introduces an example concerning the game of chess.25 How 
players move their chess pieces on a chessboard could be viewed in terms of habits; 
patterns of behavior that players generally follow when playing a game of chess. 
However, this neglects the fact that rules inform players of how particular pieces 
                                                 
22 Hart 1994, 56. 
23 Hart 1994, 55-56. 
24 Hart 1994, 56. Hart uses the term standard in relation to the internal aspect of rules. 
25 Hart 1994, 56-57. 
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should be moved across the board. We should therefore speak of rules instead of 
habits in this context. The internal aspect of the rules concerning the game of chess 
inform players how pieces should be moved and players of the game will therefore 
condemn noncompliance with these rules. Hart emphasizes that individuals do not 
follow rules because they feel that they are obligated.26 Individuals have what Hart 
calls a ‘critical reflective attitude’ towards the rules they follow.27 This means that 
individuals follow rules because they accept the standards of behavior inherent to 
these rules. 
 Rules only give rise to obligations when there is considerable resistance to 
noncompliance.28 An example that Hart provides of rules that do not establish 
obligations are rules of etiquette. Individuals who do not follow rules of etiquette 
will generally not be met with considerable disapproval by others.29 Legal rules give 
rise to obligation because both citizens and officials will usually denounce 
noncompliance. Joseph Raz’s distinction between first-order and second-order 
reasons provides a helpful example of how rules may give rise to obligations.30 First-
order reasons are reasons for individuals to behave in a particular way. Second-
order reasons influence the decision-making process of individuals in which 
different first-order reasons are considered. These second-order reasons provide 
reasons to follow or disregard particular first-order reasons. Raz calls secondary 
reasons that require us to disregard particular first-order reasons exclusionary 
reasons.31 These second-order reasons exclude particular first-order reasons in the 
decision-making process of individuals. An example that Raz provides is of a soldier 
who receives an order from a higher-ranking officer.32 This order provides a first-
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order reason to act in a particular way, and it excludes other first-order reasons by 
way of second-order exclusionary reasons. Exclusionary reasons ensure that no 
other first-order reasons will compel the soldier to disobey the order given by the 
higher-ranking officer. Rules provide both first-order reasons and exclusionary 
reasons.33 Rules provide us with reasons to act in a particular way in the form of 
first-order reasons, and rules exclude first-order reasons by way of exclusionary 
reasons. Individuals who follow a rule will have a first-order reason to behave or 
refrain from behaving a certain way, and will have a second-order exclusionary 
reason to exclude other particular first-order reasons.  
 Rules play an important role in legal, social and moral orders. Hart explains 
the difference between legal and non-legal orders with the distinction between 
primary and secondary rules. In each legal order, primary and secondary rules exist. 
Primary rules should be seen as rules that constitute obligations.34 Primary rules 
encompass both private and public law obligations. Provisions in a contract that 
stipulate the obligations of parties or provisions that restrict government decisions 
are examples of primary rules. Hart identifies three types of secondary rules: rules 
of change, rules of adjudication and rules of recognition.35 Officials follow rules of 
change when they introduce new primary rules or when they amend or abolish 
existing primary rules. Citizens may also create primary rules. For example, citizens 
follow secondary rules of change when they enter into a contract. Officials settle 
disputes over contested non-compliance of primary rules by following rules of 
adjudication. When judges adjudicate criminal cases or when judges determine 
whether a party has breached a contract, rules of adjudication are being followed. 
Lastly, officials follow rules of recognition when they identify valid primary legal 
rules. 
 Central to a legal order is the interdependence of primary and secondary 
rules, or what Hart’s calls ‘the union of primary and secondary rules.’36 Legal rules 
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are amended with secondary rules of change, enforced with secondary rules of 
adjudication and identified with secondary rules of recognition. This union of 
primary and secondary rules establishes a legal order. Hart illustrates this union of 
primary and secondary rules by explaining how secondary rules solve challenges in 
rule-governed societies or ‘primitive communities’ that do not have rules of change, 
adjudication and recognition.37 Hart argues that three deficiencies are overcome 
with secondary rules. Firstly, rules of recognition ensure that there is clarity under 
which conditions primary rules are valid. Without rules of recognition, citizens and 
officials cannot be fully certain whether a rule is legally valid.38 Secondly, rules of 
change enable citizens and officials to enact new rules or to amend existing ones. 
Primary rules only change gradually if these secondary rules do not exist.39 Thirdly, 
rules of adjudication ensure that disputes are resolved in a decisive manner.40 When 
these challenges are overcome, a legal order is established in which primary and 
secondary rules form a union: ‘[t]he introduction of the remedy for each defect 
might, in itself, be considered a step from the pre-legal into the legal world; since 
each remedy brings with it many elements that permeate law: certainly all three 
remedies together are enough to convert the regime of primary rules into what is 
indisputably a legal system.41 
 
3.2 Officials 
 
Next to the distinction between primary and secondary rules, Hart’s positivist legal 
theory centers on the role of officials in upholding the validity of secondary rules. 
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Here it is important to explore the two necessary conditions of a legal order.42 The 
first condition is that a majority of citizens needs to follow the primary rules of a 
legal order. Hart claims that citizens will generally take an internal point of view 
towards primary rules. Citizens may have other motives for following primary 
rules. For example, strict enforcement may encourage citizens to follow rules. Thus, 
citizens do not necessarily need to take an internal point of view towards primary 
rules for a legal order to exist. The second condition for the existence of a legal order 
is that officials need to accept the rules of change, adjudication and recognition of a 
legal order. Officials need to take an internal point of view to these secondary rules. 
This means that officials need to understand secondary rules as standards that 
should be followed. 
 Officials are those individuals and organizations who follow the secondary 
rules of a legal order and accept them as general standards.43 Disputes can be 
resolved and if necessary executed by officials by following rules of adjudication. 
Primary rules are enacted, amended or abolished by officials when rules of change 
are followed. Judges follow rules of change when they cannot reach a decision on 
the basis of existing primary rules. On Hart’s view, judges have discretion in these 
cases, and are permitted to make new primary rules with their decisions.44 Officials 
follow rules of recognition when they identify valid primary rules based on 
generally accepted validity criteria. Based on these criteria officials are able to 
identify valid primary rules.45 In every legal order, a rule of recognition exists that 
Hart describes as supreme and ultimate. This rule of recognition is supreme in that 
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no other rules are able to overrule the criteria of validity of this secondary rule.46 This 
rule of recognition is ultimate in that the validity of this secondary rule does not 
follow from any other rule in a legal order.47 Officials follow the rule of recognition 
because they accept it as an ultimate and supreme standard on the basis of which 
valid primary rules can be identified.  
 Secondary rules of change, adjudication and recognition may be codified. 
For example, a rule of recognition could be laid down in a constitution or a statute.48 
Although the supreme and ultimate rule of recognition of a legal order can be 
codified, the validity of this secondary rule is dependent on the general acceptance 
of officials of its validity criteria. Hart emphasizes this point by describing the rule 
of recognition in terms of a convention. On Hart’s view, the rule of recognition is 
followed because the general acceptance of the validity criteria is a reason for 
officials to follow this secondary rule. Hart explains this point in the postscript of 
The Concept of Law: ‘[r]ules are conventional social practices if the general conformity 
of a group to them is part of the reasons which its individual members have for the 
acceptance’.49 This underlines that in a legal order officials need to accept the validity 
criteria that follow from the rule of recognition. 
 It is important to stress the importance of officials in upholding a legal order 
by following its secondary rules, and in particular, the rule of recognition. From the 
perspective of Hart’s legal theory, officials must accept the criteria of validity of the 
rule of recognition. If officials do not follow the rule of recognition, a legal order 
collapses. The stringent relation between the rule of recognition and officials can be 
illustrated with Hart’s argument on the validity of laws and regulations under the 
Nazi regime.50 From the perspective of Hart’s positivist legal theory, primary rules 
can be valid under repressive conditions, such as, for example, under the Nazi 
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regime, as long as officials accept the rule of recognition. This demonstrates the 
important role of officials in upholding a legal order, next to citizens who generally 
need to follow primary rules. 
 
4 International law as a legal order 
 
In the last chapter of The Concept of Law, Hart explores international law in light of 
the argument made in the previous chapters of the book that law should generally 
be understood in terms of rules and officials. In this last chapter, Hart poses the 
question whether secondary rules can be found in international law. He maintains 
that international law lacks secondary rules: ‘[i]t is indeed arguable, as we shall 
show, that international law not only lacks the secondary rules of change and 
adjudication which provide for the legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of 
recognition specifying ‘sources’ of law and providing general criteria for the 
identification of its rules.’51 
  In this section, I will argue that secondary rules of change, adjudication and 
recognition can be found in international law. This entails that international law 
should be considered a legal order. Moreover, I will maintain that some regimes of 
international law, such as, for example, EU law and the law of the Council of Europe, 
are best understood as legal orders embedded in general international law. In these 
regimes, rules of recognition exist that are distinct from the secondary rules of 
recognition of general international law. Moreover, in some of these regimes distinct 
secondary rules of change and adjudication exist. In these regimes, distinct 
secondary rules are followed, next to the rules of change, adjudication and 
recognition of general international law. Therefore, a number of international legal 
orders can be identified that are embedded in the legal order of general international 
law. 
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4.1 International law and secondary rules 
 
Hart maintains that there are two general uncertainties that trouble lawyers in 
accepting international law as law.52 Firstly, lawyers often do not consider 
international law to be law because there is no enforcement of international legal 
rules. This assumes that law can be understood in terms of general commands that 
are enforced by authorities. Hart points out that his legal theory demonstrates that 
such a line of reasoning is unconvincing. We generally understand law not in terms 
of general commands that are enforced, but in terms of rules perceived from an 
internal point of view.53 He also considers that some rules of international law might 
secure essential basic needs of individuals, which require general enforcement. Hart 
seems to allude here to an argument he has made on rules that are indispensable for 
any legal order to exist.54 Hart calls these rules the minimum content of natural law.55 
For example, constraints on the use of violence could be seen as part of the minimum 
content of natural law of any legal order.56 However, Hart explains that in 
international law by and large peace between states has existed, therefore not 
requiring enforcement of such rules. He maintains that international law is generally 
perceived from an internal point of view, meaning that rules of international law are 
followed in light of their inherent standards of behavior.57 This entails that 
international law fulfills the first necessary condition of a legal order. On this view, 
primary rules of international law are generally followed. Moreover, primary rules 
of international law are generally understood from an internal point of view. 
 Hart points out that a second uncertainty that troubles lawyers is the 
supposed conflictual nature of state sovereignty and international law. States are 
considered sovereign, but also under the obligation to follow rules of international 
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law. State sovereignty may thus seem constrained in some respects.58 Hart maintains 
that this does not provide a convincing line of reasoning. International law does not 
limit the sovereignty of states. Instead, state sovereignty is constructed through 
international law.59 The view that states have unrestricted sovereignty is 
unconvincing because this view disregards the rule governed character of 
international law. If one assumes that international law originates from unrestricted 
state sovereignty, no convincing argument can be given that explains how legal 
obligations emerge in international law. For example, this view begs the question 
how legal obligations come into being when states conclude a treaty.60 Or as Hart 
explains: ‘in order that words, spoken or written, should in certain circumstances 
function as a promise, agreement, or treaty, and so give rise to obligations and confer 
rights which others may claim, rules must already exist providing that a state is 
bound to do whatever it undertakes by appropriate words to do.’61 Hart also notes 
that not all rules of international law can be considered to follow from consent of 
sovereign states.62 
 Although these two uncertainties are unwarranted, Hart claims that 
international law should be considered a ‘regime of primary rules’ which is very 
similar to a domestic legal order in content, but not in form.63 International law is 
different in form to domestic law because no international secondary rules of 
change, adjudication and recognition exist. Hart argues that rules of change are 
absent because there is no legislative official that enacts or amends primary rules.64 
Secondary rules of adjudication are also not part of international law. For example, 
he does not consider the International Court of Justice an authoritative official in 
settling disputes because the Court does not have compulsory jurisdiction.65 Finally, 
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Hart maintains that no rule of recognition is generally followed in international 
law.66 Surprisingly, he argues that a rule of recognition does not need to be followed 
for primary rules to be considered authoritative.67 Nevertheless, he acknowledges 
that there is a possibility that a rule of recognition could develop in international 
law.68 
 I agree with Hart that primary rules of international law can also be 
considered binding in the absence of a rule of recognition. However, he misses the 
point here, in my view. In his legal theory, the existence of a rule of recognition, next 
to secondary rules of change and adjudication, is a necessary condition of a legal 
order. Thus, the absence of a rule of recognition implies that international law does 
not constitute a legal order. International law may be considered a legal order if 
secondary rules could be identified. Nonetheless, Hart’s claim that secondary rules 
are absent in international law entails that it does not constitute a legal order. One 
could object to my argument and maintain that Hart never explicitly denied that 
international law is law. However, based on this line of reasoning Hart’s claim that 
legal orders are constituted by primary and secondary rules collapses. He 
distinguishes between these types of rules to explain the difference between legal 
and non-legal orders. If the existence of secondary rules is not a necessary condition 
of a legal order all rule-governed practices are law. Rules of international law would 
be considered law, irrespective of whether secondary rules of change, adjudication 
and recognition exist beyond domestic legal orders. 
 Hart’s remark in 1961 that secondary rules of international law may develop 
in the future has caught up with reality. In my view, secondary rules of change, 
adjudication and recognition can be identified in the field of international law today. 
Consider first secondary rules of change. Payandeh has pointed out that secondary 
rules of change are generally followed when primary rules of international law are 
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established.69 For example, the growing importance of international organizations, 
such as the United Nations, illustrates that these institutions are considered 
authoritative in enacting new rules of international law.70 Moreover, Waldron has 
pointed out that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has codified many 
secondary rules of change of international law.71 Secondary rules of adjudication can 
also be observed in the field of international law. International courts and tribunals, 
such as, for example, the International Court of Justice, adjudicate disputes over 
primary rules between states.72 Hart’s claim that the International Court of Justice 
cannot be considered an official because it does not have compulsory jurisdiction, 
does not follow from his previous argument on secondary rules of adjudication. 
Compulsory jurisdiction is not a necessary condition for the existence of a secondary 
rule of adjudication.73 Finally, a rule of recognition exists in international law that is 
supreme and ultimate. Officials identify primary rules of international law by 
following a rule of recognition. This can be illustrated with article 38(1) of the ICJ 
statute. Payanedeh has pointed out that article 38(1) of the ICJ statute stipulates what 
valid sources of international law are.74 Treaties, custom and general principles are 
considered valid sources of international law. Article 38(1) of the ICJ statute brings 
to light that a general agreement exists on the validity criteria of primary rules of 
international law. This means that generally accepted criteria are followed when 
valid primary rules of international law are identified.75 
 Critics could object to my claim that a rule of recognition exists in 
international law. Disagreement concerning the validity of primary rules of 
international law illustrates that there is no generally followed rule of recognition.76 
However, disagreement on the validity of primary rules of international law does 
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not necessarily imply that no rule of recognition exists. It is important to bear in 
mind two distinctions. Firstly, a distinction should be made between the content of 
the rule of recognition and the application of this secondary rule.77 The rule of 
recognition in international law provides validity criteria that officials follow when 
they identify valid primary rules. Officials and citizens may disagree whether the 
rule of recognition has been correctly applied in relation to a primary rule or set of 
primary rules. Disagreement on the application of the rule of recognition does not 
necessarily entail that the rule of recognition is not generally accepted by officials. 
Secondly, a distinction should be made between cases that concern the core meaning 
of the rule of recognition and penumbra cases.78 We generally agree on the core 
meaning of a rule, but we will inevitably encounter cases that challenge our common 
understanding of the meaning of a rule. Hart calls these penumbra cases. Although 
we may disagree on the meaning of the rule of recognition in a penumbra case, we 
may still follow this secondary rule because we generally agree on its core meaning. 
 The importance of the distinctions between the content and application of 
the rule of recognition, and between core and penumbra cases can be illustrated with 
the validity of customary international law. Rules of customary international law are 
understood to be valid when they fulfill two criteria: a consistent state practice and 
a general conviction. In the field of international law there has been an ongoing 
debate on how these two criteria should be applied.79 Although we may disagree on 
the meaning of the validity criteria of rules of customary international law in 
penumbra cases, the notions of state practice and general conviction have a core 
meaning that enables us to determine the validity of a rule of customary law. If we 
would identify rules of customary international law based on disparate and 
conflicting validity criteria no core cases would exist. Moreover, it should be stressed 
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that disagreement on the application of the rule of recognition is also common in 
domestic legal orders.80 In domestic legal orders, officials and citizens may disagree 
whether the validity criteria of the rule of recognition are fulfilled, and thus whether 
a particular primary rule should be considered valid. Disagreement concerning the 
application of the rule of recognition may therefore arise in both international law 
and domestic legal orders. 
 
4.2 From international law to international legal orders 
 
Hart’s account of international law is unpersuasive now because secondary rules of 
change, adjudication and recognition can be identified beyond domestic legal 
orders. Since the publication of The Concept of Law in 1961, international legal practice 
has changed in ways that Hart could probably not have foreseen.81 It should be 
stressed that today’s international legal practice challenges Hart’s account of 
international law in another respect. The fragmentation of international law in the 
second half of the 20th century into different and specialized legal regimes and 
institutions challenges the idea that international law is a unified field.82 Although 
Hart did not consider international law a legal order, his approach assumes it should 
be considered a single coherent field. Hart’s approach to international law should be 
reconsidered in light of the fragmentation of this field into different regimes. I 
maintain that some regimes of international law are best understood as legal orders 
that are embedded in general international law. For example, EU law and the law of 
the Council of Europe should be considered international legal orders.83 These legal 
orders have their own rules of recognition, and in some respects their own rules of 
change and adjudication. However, not all secondary rules in these legal orders are 
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distinct from the secondary rules of general international law. Thus, these regimes 
are best seen as distinct legal orders, but embedded in the legal order of general 
international law.84 
 The most important reason why some regimes of international law should 
be understood as international legal orders is that they have their own rule of 
recognition. In these regimes, officials identify some valid primary rules on the basis 
of secondary rules of recognition that only hold for a particular regime. For example, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, may review the validity of secondary 
EU legislation, such as, for example, directives or regulations, based validity criteria 
that hold for the EU.85 These validity criteria do not hold for other regimes of 
international law. Another reason why some regimes of international law are best 
understood as international legal orders is that officials increasingly follow their 
own secondary rules of adjudication or change. For example, the European Court of 
Human Rights has its own distinct approach to settling disputes.86 And the legal 
order of the European Union contains its own secondary rules of change that 
stipulate how secondary EU legislation should be enacted by EU institutions.87 Thus, 
some regimes of international law have their own rules of recognition, change and 
adjudication. 
Two examples help to illustrate my argument that regimes of international 
law that contain their own secondary rules are embedded in the legal order of 
general international law. My first example concerns EU law.88 EU law is contained 
in primary and secondary legislation. The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union form the primary legislation of the 
European Union. These foundational treaties have come into being on the basis of 
the rules of change of general international law.89 Member states have signed and 
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ratified treaties to adopt and amend the foundational treaties of the European Union. 
This illustrates that rules of change of general international law are followed to enact 
and amend the primary legislation of the European Union. The secondary legislation 
of the European union encompasses the legal norms enacted on the basis of primary 
EU legislation. For example, EU institutions may adopt directives or regulations to 
exercise its competences as laid down in the foundational treaties.90 When secondary 
legislation of the European Union is adopted, rules of change are followed that only 
hold for the EU legal order. EU institutions follow these rules of change to enact or 
amend secondary legislation. This illustrates that rules of change are also followed 
that are distinct from the rules of change of general international law. However, 
when states conclude a treaty, they do not follow these rules of change. Instead, 
states follow rules of change of general international law to conclude a treaty. 
Therefore, EU law is best considered a legal order that is embedded in the legal order 
of general international law. 
 My second example concerns the law of the Council of Europe. In the legal 
order of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights follows 
distinct secondary rules of adjudication and recognition when disputes concerning 
the European Convention on Human Rights are resolved.91 The Strasbourg Court 
has its own approach to the interpretation and application of the rights enshrined in 
the Convention that cannot be understood solely on the basis of the rules of 
interpretation of general international law. These rules of interpretation can be 
found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Or as Letsas 
explains: ‘’[c]lose as its methods are to the general rule of purposive interpretation 
under art 31 VCLT, the European Court has created its own labels for the 
interpretative techniques that it uses such as ‘living-instrument’, ‘practical and 
eﬀective rights’, ‘autonomous concepts’ etc.’92 The European Court of Human Rights 
considers the Convention a living instrument. This entails that the Convention rights 
cannot be understood based on the meaning commonly given to human rights 
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norms at the time the Convention was adopted. Human rights enshrined in the 
European Convention on Human Rights should be interpreted in light of current 
and common standards that may differ from the human right standards in the 
signatory states.93 In its approach, the European Court of Human Rights stresses that 
obligations under the Convention should be understood in light of a growing 
societal consensus on issues of principle.94 The living instrument approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights also signals the existence of a distinct rule of 
recognition. The Strasbourg Court does not identify valid human rights norms solely 
on the basis of the Convention. The European Court of Human Rights considers 
what human rights follow from the Convention in light of a growing societal 
consensus. However, whether the European Convention on Human Rights should 
be considered valid as such, depends on the rules of recognition of general 
international law. This illustrates that the legal order of the Council of Europe is also 
embedded in the legal order of general international law.  
 
5 A positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders 
 
In this section, I will critically reconstruct a positivist account of the intertwinement 
of legal orders based on Hart’s legal theory. Although Hart has made some 
suggestions why officials apply valid primary rules of other legal orders, I will argue 
that these suggestions fail to fully explain the complex relations between legal 
orders. In my positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders, I will 
introduce the notion of a rule of external recognition in order to make sense of the 
intertwinement of legal orders. Rules of external recognition entail validity criteria 
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that officials follow when they determine whether a primary rule of another legal 
order should be applied. Finally, I will assess the strengths and weaknesses of my 
positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders. I will evaluate how the 
notion of a rule of external recognition can explain how norms are incorporated in a 
legal order and how norm conflicts are resolved, and whether this notion can clarify 
the relations between officials of different legal orders. 
 
5.1 Rules of external recognition 
 
Central to Hart’s positivist legal theory is the idea that each legal order has its own 
secondary rules of change, adjudication and recognition. Valid primary rules are 
recognized in light of a supreme and ultimate rule of recognition. The recognition of 
a valid primary rule is dependent on a rule-governed practice of a legal order. This 
means that a rule of recognition cannot establish validity criteria of primary rules of 
other legal orders. For example, the validity of a primary rule in an international 
legal order is not dependent on a rule of recognition of another international legal 
order or a domestic legal order. This also holds for primary rules in domestic legal 
orders. The validity of a primary rule in a domestic legal order is not dependent on 
a rule of recognition in any other domestic or international legal order.  
 Although secondary rules of change, adjudication and recognition are tied 
to a legal order, this does not necessarily hold for primary rules. A primary rule may 
be considered valid in multiple legal orders. Hart emphasizes this point in his 
discussion of Hans Kelsen’s work on the relation between domestic and 
international law.95 In this discussion, Hart criticizes Kelsen’s idea of a monist legal 
system.96 He maintains that Kelsen’s idea of a monist legal system is unconvincing 
because it does not acknowledge that each legal order has its own rule of recognition 
that determines the validity of primary rules in that legal order. On Hart’s view, the 
validity of domestic law does not follow from international law, nor is the validity 
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of international law determined by domestic law. To illustrate his point, Hart 
introduces an example concerning the validity of Soviet laws in the English legal 
order.97 Soviet laws are valid because Soviet officials recognize these laws as valid. 
English law may stipulate that under certain conditions Soviet laws should be 
considered valid in the English legal order. However, this does not mean that Soviet 
laws are valid in the Soviet legal order because English rules stipulate this. Whether 
Soviet laws should be considered valid in the English legal order does not depend 
on the rule of recognition of the Soviet legal order. English officials determine 
whether Soviet laws should be applied in the English legal order. English rules may, 
for example, purport to validate primary rules of other legal orders, such as, for 
example, Soviet laws, in the English legal order.98  
In his exchange with Kelsen, Hart provides some suggestions that could 
further clarify why officials recognize valid primary rules of other legal orders as 
valid. However, he also admits that these ideas should be further developed.99 Hart’s 
first suggestion is to distinguish between the recognition and the application of 
primary rules of other legal orders.100 On this view, officials recognize the validity of 
primary rules of other legal orders, but they do not actually apply these rules. The 
recognition of rules of other legal orders by officials entails that identical primary 
rules are created. Officials do not apply primary rules of other legal orders. Instead, 
they apply primary rules that are identical to rules of other legal orders. For example, 
when English officials consider Soviet laws valid in their legal order, they apply 
rules that are identical to those in the Soviet legal order.101 By recognizing the 
validity of Soviet laws in the English legal order, English primary rules are created 
that are identical to those in the Soviet legal order. The distinction between the 
recognition and application of primary rules may also be applied to the reception of 
the European Convention on Human Rights in domestic legal orders. On this view, 
when officials in domestic legal orders apply the Convention rights, they apply 
                                                 
97 Hart 1983f, 319; 335-336; 341. 
98 Hart speaks of ‘validate purport’. See Hart 1983f, 317ff. 
99 Hart 1983f, 342. 
100 Hart 1983f, 340-341. 
101 Hart 1983f, 341. 
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primary rules that are identical to the rights enshrined in the Convention. 
Recognition in the domestic legal order entails the creation of human rights norms 
that are identical to the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, primary 
rules of other legal orders are not applied directly, but require prior recognition.  
 By distinguishing between recognition and application, Hart incorrectly 
assumes a dualist framework for all legal orders. By recognizing the validity of 
primary rules of other legal orders, new rules are created that are clones or 
duplicates in content. Hart ignores that the creation of a new primary rule depends 
on the secondary rules of change in a legal order. Some legal orders can be 
characterized as relatively monist, meaning that primary rules of other legal orders 
do not need to be duplicated before they can be applied. Some legal orders can be 
characterized as relatively dualist, meaning that primary rules of other legal orders 
need to be duplicated before these rules can be applied. Hart assumes that all 
primary rules of other legal orders need to be duplicated. However, whether a 
primary rule of another legal order should be duplicated depends on secondary 
rules of change and not on recognition by officials as such. Moreover, Hart’s 
distinction between the recognition and application of primary rules of other legal 
orders does not provide any clarification why officials actually apply these rules.102 
 Hart’s second suggestion is to distinguish between original and derivative 
recognition.103 Original recognition concerns the validity criteria that officials follow 
within a particular legal order when identifying valid primary rules. Derivative 
recognition entails that some primary rules are valid in light of the fact that officials 
in another legal order consider these primary rules valid. On Hart´s view, rules of 
private international law illustrate derivative forms of recognition.104 Rules of 
private international law regulate, for example, when a contract should be 
considered valid in another legal order. When Dutch officials recognize the validity 
of a contract that has been signed in another legal order, this affirmation by Dutch 
officials is derivative of the recognition by other officials. Whether a foreign contract 
                                                 
102 Hart acknowledges this point. See Hart 1983f, 341. 
103 Hart 1983f, 341-342. 
104 Hart 1983f, 342. 
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is legally valid in the Dutch legal order is dependent on another secondary rule of 
recognition, for example one followed by officials in the German or French legal 
order. A similar example can be given on EU law. In the legal order of EU law, 
secondary EU legislation is considered valid on the basis of validity criteria that are 
followed in the EU legal order. Officials may consider EU law valid in the domestic 
legal order because these legal norms are valid in the legal order of the European 
Union. On this view, the validity of EU law in the domestic legal orders is derivative 
of the rule of recognition in the legal order of the European Union. Thus, the 
distinction between original and derivative recognition brings to light that there are 
two sources of legal validity in a legal order. A primary rule may be considered valid 
in light of the rule of recognition internal to a legal order or the validity of a primary 
rule is derivative of a rule of recognition in another legal order. 
 Although Hart’s second suggestion explains the difference between 
identifying valid primary rules internal to a legal order and identifying valid 
primary rules of other legal orders, no clear distinction between original and 
derivative recognition can be made. Derivative forms of recognition are not solely 
dependent on a rule of recognition in another legal order. Take, for example, the 
validity of a foreign contract in a legal order. The validity of a foreign contract in the 
Dutch legal order is not merely derivative of its validity in another legal order. Its 
validity also depends on the criteria followed by Dutch officials. Dutch officials can 
decline to declare a foreign contract valid, or may refuse to enforce a foreign contract 
based on validity criteria that are part the Dutch legal order. This illustrates that 
derivative forms of recognition also depend on rules of recognition internal to a legal 
order. Thus, the distinction between original and derivative recognition is a matter 
of degree. 
 Hart’s two suggestions do not provide an adequate account of why officials 
recognize primary rules of other legal orders as valid. However, a positivist account 
of the intertwinement of legal orders can be critically constructed based on his legal 
theory. When considered in light of the central claim that the recognition of valid 
primary rules is best understood in terms of a rule-governed practice internal to a 
legal order, I suggest that a new type of secondary rule should be introduced: a rule 
of external recognition. A legal order includes two types of rules of recognition. 
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Officials follow a rule of recognition when they identify primary rules internal to 
their legal order, and they follow a rule of external recognition when they identify 
valid primary rules of other legal orders. Rules of external recognition may be 
codified in legislation or a constitution. However, like other rules of recognition, 
their validity depends on the general acceptance of officials in practice. These two 
types of rules of recognition form the supreme and ultimate rule of recognition of a 
legal order. There is also an important difference between rules of internal and 
external recognition. Rules of external recognition are not a necessary condition for 
the existence of a legal order. Legal orders may exist without rules of external 
recognition because officials may have never considered whether a primary rule of 
another legal order should be considered valid. However, rules of external 
recognition are a necessary element of a positivist account of the intertwinement of 
legal orders.105 In the absence of this notion it is unclear from a positivist perspective 
why officials recognize primary rules of other legal orders as valid.106 
 Critics may argue that the notion of a rule of external recognition overlooks 
the fact that officials in one legal order may claim to determine the validity of 
primary rules in other legal orders. This would imply that the validity of a primary 
rule is not solely dependent on a rule of external recognition. For example, based on 
the doctrine of supremacy it could be argued that the validity of EU law in domestic 
legal orders is not solely dependent on the recognition by officials in the domestic 
legal orders. Instead, EU officials claim to determine the validity of EU law. 
However, when considered in light of Hart’s central claim that secondary rules are 
tied to a legal order, this line of reasoning is unpersuasive. If EU officials determine 
the validity of EU law in the legal orders of the domestic states this would imply 
that a secondary rule of the EU legal order validates primary rules in other legal 
orders. In my view, Hart would object to this line of reasoning because it assumes 
                                                 
105 See also Michaels 2017, 113. 
106 A related notion of linkage rules can be found in Von Daniels 2010. However, Von Daniels fails to take 
into account the importance of rules in Hart’s positivist legal theory. Linkage rules do not explain why 
officials apply rules of other legal orders from an internal point of view: ‘[i]n contrast to primary and 
secondary rules and their interpretation, linkage rules are not accessible to the participants of a legal 
system from an internal point of view, but only from a descriptive view.’ See Von Daniels 2010, 163. 
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that valid primary rules can be identified on the basis of rules of recognition of 
another legal order. Hart´s example on Soviet laws highlights that each legal order 
has a rule of recognition that determines the validity of primary rules, even if these 
primary rules originate from another legal order. Although it may be the case that 
EU officials may claim to determine the validity of EU law in the legal orders of the 
member states, the recognition of EU law in domestic legal orders is ultimately 
dependent on secondary rules in the domestic legal orders. The Solange, Maastricht, 
and Lisbon decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court illustrate how 
officials determine the conditions of validity of EU law in the German legal order.107 
If these validity criteria are not met, EU law will not be considered valid by German 
officials. For example, the rule of external recognition in the Lisbon decision dictates 
that primary rules of EU law can only be considered valid insofar these rules do not 
violate the constitutional identity of the German constitution. Thus, valid primary 
rules are identified on the basis of a rule of recognition internal to a legal order. 
 The example on EU law can also be read in a different way. On this view, an 
official in an EU member state may be motivated to give effect to EU law because he 
considers himself part of a shared practice in which domestic and EU officials give 
effect to EU law. Coleman argues, for example, that recognition can be understood 
as a ‘shared cooperative activity.’108 He maintains that officials identify valid 
primary rules by following a rule of recognition that is embedded in a practice of 
shared intentions or a collective attitude.109 If recognition is understood in terms of 
a shared cooperative activity, officials of different legal orders may inform each 
other insofar their intentions partly overlap or intersect. Officials may have good 
reasons to apply primary rules of other legal orders when their practice of 
recognition intersects with other legal orders. For example, officials in a domestic 
legal order may consider that their practice of recognition partly intersects with the 
                                                 
107 BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) (Solange I); 73, 339 (1986) (Solange II); 102, 147 (2000) (Bananas); 89, 155 (1993) 
(Maastricht); 123, 267 (2009) (Lisbon). 
108 Coleman 2001, 96. Coleman relies on Michael Bratman’s notion of shared cooperative activities. See, 
for example, Bratman 1992. 
109 Coleman 2001, 96-97. 
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practice of recognition of EU officials. This would entail that officials of both legal 
orders partly share a collective attitude when applying EU law.  
 However, when considered in light of Hart´s legal theory, officials in 
domestic legal orders ultimately follow rules of recognition that are tied to a legal 
order when identifying valid primary rules of EU law. Although a practice of 
recognition can be understood in light of a collective attitude of officials, this practice 
revolves around following secondary rules to identify valid primary rules. Valid law 
cannot be identified on the basis of shared intentions. The rules of recognition that 
are followed in a shared cooperative activity govern how valid primary rules should 
be identified. Or as Coleman explains the nature of a shared cooperative activity 
(SCA): ‘the sense in which the SCA is conventional is plain. Its existence does not 
depend on the arguments offered on its behalf, but rather on its being practiced−on 
the fact that individuals display the attitudes constitutive of shared intentions.’110 
This means that a practice of recognition exists when rules are followed to identify 
valid legal rules. Officials of different legal orders may inform each other in light of 
a shared cooperative activity, but ultimately follow rules of external recognition to 
determine whether a primary rule of another legal order should be considered valid. 
 It should be noted that Ralf Michaels also makes a distinction between rules 
of internal and external recognition.111 Although influenced by Hart’s positivist legal 
theory, Michaels’ account of rules of external recognition is substantively informed 
by systems theory:  
 The emerging concept of laws is a positivist one in a strong sense. It 
 assumes that the definition and the creation of law are themselves 
 operations by the legal system. In this sense, the concept of law is an 
 autopoietic one. However, in emphasizing that legal systems mutually 
 constitute each other, the concept also has an allopoietic aspect to it. While 
 the law at large is autopoietic, individual legal systems are not; they 
 mutually constitute each other through mutual recognition.112  
                                                 
110 Coleman 2001, 158. 
111 Michaels 2017. 
112 Michaels 2017, 91. 
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On this view, rules of external recognition explain why an order should be 
considered a legal order. A view Michaels actually ascribes to Hart.113 However, this 
mischaracterizes Hart’s legal theory, in my view. In Hart’s legal theory, the existence 
of a legal order does not depend on the recognition by officials in other legal orders. 
Although the validity of some primary rules is derivate of their validity in another 
legal order, the mutual recognition of legal orders is not a necessary condition of 
their existence. Thus, my positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders 
departs from Michaels’ account of rules of external recognition in an important 
respect. Legal orders are not mutually constitutive. A legal order exists when 
citizens follow primary rules and officials follow secondary rules.  
 
5.2 The strengths and weaknesses of a positivist account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders 
 
Secondary rules of external recognition explain why legal norms are incorporated in 
a legal order. Officials identify valid primary rules of other legal orders by following 
secondary rules of external recognition. Officials accept, from an internal point of 
view, the criteria inherent to secondary rules of external recognition to determine 
the validity of a primary rule. It is important to stress that the validity of primary 
rules of other legal orders is dependent on these criteria. For example, in domestic 
legal orders, rules of external recognition determine under which conditions 
primary rules of international law should be incorporated. Whether treaty 
provisions are valid in the Dutch legal order depends on the validity criteria inherent 
to the Dutch secondary rules of external recognition that officials follow. Rules of 
external recognition highlight that the validity of primary rules ultimately rests on 
recognition in a particular legal order. Although we may consider primary rules of 
other legal orders to be directly applicable or to have direct effect, their validity 
                                                 
113 ‘recognition is constitutive for the identity of law as law. This resembles the idea, supported by Hart 
and attacked by Griffiths, that a normative order becomes law only once it is (externally) recognized.’ 
Michaels 2017, 105. 
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depends on the criteria inherent to rules of external recognition of a particular legal 
order. 
 Conflicts between legal norms that arise following incorporation can be 
resolved on the basis of the rule of recognition. Each legal order has a rule of 
recognition that is supreme and ultimate in that no other rules can overrule or justify 
its validity. Rules of internal and external recognition follow from the supreme and 
ultimate rule of recognition of a legal order. Norm conflicts may be resolved on the 
basis of this supreme and ultimate rule of recognition.114 For example, the rule of 
recognition may stipulate how conflicts between domestic and international law 
should be resolved. Thus, conflicts between primary rules in a particular legal order 
can be resolved in light of the validity criteria that follow from the supreme and 
ultimate rule of recognition. 
Rules of recognition cannot be used to resolve conflicts between primary 
rules that are part of different legal orders. For example, a citizen may feel compelled 
to follow norms from different legal orders that apply simultaneously, such as, a 
domestic and international legal norm. A conflict would arise if a citizen would 
follow norms from both the legal orders. These norm conflicts cannot be resolved 
based on rules of recognition because these secondary rules are tied to a particular 
legal order. Following MacCormick, these norm conflicts can be termed radical 
pluralism because in a positivist understanding of law there is no legal way to 
resolve these conflicts. On this view, a political decision should be made to resolve 
these conflicts.115 For example, political decisions can be made following judicial 
dialogue between officials of different legal orders. Or as Letsas explains this point 
in the context of EU law: ‘The image of judicial dialogue in the EU presupposes, 
indeed it is premised upon, the understanding of constitutional pluralism that legal 
positivism offers us. It is seen as the cure to the problem of multiple and inconsistent 
                                                 
114 Hart 1994, 95. 
115 ‘Acceptance of a radically pluralistic conception of legal systems entails acknowledging that not every 
legal problem can be solved legally. The problem in principle is not that of an absence of legal answers to 
given problems, but of a superfluity of legal answers.’ MacCormick 1999, 119. Although MacCormick 
uses the notion of radical pluralism in the context of EU law, it may be used more generally. 
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rules of recognition and the absence of any law governing what courts should 
decide. Judicial dialogue stands and falls with positivism’s assumptions about the 
nature of law.’116 Given the general and descriptive nature of a positivist 
understanding of law these extra-legal decisions fall outside the scope of a positivist 
account of the intertwinement of legal orders. No further explanation can be given 
on the basis of Hart’s legal theory on how these norm conflicts are resolved, other 
than that officials may aim to resolve these conflicts through political decision-
making. 
 The acceptance and contestation of the authority of officials also remains 
underexplored in my positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders. From 
the perspective of Hart’s legal theory, each legal order contains its own secondary 
rules of change, adjudication and recognition. Based on the secondary rules of 
change, adjudication and recognition officials exercise authority in a particular legal 
order. Officials follow secondary rules of change and adjudication when enacting 
new primary rules or adjudicating disputes. When officials identify valid primary 
rules of other legal orders, they follow secondary rules of external recognition. 
Secondary rules are considered valid because officials understand them as general 
standards in their legal order. However, seen in this light, no relations exist between 
officials of different legal orders. In some cases, officials of different legal orders may 
be considered part of a shared practice. For example, officials may feel motivated to 
rely on the authority of officials of other legal orders. Nevertheless, whether the 
authority of officials of other legal orders is accepted, ultimately depends on the 
secondary rules of external recognition that are tied to a legal order. Thus, no 
relations between officials of different legal orders exist in my positivist account of 
the intertwinement of legal orders. 
 The main strength of my positivist account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders is its ability to make sense of the general criteria we rely on when we 
determine the validity of primary rules of other legal orders. Rules of external 
recognition explain why we incorporate legal norms of other legal orders. Conflicts 
                                                 
116 Letsas 2012, 94. 
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between legal norms internal to a legal order may be resolved on the basis of the 
supreme and ultimate rule of recognition. How conflicts between norms from 
multiple legal orders that apply simultaneously are resolved remains unclear. 
Resolving these conflicts requires a political decision and goes beyond the 
descriptive scope of a positivist understanding of law. Another weakness of my 
positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders is its inability to explain how 
relations between officials of different legal orders may exist. Secondary rules of 
change, adjudication and recognition are tied to a legal order and the exercise of 
authority by officials is constitutive of the secondary rules that are tied to a particular 
legal order. Therefore, relations between officials cannot be conceptualized in a 
positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have explored Hart’s positivist legal theory to critically reconstruct 
a positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders. Hart’s legal theory should 
be understood against the background of his commitment to analytical 
jurisprudence. On this view, legal philosophers should clarify notions that are 
central to law and explain how these legal notions structure social life. Hart also 
maintains that law is best understood in a general and descriptive sense. This means 
that a legal theory should hold for all legal orders and should take the perspective 
of a participant without morally justifying this internal point of view. Central to 
Hart’s legal theory is the idea that law should be understood in terms of primary 
rules that constitute obligations and secondary rules that officials follow when 
enacting primary rules, settling disputes and identifying valid primary rules. 
Although Hart maintains that secondary rules cannot be found in international law, 
I have argued that secondary rules can be identified beyond domestic legal orders. 
Moreover, some regimes of international law, such as, for example, EU law and the 
law of the Council of Europe, are best understood as legal orders that are embedded 
in the legal order of general international law. In these regimes distinct secondary 
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rules are followed, next to rules of change, adjudication and recognition of general 
international law. 
 In my positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders I have 
introduced the notion of a rule of external recognition to explain why legal norms of 
other legal orders are considered valid. Rules of internal and external recognition 
are two sides of the same coin of the supreme and ultimate rule of recognition of a 
legal order. Conflicts between legal norms may be resolved on the basis of this 
secondary rule. However, conflicts between norms of different legal orders that 
apply simultaneously can only be resolved on the basis of a political decision 
because secondary rules are inherently tied to a legal order. The exercise of authority 
by officials follows from the secondary rules of change, adjudication and recognition 
internal to a legal order. No relations between officials of different legal orders exist 
in my positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders.
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Chapter 3 
Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory: 
constructive integrity 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory aims to conceptualize law in light of the 
fact that we actually deeply disagree on how law should be understood. This kind 
of disagreement also exists in legal practice. Lawyers may disagree on whether a 
rule or principle should be applied because no simple test exists that could be used 
to resolve their disagreement. Dworkin’s legal theory explores how legal 
philosophers and lawyers address these kinds of disagreements. He maintains that 
disagreement is inherent to the argumentative nature of law: ‘[o]f course, law is a 
social phenomenon. But its complexity, function, and consequence all depend on 
one special feature of its structure. Legal practice, unlike many other social 
phenomena, is argumentative.’1 This has lead Dworkin to argue that, despite our 
disagreement, we aim to apply legal norms consistently and in light of their coherent 
justification. 
 In this chapter, I start out with situating Dworkin’s legal theory in the 
normative tradition of jurisprudence (section 2). Dworkin maintains that legal 
philosophers should aim to construct legal theories that show law in its best light. 
Although we may deeply disagree on how we should understand legal practice, 
legal philosophers should construct a justification of law that best explains how law 
constrains the exercise of public power. This interpretive approach is also embedded 
in legal practice itself. Citizens and officials have an obligation to reflect on what 
rights and obligations they have as members of a community of principle. In his 
                                                 
1 Dworkin 1986, 13. 
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interpretive legal theory, Dworkin argues that we apply legal norms in light of a 
coherent justification of the values of fairness and justice (section 3). Our 
commitment to the value of integrity highlights that we aim to apply legal norms 
consistently and in light of a coherent justification of the values of political morality. 
I will illustrate the importance of integrity with his account of adjudication in hard 
cases. Dworkin has attempted to conceptualize international law from the 
perspective of his interpretive legal theory (section 4). On his view, the central point 
of international law revolves around the duty of mitigation and the principle of 
salience. However, I will present a more convincing interpretive account of 
international law that addresses the role of integrity. Furthermore, I will develop an 
interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders based on Dworkin’s 
notion of integrity (section 5). In an interpretive account of the intertwinement of 
legal orders, integrity should be understood as a constructive filter through which 
legal norms and authority claims of officials are assessed. Lastly, I will evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of this interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders. 
 
2 The normative tradition: Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory 
 
Dworkin has developed his interpretive legal theory in light of the view that legal 
philosophers should construct a justification of law. He maintains that legal 
philosophers should aim to provide a legal theory that explains how law constrains 
the exercise of public power. This interpretive approach is also embedded in the 
practice of law itself. On this view, citizens and officials are part of a community of 
principle in which they have a responsibility to critically reflect on what rights and 
obligations they have. 
 In this section, I will situate Dworkin’s legal theory in the normative 
tradition of jurisprudence. Although we may deeply disagree on how law should be 
understood, legal philosophers should aim to construct a legal theory that shows 
law in its best light. Citizens and officials also take an interpretive approach when 
they follow or apply legal norms. I will explain this point with Dworkin’s notion of 
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the Protestant interpretive attitude. The Protestant interpretive attitude entails that 
citizens and officials may determine what rights and obligations have normative 
force in a legal order. 
 
2.1 Law as an interpretive concept 
 
Dworkin maintains that law should be considered an interpretive concept.2 This 
means that legal philosophers should aim to provide a legal theory that shows law 
in its best light. Dworkin describes interpretive concepts as follows: ‘[w]e share an 
interpretive concept when our collective behavior in using that concept is best 
explained by taking its correct use to depend on the best justification of the role it 
plays for us.’3 Different conceptions can be formulated for an interpretive concept. 
For example, two opposing conceptions can be distinguished for the concept of 
democracy. A majoritarian conception of democracy implies governing by majority 
while a partnership conception entails governing by a community as a whole.4 A 
theory of democracy should support a conception that best explains the central point 
of democracy. For example, Dworkin maintains that a partnership conception 
provides a more convincing explanation of democracy than a majoritarian 
conception.5 Law is also an interpretive concept. Or as Dworkin explains: ‘[l]aw is 
an interpretive concept. Judges should decide what the law is by interpreting the 
practice of other judges deciding what the law is. General theories of law, for us, are 
general interpretations of our own judicial practice.’6 Dworkin argues that the 
central point of law is to constrain the exercise of public power.7 On this view, a legal 
theory should explain how law constrains the exercise of public power. For example, 
in Law’s Empire Dworkin evaluates conventionalist and pragmatist accounts of legal 
                                                 
2 Dworkin 1986, 87; 2006, 12; 2011, 404. 
3 Dworkin 2011, 158. 
4 Dworkin 2011, 382-385. 
5 Dworkin 2011, 392. 
6 Dworkin 1986, 410. 
7 Dworkin 1986, 93. 
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practice as interpretive counterparts of positivist and realist theories of law, and 
explores how these theories could discredit his own interpretive legal theory.8 
 Dworkin argues that law should be considered an interpretive concept 
because this explains why we may deeply disagree on how law should be 
understood.9 To clarify this point Dworkin distinguishes between criterial, natural 
kind and interpretive concepts.10 We generally agree on the existence criteria of 
criterial concepts. Dworkin explains that the concept of a book, for example, can be 
considered a criterial concept because we generally agree on the appropriate criteria 
on the basis of which objects can be identified as a book. If we disagree whether 
something should be called a book, we refer to these shared criteria to settle our 
disagreement.11 Natural kind concepts have characteristics that are inherent to the 
natural world. Dworkin mentions that species of animals, such as, for example, lions 
can be considered natural kind concepts. We refer to these natural characteristics 
when we disagree on whether an animal should be called a lion.12 Dworkin points 
out that an important similarity between criterial and natural kind concepts is that 
disagreement concerning these concepts can be resolved based on a test.13 For 
example, whether something is a book or a lion can be determined in light of a test 
that follows from generally accepted criteria or natural characteristics of these 
concepts. Legal theories that conceptualize law in terms of a criterial or natural kind 
concept ultimately fail to adequately address that there is no generally shared test to 
determine what the most insightful explanation of law is. An interpretive legal 
theory does not settle our disagreement, but aims to provide the best possible 
explanation of how law constrains the exercise of public power. 
                                                 
8 Dworkin 1986, 114-175. 
9 Dworkin has called this theoretical disagreement. See Dworkin 1986, 5. 
10 Dworkin 2006, 9-12; 2011, 158-163. 
11 Dworkin 2011, 158-159. Dworkin argues that Hart’s legal theory conceptualizes law as a criterial concept 
because the rule of recognition provides shared criteria on the basis of which valid legal rules can be 
identified. See Dworkin 1986, 34-35; 2006, 225-226. 
12 Dworkin 2011, 159. 
13 Dworkin 2011, 160. 
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 Although we may deeply disagree on how law should be understood, 
Dworkin maintains that we have no good reasons to be skeptical about the 
possibility of arriving at a convincing interpretive understanding of law. He 
distinguishes between two forms of skepticism: internal and external.14 External 
skepticism denies that one can objectively determine whether interpretive legal 
theories provide an insightful explanation of law’s central point. For example, 
different competing legal theories seem tenable because no objective arguments can 
be given which interpretive understanding best explains how law constrains the 
exercise of public power. Dworkin maintains that this form of skepticism assumes 
an Archimedean point of view from which all interpretive accounts of law can be 
assessed. However, an Archimedean point of view does not exist. The claim that we 
cannot objectively determine whether interpretive legal theories provide an 
insightful explanation of law can only follow from an assessment that takes into 
account to which degree these theories succeed in showing law in its best light. Thus, 
this form of skepticism is untenable because it wrongly assumes that an 
Archimedean point of view exists from which interpretive accounts of law can be 
assessed.15 
 Internal skepticism denies that we can reach a coherent interpretive 
understanding of law. Two forms of internal skepticism may be distinguished. The 
first type of internal skepticism entails that an interpretive understanding of law 
may contain conflicting dimensions. Dworkin illustrates this point with a tort law 
case in which two conflicting legal principles point towards opposing legal 
decisions.16 Both principles seem relevant to the case. Dworkin argues that a judge 
should reach a decision by considering how these conflicting principles have relative 
weight. In the case of two opposing legal principles, a judge will need to determine 
which principle provides the most convincing argument in light of a more abstract 
justification of these principles. Or as Dworkin explains: ‘some nonarbitrary scheme 
of priority or weighting or accommodation between the two, a scheme that reflects 
                                                 
14 Dworkin 1986, 78. 
15 Dworkin 1996. 
16 Dworkin 1986, 268-271. 
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their respective sources in a deeper level of political morality.’17 Thus, this type of 
internal skepticism is unconvincing because contradicting elements in an 
interpretive understanding of law may be given relative weight. 
 The second type of internal skepticism entails that an interpretive 
understanding of law is inherently incoherent. For example, an interpretive legal 
theory may consist of two contradictory elements which cannot be given relative 
weight in a more abstract justification.18 This can also mean that different 
interpretive legal theories can be constructed that each explains a distinct aspect of 
law´s central point. Dworkin calls this type of skepticism, global internal 
skepticism.19 Global internal skepticism poses a challenge to Dworkin’s legal theory 
in two respects. Firstly, if global internal skepticism should be accepted this would 
entail that no interpretive understanding of law can be reached that holds for law as 
a whole. At best, Dworkin’s legal theory provides a partial explanation of law’s 
central point. Secondly, this form of skepticism challenges the central claim of 
Dworkin’s legal theory that legal norms are applied in light of their coherent 
justification. However, Dworkin maintains that no convincing claim has been made 
that proves that our interpretive understanding of legal practice is inherently 
contradictory. No convincing positive arguments have been presented that justify 
the claim that our interpretive understanding of law is plagued by incoherence.20 
 
2.2 The Protestant interpretive attitude 
 
Entrenched in Dworkin’s interpretive understanding of law is the view that citizens 
have a responsibility to critically reflect on what rights and obligations they have in 
a legal order.21 Dworkin explains this responsibility in terms of a Protestant attitude: 
                                                 
17 Dworkin 1986, 269. 
18 Dworkin 1986, 273-274. 
19 Dworkin 1986, 272. 
20 See Dworkin 2008 in response to Waldron 2008. See also, Dworkin 2011, 88-96. 
21 One could argue that it is unlikely that all citizens and officials in a legal order have a Protestant 
interpretive attitude. For example, some citizens and officials may claim to rely on generally shared 
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‘[l]aw’s empire is defined by attitude, not territory or power or process. (…) It is a 
Protestant attitude that makes each citizen responsible for imagining what his 
society’s public commitments to principle are, and what these commitments require 
in new circumstances.’22 This attitude entails that in principle each citizen should be 
able to determine what rights and obligations he has in a legal order. For example, 
citizens in the Dutch legal order should be able to determine what rights and 
obligations they have under Dutch law. This attitude is Protestant in nature because 
we are able to construct an account of legal practice by ourselves within a 
community.23 This interpretive attitude does not contradict the fact that citizens and 
officials may disagree on what rights and obligations they have. They may, for 
example, discuss what rights follow from their interpretive understanding of law’s 
central point. Moreover, the Protestant attitude requires the existence of a 
community in which individuals can reflect on what rights and obligations are 
binding upon them. Dworkin calls this community a community of principle.24  
Dworkin’s Protestant attitude explains why an interpretive understanding 
of law can only provide a provisional explanation of how law constrains the exercise 
of public power. Citizens and officials may always contest what rights and 
obligations they have in a legal order. Here it is helpful to discuss the three 
interpretive stages that Dworkin distinguishes. When we aim to understand 
interpretive concepts like law, we follow three stages: a pre-interpretive, an 
interpretive and a post-interpretive stage. In the pre-interpretive stage, there is a 
provisional and often implicit understanding between individuals on what law is.25 
Without this minimal and provisional consensus, no discussion could follow on 
                                                 
criteria to identify valid rules and principles. However, from the perspective of Dworkin´s legal theory 
these practitioners have not yet realized that, on further scrutiny, we may deeply disagree on these 
criteria. 
22 Dworkin 1986, 413. 
23 On this Protestant interpretive attitude see Postema 1987. See also the exchange between Postema and 
Dworkin on integrity and the Protestant interpretive attitude. Postema 2004; Dworkin 2004.  
24 Dworkin 1986, 214. 
25 Dworkin 1986, 65-66. Postema captures this dimension of the Protestant interpretive attitude well: 
‘[i]nterpretation starts from "pre-interpretive" agreement regarding the boundaries and typical elements 
of the practice. Consensus fixes the object of interpretation, but not the interpretation’. Postema 1987, 297 
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which conception of law provides the most insightful account. In the interpretive 
stage, we aim to construct the most convincing justification that show law in its best 
light.26 Certain aspects of our pre-interpretive understanding of legal practice may 
be disregarded in the interpretive stage, or new elements may be introduced to 
justify our interpretive understanding of law. In the post-interpretive stage, we 
reflect on what this interpretive understanding entails. For example, in the post-
interpretive stage, we consider which decision a judge should take.27 Nevertheless, 
no clear distinction can be made between the pre-interpretive and post-interpretive 
stage. Or as Dworkin explains: ‘[i]nterpretation folds back into the practice, altering 
its shape, and the new shape encourages further reinterpretation’.28 When a decision 
is reached in the post-interpretive stage it will become part of our implicit and pre-
interpretive understanding of law is. This implicit understanding may become 
contested, and therefore examined in the interpretive stage. In the post-interpretive 
stage citizens and officials will consider what this interpretive understanding 
entails. Thus, the Protestant interpretive attitude explains why we can only reach a 
provisional interpretive understanding of law. 
 Some of Dworkin´s critics have argued that an interpretive approach 
necessarily relies on criterial foundations. On this view, a justification of law’s 
central point is grounded in consensus because it starts out from generally accepted 
claims about law. We start out with a criterial conception in the pre-interpretive 
stage and switch to an interpretive conception in the interpretive and post-
interpretive stages.29 For example, we could construct an interpretive understanding 
of law by building further on Hart’s concept of a rule of recognition.30 Nevertheless, 
from the perspective of Dworkin’s legal theory this critique should be considered 
unconvincing. We do not switch from a criterial to an interpretive concept of law. 
Firstly, the Protestant interpretive attitude demands only a provisional agreement 
                                                 
26 Dworkin 1986, 66. 
27 Dworkin 1986, 66. 
28 Dworkin 1986, 48. 
29 See, for example, the discussion in Stavropoulos 1996, 136-143. 
30 However, this does not mean that Hart’s legal theory provides a convincing interpretive understanding 
of law. See Guest 2013, 69-72. 
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between individuals on what the boundaries of law as a practice are. Based on this 
provisional agreement citizens and officials may reflect on what the most convincing 
explanation of law’s central point is. Secondly, this line of critique assumes that a 
generally shared test exists that could inform us how law should be conceptualized 
in a legal theory. No such test exists because we may deeply disagree on what the 
central point of law entails. 
 
3 Dworkin on integrity in law 
 
The central claim of Dworkin’s legal theory is that we aim to interpret legal norms 
consistently and in light of a coherent account of the values of political morality. This 
theory builds on the argument developed in his earlier work that law should be 
conceptualized in terms of rules and principles and that judges sometimes need to 
reflect on what the underlying justification of these rules and principles is. The 
notion of integrity highlights that we interpret legal rules and principles in light of 
a coherent account of their underlying values. Dworkin’s most elaborate illustration 
of the importance of integrity in law concerns adjudication. 
 In this section, I will explore Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory in light of 
the notion of integrity. Dworkin asserts that we interpret legal rules and principles 
in light of the values of fairness and justice. The notion of integrity explains why we 
aim to rely on a coherent account of the values of justice and fairness when we 
interpret legal norms. Dworkin’s claim that we interpret legal norms in light of a 
coherent account of political morality can be illustrated with how judges reach a 
decision in a hard case. When judges need to decide on a hard case, they aim to reach 
a decision that is justified in light of previous decisions and the values of justice and 
fairness. 
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3.1 Justice, fairness and integrity 
 
Dworkin’s legal theory revolves around the claim that we interpret legal norms in 
light of their coherent justification. Some elements of this legal theory have been 
developed in his early work.31 In his early work, Dworkin maintains that we should 
understand law in terms of rules and principles. Rules are binary in that they apply 
or do not apply to a particular case. Principles have a dimension of weight.32 
Principles are important in hard cases where rules are unable to inform judges which 
decision should be taken. In explaining how judges decide hard cases, Dworkin 
develops an argument that is central to his interpretive legal theory. When deciding 
on hard cases judges construct an argument that explains which general principles 
clarify and justify the applicable legal rules.33 For example, when interpreting a 
constitutional provision in a hard case a judge will consider how this provision is 
part of and informed by a set of constitutional principles. This set of constitutional 
principles explains how we should understand the provisions of our constitution 
and which interpretation of these provisions is justified.34 
 In his later work, Dworkin explores more in depth how we interpret rules 
and principles in light of their justification.35 He argues that the justification we rely 
on when we apply rules and principles can be understood as a coherent set of values 
of a political morality. Dworkin makes a distinction between justice and fairness.36 
The value of justice represents the substantive moral beliefs in a community and the 
political decisions that have been taken to implement these moral beliefs. For 
                                                 
31 Dworkin 1978. 
32 Dworkin 1978, 24-27. 
33 Dworkin 1978, 101-105. 
34 Dworkin 1978, 106-107. 
35 Dworkin 1986; 2006; 2011. Some critics argue that there is a difference between Dworkin’s views in his 
early work and his subsequent work. See, for example, Shapiro 2007. Similar to Dworkin, I consider his 
work to establish a coherent line of reasoning on how we interpret rules and principles in light of 
underlying values. See Dworkin 2006, 232-240 in which he discredits Shapiro’s claim that he changed his 
views in subsequent work. 
36 Dworkin 1986, 164-165. Dworkin also identifies procedural due process as a separate value. However, 
he disregards this value in his argument on integrity. I follow Dworkin in his focus on justice and fairness. 
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example, legal rules and principles may give expression to our notions of justice by 
granting rights to individuals. The value of fairness brings to light that members of 
a community should have the opportunity to participate in procedures that ensure 
that just political decisions are taken. Legal rules and principles may, for example, 
ensure participation in political decision-making procedures. Thus, a justification of 
rules and principles will touch upon substantive issues of justice and procedural 
issues of fairness. 
 Next to the values of justice and fairness, Dworkin considers the value of 
integrity to be central to our justification of legal norms.37 His argument on integrity 
follows from his objection to compromises on issues of moral principle. 
Checkerboard laws aim to resolve persistent disagreement on issues of justice in a 
community through compromise.38 For example, persistent disagreement may exist 
in a community on product liability in private law cases.39 One could argue that strict 
liability should not be established while others could maintain that strict liability 
should be established for all products. A compromise on product liability could 
settle this issue by enacting legal rules and principles that ensure strict liability for 
only a number of products.40 Dworkin argues that we consider these checkerboard 
laws intuitively wrong in light of another value, rather than justice or fairness.41 We 
consider checkerboard laws intuitively wrong because they entail a lack of 
coherence between the values of justice and fairness that underlie the norms of 
checkerboard laws. Dworkin maintains that the value of integrity is part of our 
political morality because we generally believe that we should construct a coherent 
account of the values that underlie legal rules and principles. No unprincipled 
compromise should be made by enacting checkerboard laws. Or as Jeremy Waldron 
explains: ‘Integrity, in Dworkin’s theory, is a response to the fact that the various 
political decisions currently in force in a given society, coming as they do from 
                                                 
37 Dworkin 1986, 166. 
38 Dworkin 1986, 179. 
39 Dworkin 1986, 178. 
40 Dworkin 1986, 178. 
41 Dworkin 1986, 183. 
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different sources, are not guaranteed to cohere with one another.’42 Thus, the value 
of integrity entails a commitment towards a coherent account of the values of justice 
and fairness in a legal order. 
 Although the value of integrity entails a commitment towards a coherent 
account of the values of justice and fairness that underlie rules and principles, 
disagreement may still arise on what these values entail in a particular case. We may 
disagree, for example, on what the right to free speech implies. Nevertheless, 
Dworkin argues that we share a commitment to integrity.43 He explains this point 
through the metaphor of a theatre of debate. He maintains that we may 
fundamentally disagree on how we view the values of justice and fairness. In a 
pluralist community it is likely that different moral views are reflected in legal rules 
and principles. Despite disagreement that may exist concerning the values of justice 
and fairness, the value of integrity entails a shared commitment to constructing a 
coherent account of the values underlying legal rules and principles. Integrity 
provides a theater of debate in which our disagreement concerning justice and 
fairness can be articulated, and points out our shared commitment to construct a 
coherent justification when applying legal rules and principles.44 Dworkin’s 
metaphor of a theatre of debate also illustrates the duty of individuals to consider 
what rights and obligations they have in a legal order. One may enter in a debate 
with other individuals on what the most coherent account of the values of political 
morality is. 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Waldron 1999, 189. 
43 Dworkin 1986, 211. The theatre of debate metaphor has been further developed by Jeremy Waldron. 
See Waldron 2004. 
44 ‘In short, each accepts political integrity as a distinct political ideal and treats the general acceptance of 
that ideal, even among people who otherwise disagree about political morality, as constitutive of political 
community.’ Dworkin 1986, 211. 
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3.2 Integrity in adjudication 
 
In his legal theory, Dworkin pays particular attention to the role of integrity in 
adjudication. How judges decide hard cases provides a clear illustration of how legal 
rules and principles are applied in light of their coherent justification. Although 
integrity is a notion that is central to law generally, adjudication illustrates the 
significance of integrity in particular.45 Dworkin maintains that adjudication 
revolves around two dimensions: fit and justification.46 He argues that judges 
consider which decision best fits the existing body of case law and asserts the most 
coherent justification of these decisions. Dworkin illustrates these two dimensions 
by comparing adjudication with writing a chain novel.47 A story of a chain novel is 
made up of chapters written successively by different writers. When a writer is 
working on a new chapter, he needs to ensure that the story is connected to the 
previous chapters. The reader will be confused when the new chapter is inconsistent 
with the story of the chain novel. The writer also needs to decide on how the story 
should progress. Dworkin explains that the writer should decide on how he wishes 
to continue the story in a new chapter. The dimension of fit explains the aim of the 
writer to ensure that a new chapter should be consistent with the previous chapters. 
The dimension of justification touches upon the writer’s aim to contribute to a 
faithful continuation of the story. In adjudication, these two dimensions of fit and 
justification can also be identified. The dimension of fit entails that judges consider 
which decision is best justified in light of previous case law. The dimension of 
justification requires judges to reach a decision that asserts the most coherent 
justification of previous decisions. 
 Generally, judges attempt to do justice to the dimensions of fit and 
justification when reaching a decision. A judge aims to ensure that his decision is in 
                                                 
45 The fact that Dworkin pays particular attention to adjudication does not mean that his legal theory 
centres solely on adjudication. Dworkin’s objection to checkerboard laws, for example, illustrates the 
importance of integrity in legislation. 
46 Dworkin 1986, 239.  
47 Dworkin 1986, 228-238. 
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line with past case law and is justified in light of general moral principles. However, 
not every decision warrants an extensive exploration into case law and the values of 
political morality. Whether judges need to consciously reflect on the dimensions of 
fit and justification depends on whether they are confronted with an argument that 
challenges their common understanding of the relevant legal rules and principles. 
Hard cases challenge our common understanding of rules and principles because it 
is not clear from the outset which decision should be reached.48 In order to reach a 
decision in a hard case a judge needs to determine which decision best fits with 
previous case law and asserts a coherent justification of the relevant rules and 
principles. Dworkin calls this exploration a justificatory ascent because judges need 
to take a more abstract perspective on the values that inform rules and principles.49 
In his earlier work, Dworkin uses the metaphor of the godlike judge Hercules to 
explain how judges reflect on the justification of rules and principles in hard cases.50 
Judge Hercules is able to reflect on the justification of rules and principles on the 
most general and abstract level, constructing a coherent account of the values of 
justice and fairness.  
 A critic could object to the metaphor of judge Hercules because judges 
should not be held responsible for constructing fully coherent interpretive legal 
theories.51 Although Dworkin agrees that in practice no judges like Hercules exist, 
the godlike Hercules illustrates that in reaching a decision in a hard case judges 
inevitably touch upon the underlying values of legal rules and principles. On this 
view, the dimensions of fit and justification are important in both easy and hard 
cases.52 In hard cases the dimensions of fit and justification need to be made explicit 
in order to determine which decision is best justified. Easy cases do not challenge 
the common understanding of legal rules and principles. Nevertheless, Dworkin 
stresses that in hard cases one cannot control how far the justificatory ascent will go 
                                                 
48 On hard cases see Dworkin 1978, 83ff. 
49 Dworkin 2006, 53. 
50 See, for example, Shapiro 2011, 312-313. 
51 See for example the discussion in Dworkin 1986; 263-266; 2006, 65-72. 
52 Dworkin 1986, 265-266. 
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into the values of political morality.53 In some hard cases, a judge may need to reflect 
on the most general and abstract values of a legal order. Thus, judges rely on the 
dimensions of fit and justification, but they do not always need to commit to an 
extensive exploration of case law and the values that underlie rules and principles. 
 
4 Integrity in international law 
 
Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory is concerned primarily with domestic legal 
orders. A posthumously published article titled A New Philosophy of International Law 
revealed that Dworkin intended to explore international law from the perspective of 
his legal theory.54 In this article, Dworkin argues that international law should be 
conceptualized in light of the principle of salience. The principle of salience entails 
that rules and principles of international law should be considered applicable insofar 
they increase the legitimacy of a state. Dworkin’s account of international law invites 
further reflection on the question how law beyond domestic legal orders should be 
conceptualized from the perspective of his interpretive legal theory. 
 In this section, I will critically assess Dworkin’s account of international law. 
I seek to evaluate the force of Dworkin’s argument that international law should be 
understood in light of the principle of salience. I will defend the claim that a more 
convincing interpretive account of international law can be constructed by building 
on the notion of integrity. The moral gravitational force of norms of international 
law is distinct from the justification of legal norms in domestic legal orders. 
Moreover, the notion of integrity explains why norms of international law are 
applied in light of their own coherent justification. 
 
                                                 
53 Dworkin 2006, 55. 
54 Dworkin 2013. On the relevance of Dworkin’s interpretive theory for international law before the 
publication of this article, see Çali 2009. 
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4.1 Salience or integrity? 
 
In his article Dworkin considers why norms of international law are followed even 
though there is no test to determine under which conditions these norms should be 
applicable. Or as Dworkin explains: ‘[e]ven though almost everyone agrees that 
“international law” is really law, and that the rules and principles set out in 
documents of that kind are part of it, the question of why these documents constitute 
some kind of legal system is crucial because how these rules and principles should 
be interpreted hinges in it.’55 Although it may seem as if Dworkin is primarily 
interested in the system-like qualities of international law, he emphasizes the 
differences between his approach and that of legal positivists. Dworkin criticizes 
legal positivists because they approach international law as a criterial concept. Legal 
positivists claim that the question whether norms of international law should be 
applied, ultimately depends on a test, such as, for example, one that follows from 
the rule of recognition. Dworkin argues that a positivist account of international law 
revolves around state consent because consent can be established based on such a 
test.56 Dworkin’s critique of legal positivist accounts of international law is best 
understood in light of his more general claim that law should be conceptualized as 
an interpretive concept.57 On this view, there is no general test to determine whether 
norms of international law should be applied. 
 Dworkin maintains that the central point of international law is to support 
and improve the legitimacy of the state. Or as he explains: ‘[i]f a state can help to 
facilitate an international order in a way that would improve the legitimacy of its 
own coercive government, then it has a political obligation to do what it can in that 
                                                 
55 Dworkin 2013, 3. 
56 ‘Many contemporary international lawyers have tried to do what Hart did not: construct a doctrinal 
account of international law from his version of positivism. They assume that a sovereign state is subject 
to international law but, on the standard account, only so far as it has consented to be bound by that law, 
and they take that principle of consent to furnish an international rule of recognition.’ [footnote omitted] 
Dworkin 2013, 5. However, positivist accounts of international law do not necessarily focus on state 
consent. See, for example, H.L.A. Hart’s views on international law, discussed in the previous chapter. 
57 Dworkin 2013, 11-12. 
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direction.’58 Dworkin explains the central point of international law in terms of a 
duty of mitigation. On this view, states should mitigate the possible dangers of 
international rules and principles that violate their legitimacy. The notion of 
legitimacy is connected to the idea that rules and principles should be seen as part 
of a community of principle. Legal norms are applied in light of the values of this 
community of principle.59 States have an obligation to improve their legitimacy 
through international law in four ways. States should further fundamental rights of 
citizens, protect citizens against forms of aggression by other states, cooperate with 
other states and ensure the existence of procedures that enhance citizen 
participation.60 Thus, the duty of mitigation requires states to support and improve 
their legitimacy through international law. 
 The duty of states to support and improve their legitimacy through 
international law can also be captured by what Dworkin calls the principle of 
salience. The principle of salience entails that a state has an obligation to follow 
norms of international law when this enhances its legitimacy and the legitimacy of 
international law.61 Following Dworkin’s terminology, international rules and 
principles have moral gravitational force: ‘[a]s more nations recognize a duty to 
accept and follow widely accepted principles, those principles, thus even more 
widely accepted, have greater moral gravitational force.’62 The gravitational force of 
international law entails that it has a ‘snowballing effect’ on states. States are pulled 
towards acceptance of norms of international law that improve their legitimacy and 
the legitimacy of international law. Dworkin provides two historical examples of the 
gravitational force of international law. Firstly, Dworkin argues that jus ad bellum 
(international law on the use of force) and jus in bello (international humanitarian 
                                                 
58 Dworkin 2013, 17. 
59 Dworkin 2013, 11. Dworkin explains a community of principle in Law’s Empire as follows: ‘(...) the 
promise that law will be chosen, changed, developed, and interpreted in an overall principled way. A 
community of principle, faithful to that promise, can claim the authority of a genuine associative 
community and can therefore claim moral legitimacy – that its collective decision are matters of obligation 
and not bare power – in the name of fraternity.’ Dworkin 1986, 214. 
60 Dworkin 2013, 17-18. 
61 Dworkin 2013, 19. 
62 Dworkin 2013, 19-20. 
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law) have developed against the background of shared Christian beliefs. Secondly, 
principles have developed from Roman law that are now generally shared among 
Western states. These principles are known as ius gentium.63 
 Dworkin maintains that article 38 of the ICJ Statute illustrates the central 
role of salience in the field of international law today.64 Article 38 considers treaties, 
customary law and general principles valid sources of international law. However, 
legal positivists generally consider article 38 of the ICJ Statute an illustration of a 
rule of recognition. On this view, treaties, customary law and general principles 
create legal obligations on the basis of state consent. Nevertheless, Dworkin argues 
that consent-based accounts of international law are unable to explain why state 
consent necessarily creates legal obligations.65 Instead, the legal sources of article 38 
of the ICJ Statute are binding in light of their moral gravitational force: ‘[a]ccording 
to the positivist account that makes consent fundamental, these sources flow – 
imperfectly - from the very idea of law as based in consent. On the account I describe, 
they flow instead from the moral demands, on which the legitimacy of an 
international system depends.’66 
 Dworkin’s account of international law is insightful in some respects. In his 
account he attempts to conceptualize international law as an interpretive concept 
and considers what interpretive understanding shows international law in its best 
light. However, Dworkin’s account of international law is ultimately unconvincing 
because he fails to connect his arguments with his interpretive legal theory in two 
important respects.67 Firstly, Dworkin wrongly assumes that the central point of 
international law is derivative of the legitimacy of the state. On this view, the moral 
gravitational force of international law has no independent weight. The salience 
principle entails that states are obliged to follow international law only if this 
enhances their legitimacy. However, in Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory the 
                                                 
63 Dworkin 2013, 20. 
64 Dworkin 2013, 21-22. 
65 Dworkin 2013, 6-10. 
66 Dworkin 2013, 22. 
67 On the discontinuity between Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory and his account of international law, 
see Scarffe 2016. 
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justification of legal norms follows from a coherent account of their underlying 
values. Dworkin does not provide a clear and convincing argument why the moral 
gravitational force of norms international law should be dependent on the state.68 
Moreover, it is unclear in Dworkin’s account of international law what the moral 
gravitational force is of legal norms enacted by international organizations, such as, 
for example, the European Union.69 
 Secondly, Dworkin’s interpretive account of international law largely 
ignores the Protestant interpretive attitude that is embedded in legal practice. The 
Protestant attitude entails that citizens and officials should be able to reflect on how 
legal norms follow from the values of justice and fairness of a community of 
principle. However, in his account of international law Dworkin fails to address 
what community or communities of principle support international law. While 
Dworkin’s legal theory is concerned with how citizens and officials apply legal 
norms in light of their underlying values, his account of international law does not 
explain how international rules and principles are applied in light of the dimensions 
of fit and justification. Thus, an interpretive account of international law should 
make sense of how citizens and officials apply norms of international law in light of 
their underlying values.70 
 The first weakness of Dworkin’s interpretive account of international law 
can be resolved by acknowledging that norms of international law require a 
justification that may differ from domestic law. This point may be illustrated with 
Letsas’ interpretive account of the European Convention on Human Rights. Letsas 
argues that the human rights enshrined in the Convention are interpreted in light of 
their underlying moral aims. He emphasizes that the human rights of the 
Convention entail notions that are often understood differently in the legal orders of 
the states that have signed and ratified the Convention. Therefore, Letsas maintains 
                                                 
68 See also Christiano 2016, 56. 
69 Dworkin 2013, 20-21. 
70 See also Palombella 2015. However, like Dworkin, Palombella maintains that international law has no 
independent moral gravitational force: ‘the “political morality” of the international system can only enjoy 
a second level status, that is, the integrity of its values has a derivative status not a self-standing 
substantive content.’ Palombella 2015, 10. 
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that the Convention entails autonomous concepts: ‘the autonomous concepts of the 
Convention enjoy a status of semantic independence—their meaning is not to be 
equated with the meaning that these very same concepts possess in domestic law.’71 
On this view, the Strasbourg Court should consider which conception of the 
Convention rights shows them in their best light. Letsas argues that the values of 
legality and liberalism justify the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of the 
Convention rights.72 Letsas’ interpretive account of the European Convention on 
Human Rights illustrates that the justification of the rights enshrined in the 
Convention may differ from the justification of human rights in domestic legal 
orders.  
 The second weakness of Dworkin’s interpretive account of international law 
can be overcome by highlighting the role of integrity. The notion of integrity 
explains how citizens and officials aim to apply norms of international law 
consistently and in light of their coherent justification. Letsas’ interpretive account 
of the European Convention on Human Rights illustrates that the application of the 
Convention rights require adherence to the dimensions of fit and justification: ‘the 
relevant actors understand the ECHR rights in a non-conventionalist way: these 
rights need not be the same as what the Contracting States (or the majorities in them) 
take them to be; rather their basis is some substantive moral principle that justifies 
them and calls for consistent application.’73 Dworkin seems to be aware of the 
importance of integrity in the field of international law, but he fails to articulate how 
integrity plays a role when norms of international law are applied.74 A commitment 
to integrity in international law does not necessarily imply the existence of one single 
community of principle.75 The notion of integrity entails that the application of 
norms of international law require their own underlying justification. On this view, 
different regimes of international law may be identified based on their specific 
                                                 
71 Letsas 2007, 42. 
72 Letsas 2007, 5; 99-119.  
73 Letsas 2007, 40. 
74 Dworkin 2013, 22. 
75 See also Çali 2009, 815. Although Çali wrongly reduces integrity to the principle of equal concern and 
respect, she acknowledges that different communities of principle can be identified in international law. 
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underlying justification.76 For example, EU law may be seen as a regime that is 
informed by a distinct set of values, such as, for example, the rule of law and human 
dignity, as set out in the Treaty on European Union.77 Thus, distinctions may be 
drawn between regimes of international law in light of how the notion of integrity 
is constructed. 
 
5 An interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders 
 
In this section, I develop an interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders by building further on the notion of integrity. I will argue that in an 
interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders integrity can best be seen 
as a constructive filter in which dimensions of fit and justification can be 
distinguished. The dimension of fit entails that we apply rules and principles of 
other legal orders when they can be made consistent with other legal norms. The 
dimension of justification demands that these legal norms can be made coherent 
with one’s own conception of the values of justice and fairness. I will also build on 
the notion of integrity to develop an interpretive account of the relations between 
officials of different legal orders. In an interpretive account of the intertwinement of 
legal orders, officials of other legal orders are considered authoritative when their 
exercise of authority is consistent with past decisions and coherent with one’s own 
conception of the values of political morality. Finally, I will assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of my interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders. 
 
 
                                                 
76 Jovanović makes a similar claim in arguing that Dworkin is not sufficiently aware of the fragmentation 
of international law. See Jovanović 2015, 456-457. 
77 Art 2 TEU. On the development of the values underlying EU law, see Weatherill 2016, 393-419.  
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5.1 The constructive filter of integrity 
 
In Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory, the notion of integrity is central to his claim 
that we apply rules and principles in light of a coherent understanding of the values 
of fairness and justice. Integrity encompasses two dimensions: fit and justification. 
A legal norm should be consistent with other legal norms in a legal order (fit), and 
support the most coherent justification of the values of political morality 
(justification). In my view, the notion of integrity can be further developed to explain 
why legal norms of other legal orders are applied. The dimensions of fit and 
justification explain how a citizen or official may need to consciously reflect on 
whether a legal norm of another legal order fits in the existing body of law in a legal 
order and is justified in light of a coherent justification. Take, for example, a judge 
in a domestic legal order who is requested to apply a norm of international law. The 
judge will consider whether the norm of international law is consistent with legal 
norms in the domestic legal order and whether this norm can be justified in light of 
his conception of the values of political morality. A decision on a legal claim that is 
based on domestic and international legal norms can be reached by exploring which 
decision best fits the existing body of law in the domestic and international legal 
orders, and is justified in light of a coherent justification of both sets of human rights 
norms.  
 An illustrative example of how integrity can be easily reached, can be found 
in Jeremy Waldron’s account of modern forms of ius gentium. Waldron defines ius 
gentium as: ‘a body of world law that helps particular legal systems dispose of certain 
difficult problems within their own jurisdiction or problems that, though internal, 
require some dimension of harmonization with other jurisdictions.’78 He explains 
that ius gentium finds its origin in Roman legal scholarship and is generally 
understood as a set of principles shared among legal orders. The existence of these 
legal norms also signals a normative consensus on particular issues of political 
                                                 
78 Waldron 2012, 32. 
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morality.79 Waldron maintains that human rights are a contemporary example of ius 
gentium. Human rights can be found in domestic and international legal orders and 
these legal norms signal a normative consensus that extends across different legal 
orders.80 Although Waldron’s account of ius gentium principles is informed by the 
claim that judges should refer to decisions of courts of other legal orders, a more 
general point can be made in relation to the notion of integrity.81 Integrity can easily 
be attained when ius gentium principles are applied. These legal norms exist across 
legal orders and thus fit in the existing body of law of a legal order. Moreover, the 
justification of ius gentium follows from a normative consensus across domestic and 
international legal orders. 
 Waldron’s account of ius gentium principles illustrates that integrity can 
easily be attained when legal norms are consistent across different legal orders and 
are informed by normative consensus. However, in most cases where rules and 
principles of different legal orders are applied the question can arise whether 
integrity can be attained in terms of fit and justification. The dimension of fit requires 
legal norms of different legal orders to be consistent with each other. This may not 
always be the case. Norms of different legal orders may be inconsistent. The 
dimension of justification entails that legal norms of different legal orders are 
applied in light of a coherent justification. Legal norms may reflect different values. 
For example, Letsas’ interpretive account of the European Convention of Human 
Rights illustrates that Convention rights entail autonomous concepts that may differ 
from how officials in the legal orders of the member states interpret human rights.82 
Therefore, Waldron’s account of contemporary ius gentium principles must 
presuppose a very abstract normative consensus across different legal orders. Even 
if this normative consensus would exist, it is implausible that this justification could 
actually inform us how to apply human rights provisions. This raises the question 
                                                 
79 Waldron 2012, 33-35. 
80 Waldron 2012, 32-33. 
81 Waldron 2012, 109-141. 
82 Letsas 2007, 40. However, it should be stressed that Convention rights cannot encompass fully 
autonomous concepts if courts in domestic legal orders also apply these rights. If Convention rights entail 
fully autonomous concepts only the Strasbourg Court would apply them.  
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how integrity can be attained when norms of different legal orders are not prima 
facie consistent, or informed by different underlying values.  
 Building on Dworkin´s interpretive legal theory, I maintain that integrity 
can best be seen as a constructive filter through which we assess which norms of 
other legal orders should be applied. Integrity compels a citizen or official to 
consider which rules and principles can be made consistent in an existing body of 
law of a particular legal order and coherent in light of a conception of the values of 
political morality.83 Inconsistency between legal norms of different legal orders may 
be accommodated by assigning relative weight to these norms in light of a more 
abstract justification. For example, a judge may argue that norms of international 
law should trump domestic law because these international norms should be given 
relative weight in light of the justification of these different norms. Incoherence 
between the justification of norms of different legal orders may be also be 
accommodated in a more abstract justification. For example, the justification of 
norms of international law may be made coherent with the judge’s conception of the 
values of political morality. However, in some cases, inconsistencies between norms 
of different legal orders cannot be given relative weight in a more abstract 
justification or these norms can only be understood in light of radically opposing 
justifications. In these cases, integrity is reached by disregarding norms that cannot 
be made consistent in light of a coherent justification. Take, for example, a judge in 
a domestic legal order who needs to determine whether to apply a norm of 
international law that is inconsistent with the body of law in his own legal order and 
incoherent with his conception of the values of political morality. Assuming that 
domestic legal rules and principles fit the existing body of law and provide the most 
coherent justification of the values of political morality, the judge will construct 
integrity in such a way that he will disregard these norms of international law. Thus, 
integrity functions as a constructive filter because legal norms of other legal orders 
                                                 
83 See also Eleftheriadis 2010. However, Eleftheriadis views integrity as a system-like quality of legal 
orders: ‘[i]ntegrity is achieved because the international law respects in principle the claims of the 
constitutional order and vice versa. It is achieved through mutual deference.’ Eleftheriadis 2010, 384. 
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are only applied if they can be made consistent in a body of existing law and against 
the background of one’s conception of the values of political morality. 
The notion of integrity may also be used to develop an interpretive account 
of the relations between officials of different legal orders. This requires a more actor-
driven account of integrity. Kyritsis’ interpretive account of the relations between 
legislatures and courts illustrates how such an actor-driven account of integrity may 
be developed. Kyritsis maintains that the relations between legislatures and courts 
should be considered part of a joint project. He argues that courts and legislatures: 
‘participate in a joint institutional project aimed at governing. They share the 
authority to govern. But their relationship is truly one of shared authority only to the 
extent that it is structured in a way that serves the point of the joint project; for this 
to be the case, it is necessary – though not sufficient – that the project accord with 
principles of political morality regarding the proper allocation of government 
power.’84 Kyritsis views the dimensions of fit and justification in terms of content 
and institutional design.85 For example, when judges interpret a statute they take 
into account the rights and obligations that should follow from a statute and their 
institutional role vis-à-vis other officials in the legal order.86 Thus, in an actor-driven 
account of integrity officials share their authority because they take into 
consideration their institutional role.  
 Kyritsis’s interpretive account of the relations between courts and 
legislatures can be extended to the relations between officials of different legal 
orders.87 When officials of different legal orders are committed to a joint project, their 
exercise of power involves relations of shared authority. On this view, each official 
aims to contribute to a central point, and shares its authority in light of the moral 
aims of this joint project. Letsas’ interpretive account of EU law may be used as an 
illustration of how officials of different legal orders are part of a joint project in which 
                                                 
84 Kyrtisis 2015, 12. 
85 Kyrtisis 2015, 70. 
86 Kyrtisis 2015, 70-71. Kyritsis explains this point in terms of the dimensions of content and institutional 
design. 
87 It should be noted that Kyritsis downplays the role of integrity and thus would probably object to my 
focus on integrity. See Kyrtisis 2015, 101-104. 
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they aim to give effect to EU law.88 He suggests that we should understand EU law 
as a joint project in which officials of the EU and the member states are committed 
to shared goals, such as, for example an internal market: ‘[m]ost EU measures seek 
to advance goals (such as a common market) that work to the mutual advantage of 
Member States and their citizens. EU and national institutions have to coordinate in 
the choice of means (such as free movement of goods, or common currency) for 
pursuing those goals, otherwise the joint venture will fail.’89 On this view, domestic 
and EU officials are part of a joint project in which the exercise of authority is 
informed by the moral aims of shared goals, such as an internal market.90 No official 
has the ultimate authority to determine what rights and obligations follow from EU 
law because these officials are part of a joint project.91 Officials of different legal 
orders are part of a dialectical interplay in which they aim to support a shared goal.  
 Although EU law provides a good illustration of how relations between 
officials of different legal orders can be understood in an interpretive account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders, it should be highlighted that there is no external 
point of view from which considerations of institutional design or cooperation can 
be assessed. In my view, Letsas fails to take into account that integrity cannot be 
constructed from an external point of view.92 The notion of constructive integrity 
highlights that considerations of institutional design or cooperation are always 
assessed in light of one’s own conception of integrity. Integrity is thus inherently 
perspectival. Integrity compels officials to decide from their own point of view 
                                                 
88 Letsas 2012. 
89 Letsas 2012, 101. 
90 Letsas argues that this does not hold for human rights. Given their fundamental nature, human rights 
are not a matter of coordination between officials. See Letsas 2012, 101. 
91 ‘if the relevance and normative weight of EU norms is partly premised on the moral significance of 
there being an ongoing scheme of cooperation between Member States, then nobody is to decide what falls 
within the competence of the EU because this question is objectively determined by moral facts to do with 
principles of social cooperation.’ Letsas 2012, 100. 
92 ‘Human rights are not criterial concepts whose meaning is exhausted by their common usage across 
Contracting States. They are meant to express a moral commitment to objective principles of liberal 
democracy.’ Letsas 2007, 11. He makes a similar claim in his interpretive account of EU law. See Letsas 
2012, 100-102. 
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whether they should take part in institutional cooperation. This means that a court 
or legislature will determine what kind of institutional cooperation between officials 
of different legal orders should be maintained from the point of view of their own 
conception of integrity. The perspectival nature of integrity can be illustrated with 
the Solange, Maastricht and Lisbon decisions of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court.93 In a series of decisions, the Federal Constitutional Court considered that EU 
law should be applied in the German legal order when EU law respects conditions 
as set out in the German constitution. On this view, EU law and its institutions 
should respect fundamental rights, the competences that have been conferred to EU 
institutions by virtue of the German constitution and the constitutional identity of 
the German state. From the perspective of the Federal Constitutional Court, EU law 
could not be made consistent in light of their conception of the values of political 
morality. In these decisions, the Federal Constitutional Court was able to make 
explicit how it constructs integrity from the point of view of the German legal order.  
 The perspectival nature of integrity can also be illustrated with the 
relationship between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights. In the Bosphorus and Avotiņš decisions, the European Court of 
Human Rights argued that it will not review whether states have violated the 
Convention when giving effect to EU law, as long as the EU provides an equal level 
of human rights protection.94 Thus, from the perspective of the European Court of 
Human Rights, a dialectical interplay may exist between the Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg Courts. However, from the perspective of the European Court of 
Justice such a dialectical interplay can only exist if the supremacy of EU law is 
respected.95 This illustrates that the European Court of Justice and the European 
Court of Human Rights construct integrity differently. Although institutional 
cooperation between officials of different legal orders may be justified, there is no 
                                                 
93 BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) (Solange I); 73, 339 (1986) (Solange II); 102, 147 (2000) (Bananas); 89, 155 (1993) 
(Maastricht); 123, 267 (2009) (Lisbon). 
94 Bosphorus v Ireland App no 45036/98 (ECtHR, 30 June 2005); Avotiņš v Latvia App no 17502/07 (ECtHR, 
23 May 2016). 
95 Opinion 2/13 EU EU:C:2014:2454. Melloni suggests a similar view on the relations between national 
courts and the Luxembourg Court. See Case C-399/11 Melloni ECLI:EU:C:2013:107.  
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external point of view from which relations between officials may be understood. 
Thus, an official is informed by his own conception of integrity when he assesses 
whether and how he should take part in institutional cooperation. 
 
5.2 The strengths and weaknesses of an interpretive account of 
the intertwinement of legal orders 
 
In light of our conception of integrity we incorporate rules and principles of other 
legal orders. On this view, officials incorporate legal norms of other legal orders if 
they can be made consistent with the norms in their legal order and coherent in light 
of their conception of the values of political morality. Inconsistency between norms 
or incoherence in their justification may be resolved by giving relative weight to 
these norms and their underlying justification in light of a more abstract justification. 
However, in some cases inconsistency between norms of different legal orders or 
incoherence in their justification cannot be given relative weight in a more abstract 
justification. For example, a judge in a domestic legal order will not give effect to a 
norm of another legal order if this norm cannot be made consistent with domestic 
law and coherent in his conception of the values of political morality. However, a 
norm of another legal order will be incorporated if this norm can be made consistent 
with existing law and made coherent in light of justification of the values of justice 
and fairness. On this view, integrity should be seen as a constructive filter, sifting 
out legal norms that cannot be made consistent and coherent. 
 Although the incorporation of legal norms and the possibility of norm 
conflicts can be articulated in an interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders, persistent conflicts between norms cannot be conceptualized. A conflict 
between norms of different legal orders challenges the interpretive understanding 
of a citizen or judge of the relevant legal rules and principles. In order to solve such 
a conflict, one needs to take into account the dimensions of fit and justification. A 
conflict between norms of different legal orders can be resolved by giving relative 
weight to these norms and their underlying justification in light of a more abstract 
justification. However, persistent conflicts between norms of different legal orders 
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do not exist in an interpretive account of the relations between legal orders. Legal 
norms that conflict with one’s own conception of integrity are disregarded. Here 
Letsas’ claim that ‘[l]aw, on the non-positivist account, will turn out to be essentially 
harmonic’ is correct in the sense that persistent conflicts between norms of different 
legal orders cannot be articulated.96 Thus, norm conflicts are resolved or disregarded 
in light of one’s conception of integrity. 
 The intertwinement of legal orders also concerns the exercise of authority by 
officials. In Dworkin’s legal theory, the authority of an official is dependent on the 
question whether its exercise of power is consistent with its previous decisions and 
justified in light of the values of political morality. Kyritsis captures this point well 
in relation to the authority of adjudicative officials: ‘[i]n order to perform his role 
adequately, the judge must always look over his shoulder to see whether the 
legislature has decided something that is relevant to the case before him. If he finds 
in the legislative record a pertinent decision, he must further ascertain whether he 
has a special kind of moral reason to give it effect.’97 In some cases, officials of 
different legal orders are part of a joint project in which they exercise authority in 
relation to each other. For example, EU law can be understood in terms of a joint 
project in which national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union share 
their authority.98  
 Although officials of different legal orders may be considered part of a joint 
project, they understand authority claims from their point of view. This entails that 
officials consider how authority is best exercised in light of their own conception of 
integrity. This point can be illustrated with the decisions of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court that challenge the supremacy of EU law. Assuming that EU 
law entails a joint project in which EU member state officials share authority with 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, how these officials understand relations 
across legal orders depends on their conception of integrity. From the perspective of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, EU law should trump domestic law, 
                                                 
96 Letsas 2012, 99. 
97 Kyritsis 2015, 91. 
98 Letsas 2012. 
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such as, for example, the German constitution. However, from a German 
perspective, EU law should only be applied in the German legal order insofar as 
these norms can be made consistent and coherent in the German conception of 
integrity. Thus, an interpretive account of the relations between legal orders brings 
to light how officials accept or contest the authority of other officials in light of their 
own conception of integrity. 
 And although an interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders 
can explain why officials accept or contest the authority of other officials in light of 
their conception of integrity, no argument can be given why officials persistently 
construct integrity differently. From the perspective of Dworkin’s interpretive legal 
theory, disagreement may exist on how officials exercise their authority. One could 
argue that the Solange decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
illustrate that this kind of disagreement is often resolved in practice over time.99 
However, in some cases persistent contestation is not resolved. Even when officials 
of different legal orders are part of a joint project, officials may differ in how they 
exercise their authority in a legal order. Cases such as Benthem, Kleyn and Salah 
Sheekh illustrate that officials of different legal orders may disagree on how authority 
should be exercised even though it seems that they are committed to a joint project.100 
In these cases, the Dutch Council of State and the European Court of Human Rights 
are both committed to the protection of fundamental rights, but disagree on how 
these rights should be applied. Cases such as Benthem, Kleyn and Salah Sheekh pose a 
challenge to an interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders because 
officials do not always construct integrity in the same way over time even though 
they seem committed to a joint project. Thus, an interpretive account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders is unable to explain why persistent contestation 
between officials of different legal orders exist. 
                                                 
99 BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) (Solange I); 73, 339 (1986) (Solange II); 102, 147 (2000) (Bananas). 
100 Benthem v The Netherlands App no 8848/80 (ECtHR, 23 October 1985); Kleyn and others v The Netherlands 
App no 39343/98; 39651/98; 43147/98; 46664/99 (ECtHR, 6 May 2003); Salah Sheekh v The Netherlands App 
no 1948/04 (ECtHR, 11 January 2007). 
103 
 
 The main strength of an interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders is its ability to explain these complex relations even though conflict and 
contestation may exist. Norms of other legal orders may be incorporated or given 
effect when they fit with the existing body of law and are coherent in light of a 
conception of the values of political morality. Norms of different legal orders may 
be inconsistent or represent different values. For example, a judge may be 
confronted with norms that in some respects conflict with the existing body of law 
in his legal order or may conflict with his conception of the values of political 
morality. Norm conflicts are resolved by considering how norms and their 
underlying justification should be given relative weight in light of a more abstract 
justification. Relations between officials of different legal orders may develop when 
these officials are part of a joint project. On this view, the exercise of authority by 
other officials is accepted in light of one’s own conception of integrity. The central 
weaknesses of an interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders is its 
inability to make sense of persistent conflict and contestation. If norm conflicts 
cannot be resolved the conflicting rules and principles will be disregarded because 
they cannot be made part of a consistent and coherent conception of integrity. This 
also holds for the authority of officials. Persistent contestation of the authority of 
officials cannot be articulated. Persistent conflicts and contestation undermine the 
central idea of Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory that integrity functions as a 
constructive filter through which we may remedy conflict and contestation between 
legal orders. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have explored Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory with a particular 
focus on the notion of integrity. Dworkin maintains that law should be 
conceptualized as an interpretive concept because we may fundamentally disagree 
on how law should be understood. When we apply a rule or principle, we rely on a 
justification of the underlying values of these legal norms. The Protestant 
interpretive attitude entails that citizens and officials may determine what rights and 
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obligations follow from their conception of integrity. I have illustrated the value of 
integrity with Dworkin’s account of adjudication. On Dworkin’s view, judges aim 
to reach a decision that fits in the existing body of case law and asserts the most 
coherent account of the values of political morality. Surprisingly, Dworkin fails to 
connect his interpretive account of international law with his interpretive legal 
theory. I have argued that a more convincing interpretive account on international 
law centers on the notion of integrity. The value of integrity compels us to 
consistently apply norms of international law in light of a justification that is distinct 
from domestic law. 
 In my interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders I have 
argued that integrity can best be seen as a constructive filter. On this view, we sift 
out rules and principles of other legal orders that cannot be made consistent in an 
existing body of law and made coherent in light of one’s conception of the values of 
political morality. Possible norm conflicts are resolved in light of a more abstract 
justification of these legal norms. Relations of officials of different legal orders exist 
when officials are committed to a joint project. Nonetheless, relations between 
officials will always be considered in light of their own conception of integrity. The 
main strength of an interpretive account of the relations between legal orders is its 
ability to make sense of both the interconnections and frictions between legal orders. 
However, persistent norm conflicts and contestation between officials cannot be 
explained in an interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders. 
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Chapter 4 
Karl Llewellyn and Philip Selznick’s pragmatist 
legal theories: intersecting sub-practices 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Karl Llewellyn and Philip Selznick’s pragmatist legal theories incorporate insights 
from the social sciences to construct a sociologically informed account of law. Legal 
pragmatists like Llewellyn and Selznick often make a distinction between law’s 
functional and ideal dimension. On this view, law contributes to social ordering, but 
is also oriented towards values and ideals. In this chapter, I explore Llewellyn and 
Selznick’s legal theories to critically reconstruct a pragmatist account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders. I will argue that the intertwinement of legal orders 
should be understood in terms of intersecting legal sub-practices. A multitude of 
norms and officials are perceived authoritative when different legal sub-practices 
intersect. 
 In this chapter, I will first argue that Llewellyn and Selznick are committed 
to socio-legal jurisprudence because their theories incorporate insights from the 
social sciences (section 2). Their legal theories should also be understood against the 
background of American pragmatist philosophy, and in particular the claim that 
facts and values are entangled. Legal pragmatists like Llewellyn and Selznick 
conceptualize law as a social practice in which a functional and ideal dimension can 
be identified (section 3). Law’s functional dimension makes clear how law 
contributes to social ordering, while its ideal dimension highlights the values and 
ideals that are embedded in its practice. Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories lack 
a solid account of legal norms. Therefore, I will build on Fuller’s typology of enacted 
and interactional law to argue that legal norms emerge from interactional 
expectations between citizens and officials. In the following section, I will develop a 
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pragmatist account of international law (section 4). Lastly, I will critically reconstruct 
a pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders and introduce the notion 
of intersecting legal sub-practices (section 5). 
 
2 The socio-legal tradition: Llewellyn and Selznick’s 
pragmatist legal theories 
 
Karl Llewellyn and Philip Selznick’s legal theories should be situated in the socio-
legal tradition of jurisprudence because their theories incorporate anthropological 
and sociological insights. Moreover, Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories should 
be understood against the background of American pragmatist philosophy. 
 In this section, I will argue that legal philosophers committed to socio-legal 
jurisprudence are naturalists in a methodological sense. On this view, legal theories 
cannot be based solely on a priori claims, but should also build on a posteriori claims 
about law. Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories build on a posteriori claims about 
law. I will also argue that Llewellyn and Selznick’s contextual and value-laden 
account of law is informed by the pragmatist idea that fact and values are entangled. 
 
2.1 Methodological naturalism 
 
Legal theories in the socio-legal tradition are informed by the naturalist idea that 
philosophical reasoning cannot be based solely on a priori claims. An a priori claim is 
justified in light of a concept itself. A posteriori claims are based on experience. For 
example, ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ is an a priori claim because no a posteriori 
knowledge of bachelors is needed to justify this claim.1 Naturalists deny that we can 
do philosophy solely based on a priori claims because philosophers inevitably rely 
on claims that follow from experience. Or as Leiter explains this point: ‘[t]he 
naturalist, following Quine, rejects the idea that there could be a “first philosophy”, 
                                                 
1 Baehr 2016, cited in Tamanaha 2017. 
107 
 
a philosophical solution to problems that proceeds a priori, that is, prior to any 
experience.’2 This means that legal theories cannot rely solely on a priori claims. A 
legal theory should incorporate an economic, sociological or anthropological 
perspective to incorporate a posteriori claims about law. Legal theories in the socio-
legal tradition may also be rooted in the practical experience of lawyers.3 Two types 
of methodological naturalism can be distinguished.4 Firstly, methodological 
naturalists may argue that philosophical insights should be coherent with a posteriori 
claims. This entails that legal theories should not contradict with a posteriori claims 
about law. Secondly, methodological naturalists may argue that philosophers 
should only use methods that contribute to a posteriori knowledge. For example, 
empirical methods may be used to construct a legal theory. 
 Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories are informed by the first type of 
methodological naturalism. They rely on a posteriori claims from the social sciences 
to arrive at a sociologically informed legal theory. Llewellyn’s legal theory takes 
inspiration from an anthropological study on the Cheyenne native Americans, 
which Llewellyn conducted with Edward Hoebel.5 Based on Hoebel’s 
anthropological work, Llewellyn presents a more general legal theory.6 Selznick also 
relies on social scientific insights in his legal theory. For example, his developmental 
model of law and his study on the emergence of public law values in the relations 
between employers and employees of American industry are informed by 
sociological studies and theories.7 These insights are central to Selznick’s argument 
that law should be understood as a social practice governed by the master ideal of 
legality. 
 
                                                 
2 Leiter 2007, 34. [footnote omitted] 
3 Tamanaha 2017; Cotterrell 2018. 
4 See Leiter 2007, 34. 
5 Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941. 
6 Llewellyn 1940. 
7 Selznick 1969; Nonet and Selznick 2001. 
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2.2 Value-ladenness and contextualism 
 
In order to understand fully Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories it is important 
to highlight the influence of American pragmatist philosophy in their work.8 
American pragmatist philosophy is a school of philosophical ideas founded by 
Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey, and further developed by thinkers, 
such as, for example, Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.9 A pragmatist idea that 
informs Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories in particular is the view that facts 
and values are necessarily entangled.10 Pragmatist philosophers maintain that we 
cannot understand social phenomena from a purely descriptive point of view 
because humans necessarily ascribe value to the world. Evaluation is embedded in 
how we understand and perceive social phenomena because there is no non-
evaluative point of view from which we understand our world. This may be 
illustrated with Richard Rorty’s critique of the metaphor of the mind as a mirror. 
Rorty maintains that it is common to see philosophy as an attempt to grasp the world 
from an objective and non-normative point of view.11 He argues that the metaphor 
of the mind as a mirror is misleading: ‘[t]he picture which holds traditional 
philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various 
representations – some accurate, some not – and capable of being studied by pure, 
nonempirical methods.’ On Rorty’s view, we cannot study the world from an 
objective and non-normative point of view because we as individuals necessarily 
perceive our world from a value-laden perspective. This means that we do not have 
access to a ‘value-free vocabulary’ to understand and conceptualize our world.12 
                                                 
8 Some legal pragmatists maintain that pragmatist philosophy can be of no relevance to a legal theory. 
See, for example, Grey 1998; Posner 2003. In this section, I show how pragmatist philosophy has 
successfully been incorporated in Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories. See also the extensive study in 
De Been 2008 on the influence of pragmatist philosophy in the American Legal Realist movement. 
9 Bernstein 2010. 
10 Putnam 2002. 
11 Rorty 2009, 12. 
12 Rorty 2009, 364. 
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 Pragmatists maintain that human inquiry is value-laden because our aim to 
understand our world is fueled by the human need to solve practical problems. From 
a pragmatist perspective human action drives human inquiry. This point may be 
illustrated with John Dewey’s critique of spectator theories of knowledge. Dewey 
maintains that spectator theories of knowledge are incorrect because they falsely 
assume that philosophy is a matter of perceiving objective truth. Instead, human 
inquiry entails an active engagement with real felt problems. Or as he explains: ‘[i]f 
we see that knowing is not the act of an outside spectator but of a participator inside 
the natural and social scene, then the true object of knowledge resides in the 
consequences of direct action.’13 This means that human inquiry is inherently 
contextual because it is driven by our aim to grasp our practical needs and direct 
human action. Thus, from a pragmatist perspective human inquiry is contextual in 
nature. 
 Llewellyn and Selznick’s contextual and value-laden account of law is 
informed by the pragmatist idea that facts and values are entangled. Llewellyn 
considers law primarily as a social practice that contributes to social ordering. 
Adjudicating disputes, managing expectations, attributing authority, establishing 
common goals and institutionalizing these activities contribute to maintaining social 
relations. Llewellyn argues that these law-jobs contribute to the survival and 
flourishing of society.14 This means that these law-jobs should be seen as purposive 
activities that contribute to the wellbeing of society. Nevertheless, Llewellyn’s 
primary focus is on how the law-jobs contribute to the survival of society.15 
However, in Selznick’s legal theory, values play a more prominent role. Selznick 
conceptualizes social practices, such as, for example, law, in light of their master 
ideals and often reflects on whether these master ideals themselves should be 
considered justifiable. He maintains that law should be understood in light of the 
master ideal of legality.16 Krygier distinguishes between four stages of value-
                                                 
13 Dewey 2008, 157. 
14 Llewellyn 1940. 
15 See also Twining 2009, 107. 
16 Selznick 1969. 
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ladenness to clarify the growing importance of values in Selznick’s work.17 In the 
first stage, values are considered important to how individuals view themselves and 
their behavior. In the second stage, values are considered important to the 
researcher’s’ understanding of social practices. In the third stage, social practices, 
such as, for example, law, are evaluated in light of their inherent values. In the fourth 
and last stage, social practices are evaluated in light of one’s own personal values. 
In each successive stage, values play a more prominent role in the way law is 
understood. Krygier explains that Selznick’s ideas have developed into the fourth 
stage of personal evaluative assessment over time. At times it is difficult to 
distinguish between the different stages in his later work.18 
 Some critics have argued that pragmatist legal theories are devoid of 
substantive insights. On this view, pragmatist legal theories are methodological in 
nature, only emphasizing the importance of scientific methods and insights.19 
However, this critique should be considered unpersuasive for two reasons. Firstly, 
this critique mischaracterizes the role of a posteriori claims in pragmatist legal 
theories. A posteriori claims about law are an integral part of legal theories in the 
socio-legal tradition. Disregarding the important role of social science insights in 
Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories would lead to an impoverished view of these 
theories. Secondly, pragmatist legal theories offer substantive insights in that they 
conceptualize law as a purposive practice. Here it is helpful to distinguish between 
purposiveness in a thin and thick sense. Llewellyn is committed to a purposive 
account of law in a thin sense because he does not assign law a central value. 
However, this does not mean that law does not have any normative point. The 
performance of the law-jobs contributes to the survival and flourishing of society. 
Selznick, on the other hand, conceptualizes law as a purposive practice in a thick 
sense. He assigns values to social practices, such as law. In his work, Selznick went 
                                                 
17 Krygier 2012 204-205. 
18 Krygier 2012, 205-206. 
19 Tamanaha 1999, 34-35.  
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beyond a ‘clinical assessment’ of the values central to the social practices and often 
considered whether the values themselves are justifiable.20 
 
3 Llewellyn and Selznick on law as a social practice 
 
Both Llewellyn and Selznick consider law to be a social practice in which a functional 
and ideal dimension can be distinguished. Llewellyn’s legal theory primarily 
addresses the functional dimension of law by explaining how adjudicating disputes, 
managing expectations, attributing authority, establishing common goals and the 
institutionalization of these activities contributes to social ordering. Selznick’s legal 
theory pays more attention to the ideal dimension by highlighting the values 
embedded in the social practice of law. 
 In this section, I will explore Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories in light 
of law’s functional and ideal dimension. Implicit in Llewellyn and Selznick’s account 
of law is the view that legal norms emerge in light of social interactions. Building on 
the work of Lon Fuller, I will construct an account of legal norms from a legal 
pragmatist perspective and argue that legal norms are rooted in interactional 
expectations. 
 
3.1  Law’s functional and ideal dimensions 
 
Pragmatist legal theories conceptualize law in terms of a social practice. A social 
practice may be defined as ‘any coherent and complex form of socially established 
co-operative human activity.’21 Social practices are interactional in nature because 
they arise out of social relations between individuals. For example, Llewellyn’s law-
jobs theory illustrates how the adjudication of disputes is crucial for the maintenance 
                                                 
20 Krygier 2012, 206. 
21 Van der Burg 2014, 25. Van der Burg partly relies on MacIntyre’s notion of a practice. See also Tamanaha 
1999, 167-172 on the notion of a practice.  
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of social relations.22 In Selznick’s legal theory, law is also conceptualized as a social 
practice that sustains social relations: ‘[p]ositive law is the product of legal problem 
solving. The legal order has the job of producing positive law as society's best effort 
to regulate conduct and settle disputes.’23 Law can be distinguished from other social 
practices because each social practice is oriented towards a central point.24 In 
Llewellyn’s law-jobs theory, the central point of law entails the performance of five 
law-jobs. In Selznick’s legal theory, the central point of law is understood in light of 
the master ideal of legality; the progressive reduction of arbitrary power through 
positive law. 
 In a social practice, different sub-practices may be identified. Legal sub-
practices may be identified by highlighting the types of social relations that law 
regulates. For example, public and private law can be understood as legal sub-
practices. In public law, social interactions primarily concern vertical relations 
between officials and citizens, while in private law social interactions concern 
horizontal relations between citizens. Moreover, law’s relative autonomy as a social 
practice should also be taken into account when distinguishing between legal sub-
practices. The variance in significance of law’s central point brings to light different 
legal sub-practices. Consider, for example, the difference between legislation and 
adjudication in terms of values.25 Legislation is a sub-practice of law aimed at 
adopting legal rules. In this sub-practice, legal values play a more indirect role 
because legislation requires a balance between legal values and values of other social 
practices. For example, legislation may incorporate political values, such as, 
economic growth or a clean environment. In the sub-practice of adjudication legal 
values play a more direct role because dispute resolution in concrete cases should 
generally exclude political considerations. This does not entail that political values 
do not play a role in adjudication. The judge may take into account the political 
values that have informed legislation when he applies legal rules in a concrete case. 
                                                 
22 Llewellyn 1940, 1375-1376. 
23 Selznick 1961, 99. 
24 Twining 2009, 110-111. 
25 Taekema 2003, 190-191. 
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However, these political values play a more indirect role in adjudication when 
compared to the sub-practice of legislation.26 
 In conceptualizing law as a social practice, legal pragmatists often 
distinguish between its functional and ideal dimension. The functional dimension 
of law explains how law contributes to social ordering. On this view, law does not 
necessarily lead to social order. Instead, law’s functional dimension brings to light 
how the social practice of law helps to maintain social relations.27 Law’s ideal 
dimension pertains to the values and ideals that are embedded in social practices. 
Values capture the central aims pursued by individuals in a practice. Ideals address 
the unrealized aspects of these values.28 Llewellyn relies on the distinction between 
law’s functional and ideal dimension when distinguishing between the ‘bare-bones’ 
and ‘questing’ aspects of five law-jobs.29 Similarly, Selznick separates the ‘baseline’ 
from the ‘flourishing’ of social practices.30 Although Llewellyn and Selznick 
distinguish between law’s functional and ideal dimension, they each focus on a 
particular dimension in their legal theories. Llewellyn’s legal theory pays more 
attention to the functional dimension, while Selznick’s work highlights law’s ideal 
dimension.  
Llewellyn’s law-jobs theory identifies five different law-jobs.31 These law-
jobs are seen as activities that are carried out by individuals in a community. 
Llewellyn’s theory is informed by an anthropological study he conducted with 
Edward Hoebel. This anthropological study shows, for example, that in native 
American societies community leaders carry out these tasks. Llewellyn maintains 
that these law-jobs are to be found in any well-functioning society. These law-jobs 
can be identified for a society as a whole, but also for any distinct part.32 The first 
                                                 
26 Taekema 2003, 190-191; Van der Burg 2014, 157-158. 
27 On the difference between social order and social ordering, see Twining 2009, 97-99.  
28 I adopt Taekema’s terminology on values and ideals. See Taekema 2003.  
29 Llewellyn 1940, 1375. 
30 Selznick 1992, 34. 
31 Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941, and presented concisely in Llewellyn 1940. 
32 Llewellyn 1940, 1374. 
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law-job concerns the adjudication of disputes between individuals.33 The second 
law-job is aimed towards preventing such disputes by regulating expectations. For 
example, managing the expectations between individuals through legal norms will 
contribute to this goal.34 The third law-job concerns the attribution of authority to 
officials. This law-job ensures that it is clear who may assign authority to officials.35 
The fourth law-job concerns what Llewellyn calls net drive. This law-job entails that 
in a given practice the three other law-jobs are done in light of a common goal. 
Therefore, the fourth law-job ensures that a society is given direction by establishing 
common goals and carrying out the law-jobs in light of these goals.36 Llewellyn also 
identifies a fifth law-job, called juristic method. The law-job of juristic method entails 
the institutionalization of these law-jobs through organizations. For example, courts 
resolve dispute on the basis of procedures through which parties can present their 
legal claims.37 
 In his legal theory, Llewellyn pays particular attention to how these five 
law-jobs contribute to social ordering. Llewellyn distinguishes between the ‘bare-
bones’ and ‘questing’ aspects of adjudicating of disputes, managing expectations, 
attributing authority, establishing common goals and the institutionalization of 
these activities.38 The ‘bare-bones’ aspect of the law-jobs clarifies how these activities 
contribute to social ordering. On this view, the performance of these law-jobs is 
necessary for the survival of society: ‘Each alone, and all together, present first of all 
a basic aspect, one of pure survival, a bare-bones. The job must get done enough to 
keep the group going.’39 Llewellyn makes a distinction between two elements of the 
‘questing’ aspect of these law-jobs.40 Firstly, the performance of these law-jobs may 
be improved in terms of efficacy. For example, disputes can be resolved more 
                                                 
33 Llewellyn 1940, 1375-1376. 
34 Llewellyn 1940, 1376-1383. 
35 Llewellyn 1940, 1383-1387. 
36 Llewellyn 1940, 1387-1391. 
37 Llewellyn 1940, 1392-1395. 
38 Llewellyn 1940, 1375. 
39 Llewellyn 1940, 1375. 
40 Llewellyn 1940, 1375. 
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quickly. Secondly, the performance of these law-jobs may be improved in light of 
more general societal values. Llewellyn highlights the connection between the law-
job of establishing common goals and the more general value of justice: ‘it is under 
this Net Drive focus that one can most readily pick out that phase of the Justice ideal 
which looks to long-range welfare of the Entirety.’41 However, what the value of 
justice entails and how this value is related to law remains unclear in Llewellyn’s 
law-jobs theory. 
 Selznick’s legal theory provides a more comprehensive account of law’s 
ideal dimension. He maintains that social practices should be studied in light of their 
implicit values and ideals: ´It is impossible to understand any of these phenomena 
without also understanding what ideal states are to be approximated. In addition 
we must understand what forces are produced within the system, and what 
pressures exerted on it which inhibit or facilitate fulfilling the ideal.´42 The central 
value of a social practice is called its master ideal. The master ideal of law is legality.43 
What the master ideal of legality entails changes over time, given the social context 
in which law develops. This can be illustrated with Selznick and Nonet’s argument 
that in western liberal democracies law has shifted towards responsive forms.44 In 
many western liberal democracies, law is considered to protect individuals from 
arbitrary exercise of power through institutionalized procedures and legal rules. 
Nonet and Selznick call these forms of law autonomous.45 Autonomous law has 
developed out of repressive forms of law. Under repressive law, law is used to 
further the aims of those in power.46 Autonomous law entails a separation between 
politics and law. In many western liberal democracies law also functions as an 
instrument to further substantive justice. Nonet and Selznick call these forms of law 
responsive.47 Nonet and Selznick argue that the shift from autonomous law to 
                                                 
41 Llewellyn 1940, 1391. 
42 Selznick 1961, 87. 
43 Selznick 1961; 1969; Nonet and Selznick 2001. 
44 Nonet and Selznick 2001. 
45 Nonet and Selznick 2001, 54. 
46 Nonet and Selznick 2001, 33. 
47 Nonet and Selznick 2001, 78. 
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responsive law entails a shift in conception of the master ideal of legality. In 
responsive forms of law legality entails a commitment towards substantive justice 
while under autonomous law the value of legality entails a commitment towards 
procedural fairness.48 
 Selznick’s legal theory provides a more extensive account of law’s ideal 
dimension compared to Llewellyn. Similar to Llewellyn, Selznick distinguishes 
between the ‘baseline’ and ‘flourishing’ of a social practice.49 Selznick acknowledges 
the importance of the functional dimension of social practices. However, his main 
concern is under which conditions values embedded in a social practice can flourish 
and how we can contribute to their realization, for example, by institutionalizing 
values through organizations: ‘[i]n normative systems, it should be noted, terms like 
"maintenance" and "survival" are relevant but not adequate. They do not prepare us 
for observing, when it occurs, the evolutionary development of the system toward 
increased realization of its implicit ideals.’50 For example, in his study on the 
emergence of public law principles in the relations between employers and 
employees of American industry, Selznick explores whether principles of the rule of 
law have become important in contexts that are generally understood to be part of 
private law.51 When compared to Llewellyn’s law-jobs theory, Nonet and Selznick’s 
developmental model also provides an account of the relation between legal values 
and justice. Although I agree with Nonet and Selznick that different conceptions of 
the master ideal of legality have developed in western liberal democracies, the shift 
towards responsive law points towards the emergence of another central value next 
to legality. Following Taekema, I maintain that Nonet and Selznick’s developmental 
model illustrates that in responsive forms of law justice has become a central value 
next to legality.52 Legal orders in which autonomous and responsive forms of law 
can be identified should therefore be understood in light of two values: legality and 
justice. Legality entails a commitment towards the reduction of arbitrary exercise of 
                                                 
48 Nonet and Selznick 2001, 16. 
49 Selznick 1992, 34. 
50 Selznick 1961, 91. 
51 Selznick 1969.  
52 Taekema 2003, 183-184. 
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power through positive law. Justice demands a commitment to the values of fairness 
and equality. Fairness entails that individuals have an equal say, while equality 
requires individuals to treat similar cases alike.53 
 
3.2 The interactional underpinnings of legal norms 
 
A drawback of Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories is that they do not explain 
how legal norms emerge from the interactional expectations of law as a social 
practice. Postema’s account of Fuller’s typology of enacted law and interactional law 
provides an insightful account of how legal norms are embedded in the interactional 
expectations of law as a social practice. Moreover, Fuller’s ideas share many 
affinities with legal pragmatist legal theories.54 Therefore, I will construct a legal 
pragmatist account of legal norms by using Postema’s account of Fuller’s typology 
of enacted law and interactional law.55 In Fuller’s typology, two forms of law are 
distinguished: enacted and interactional law. Enacted law entails legal norms that 
have been promulgated by officials. Enacted forms of law imply a vertical relation 
between an official and the addressee of a legal norm, a citizen or another official. 
Legal norms laid down in statutes, for example, can be considered enacted law. 
Interactional law entails legal norms that arise out of sustained social interactions 
between citizens. Interactional forms of law therefore concern horizontal relations. 
For example, customary law comes into being based on social interaction instead of 
formal enactment by officials. 
 There is an important commonality between enacted and interactional 
forms of law. Both enacted and interactional law should be embedded in 
                                                 
53 Taekema 2003, 192. 
54 On the affinities between American pragmatist philosophy and Lon Fuller’s ideas see Winston 1988; 
Rundle 2012, 46-47. 
55 Postema 1999; Fuller 1981. It should be noted that Postema uses a different terminology. Instead of 
distinguishing between enacted and interactional law he relies on Fuller’s distinction between made and 
implicit legal rules. See Postema 1999, 256. This latter distinction is confusing because it suggests that 
implicit legal rules, such as customary law and contracts, are not explicit in nature. This is not the case. I 
follow Van der Burg 2014, 99 in distinguishing between enacted and interactional forms of law. 
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interactional expectations. For legal norms to have normative force they must be 
consistent with the underlying interactional expectations that citizens have with 
regard to what behavior is prescribed or prohibited.56 In the case of interactional law, 
interactional expectations between individuals have developed into norms, based 
on which individuals can anticipate each other’s behavior. In the case of enacted law, 
individuals expect officials to enact legal norms that are congruent with the 
interactional expectations concerning their meaning and scope.57 Fuller maintains 
that this entails a reciprocal relation between official and norm addressee.58 Citizens 
are expected to follow legal norms insofar as they are consistent with general 
interactional expectations and officials are expected to enact legal norms that are 
congruent with the interactional expectations of citizens. 
 Enacted and interactional legal norms help to sustain social interactions in 
different ways. Interactional law entails legal norms that help to stabilize 
interactional expectations. For example, customary law encompasses interactional 
norms that help to stabilize interactional expectations between citizens. Enacted 
laws, on the other hand, have normative force by virtue of the officials that sustain 
interactional expectations.59 An important aspect of how officials are able to sustain 
social interactions through legal norms is by coordination. Enacted laws may 
contribute to the coordination of social interactions between individuals, but also 
between different officials. Officials may solve coordination problems when there 
are different possibilities to further social interactions.60 Take, for example, statutory 
traffic laws. Different types of traffic laws may be adopted to protect traffic users. If 
statutory traffic laws can improve the conditions for all traffic users, officials may 
decide to regulate traffic in a particular way through legal norms. Coordination by 
officials may be necessary in cases where this would improve the social interactions 
                                                 
56 Postema 1999, 265. 
57 Postema 1999, 261. 
58 Postema 1999, 264. 
59 Postema 1999, 274-275. 
60 On the coordinative function of law, see Postema 1982, 174. See also Ehrenberg 2016, 182-187. 
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of all citizens.61 On this view, officials can be seen as referees.62 Their decisions help 
to further the interactional expectations of the players who are committed to the 
game. Referees determine which decisions need to be taken in order to sustain and 
further develop the interactional expectations of the players. Similar to referees, 
officials should contribute to the interactional expectations by way of coordinating 
social interactions. 
 Pragmatists highlight that legal norms are rooted in the problem-solving 
ability of individuals. Pragmatist philosopher John Dewey argues, for example, that 
legal norms should be understood as working hypotheses. Legal norms are working 
hypotheses because they offer workable solutions to problems that have been 
encountered in the past. This means that the normative force of a legal norm is 
contextually dependent: ‘But if they [legal rules] are conceived as tools to be adapted 
to the conditions in which they are employed rather than as absolute and intrinsic 
“principles,” attention will go to the facts of social life, and the rule will not be 
allowed to engross attention and become absolute truths to be maintained intact at 
all costs.’63 Nonetheless, the contextual nature of the normative force of legal norms 
should not be overemphasized. Legal pragmatists do not mean to suggest that in 
following legal norms we always consciously establish whether a norm provides a 
workable solution to sustain social relations. The normative force of legal norms will 
often remain implicit because these norms are embedded in interactional 
expectations. Legal norms are habitually followed because their normative force 
follows from these expectations. For example, citizens will generally follow 
contracts, rules of customary law and legislation when these norms are congruent 
with the underlying interactional expectations concerning their meaning and scope. 
Only when these underlying interactional expectations are called into question do 
citizens or officials need to consciously reflect on whether a legal norm provides a 
workable solution to sustain social relations. Thus, when enacted and interactional 
                                                 
61 Enacted laws may also serve other functions, such as, for example, expressing generally shared values. 
On the symbolic function of law see, for example, Zeegers, Witteveen and Van Klink 2005. 
62 Postema 1999, 275. 
63 Dewey 1998. 361. 
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legal norms are congruent to their underlying interactional expectations they will 
generally be followed.64 
 The view that legal norms should be understood in terms of working 
hypotheses entails that they can be considered both a means and an end-in-
themselves. Here it is important to highlight the pragmatist idea of means and ends 
entanglement.65 On this view, ends cannot be justified in isolation from their means. 
For example, whether you want to go to a picnic depends on the means at your 
disposal to make it an enjoyable picnic. Means also influence the ends individuals 
wish to pursue. For example, going on a picnic may become an end worth pursuing 
because you have the means to pursue this end.66 Means and ends are also 
contextually dependent. Going on a picnic may be considered an end in one context, 
but it may also be considered a means to a particular end in other contexts. Given 
the interdependence of means and ends, a legal norm can be considered both a 
means and an end-in itself. Depending upon the context in which a legal norm is 
understood, it may be pursued in light of the central point of the practice or law, or 
a legal norm may be followed as a means to other ends. Or as Taekema explains: 
‘legal rules can be part of a purposive activity, even if such activity is contrary to the 
purposes for which the rules were adopted. The means created by law can often be 
put to use in different ways, sometimes turning out to be more flexible than 
intended.’67 
 It is important to highlight that for legal pragmatists the distinction between 
legal and non-legal norms is dependent on the context in which a norm is 
experienced. This may be illustrated with two examples from the field of private 
law.68 In tort law, a party may be held liable based on standards that implicitly refer 
to social or moral norms, such as, for example, a moral duty of care. Judges rely on 
the interactional expectations of the parties concerning this standard in order to 
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65 Selznick 1992, 328. 
66 Selznick 1992, 328. 
67 Taekema 2017, 125. 
68 Taekema 2014, 144-148. 
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decide whether a legal norm has been violated. A similar example can be given in 
contract law. When disputes arise between parties, a contract will be interpreted in 
light of the interactional expectations the parties had in relation to each other when 
they concluded the agreement. These interactional expectations are not purely legal; 
they can only be understood when moral and social norms are taken into account. 
When judges review cases that deal with liability and contract, the norms that are 
applied can be considered primarily legal. Liability rules provide remedies to 
compensate for harmful social interactions, such as, for example, negligence. 
Contracts help to regulate social interactions by further formalizing the expectations 
of parties through legal norms and by creating a fair balance between the burdens 
of the parties. Liability rules and contracts should therefore be considered primarily 
legal in nature. However, liability rules and contracts cannot be understood in 
isolation from other social practices. Although liability rules and contracts can be 
considered primarily legal, they also contribute to, for example, economic growth 
and social customs. Thus, the context in which interactional expectations are 
understood is of importance to determine whether a norm should be considered 
primarily legal in nature. 
 
4 International law as a social practice 
 
Llewellyn and Selznick have formulated their legal theories with Native American 
communities and industrial relations in mind. They did not consider how their legal 
theories might apply to law beyond a domestic context. In this section, I explore how 
international law should be understood from the perspective of Llewellyn, Selznick 
and Fuller’s legal theories. 
 In this section, I explore the functional and ideal dimension of international 
law. When applied to international law, Llewellyn’s law-jobs theory illustrates that 
adjudicating disputes, managing expectations, attributing authority, establishing 
common goals and the institutionalization of the law-jobs contribute to social 
ordering between states and individuals in an international context. Building on 
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Brunnée and Toope’s interactional account of international law, I will claim that the 
master ideal of international law is legality. 
 
4.1 The functional and ideal dimensions of international law 
 
In its functional dimension, international law contributes to social ordering between 
states and individuals.69 This can be illustrated by applying Llewellyn’s law-jobs 
theory to EU law. The first law-job of Llewellyn’s legal theory concerns dispute 
resolution. The Court of Justice of the European Union resolves disputes concerning 
the validity and interpretation of EU law.70 The second law-job involves preventive 
channeling. The institutions of the European Union manage expectations by way of 
issuing decisions, guidelines, norms and best practices. For example, the European 
Parliament and the Council manage expectations by enacting directives and 
regulations.71 The third law-job of Llewellyn’s legal theory concerns the attribution 
of authority. Different EU institutions exist that exercise authority over a particular 
subject matter. For example, the European Central Bank supervises banks in the 
member states, while the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
play a role in the legislative process of the European Union.72 The fourth law-job 
concerns the establishment of common aims and purposes. EU law may be 
understood against the background of, for example, free trade, human rights or the 
protection of a clean environment.73 The fifth and final law-job of juristic method 
explains how EU institutions may carry out these tasks. On this view, EU institutions 
have institutionalized some of the other law-jobs. 
 The ideal dimension of international law concerns the values and ideals 
embedded in its practice. The values of international law capture the central aims 
                                                 
69 See Twining 2000, 75-82; Twining 2009, 103-107, for an application of Llewellyn’s law-jobs theory to 
international law. 
70 Arts 263 and 267 TFEU. 
71 Arts 14 and 16 TEU. 
72 Arts 132 and 294 TFEU. 
73 Arts 2 and 3 TEU. See also Weatherill 2016, 393-419. 
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pursued by states and individuals. The ideals of international law pertain to the 
unrealized aspects of these values. In Selznick’s legal theory, the central value of law 
is legality.74 In my view, the master ideal of legality also captures the central value 
of international law. Following Selznick’s account of this master ideal, legality in 
international law can be understood as the progressive reduction of arbitrary 
exercise of power among states and individuals through positive law. The 
orientation of states and individuals towards legality in international law may be 
further explained with Brunnée and Toope’s interactional account of international 
law. Brunnée and Toope’s account of international law draws extensively on the 
work of Lon Fuller, which I have used to explore the interactional underpinnings of 
legal norms. Brunnée and Toope maintain that international law entails a practice of 
legality in which actors consider norms legally valid in light of their interactional 
expectations and the value of legality.75 International law entails a social practice in 
which states, international organizations and individuals are committed to norms 
that are congruent to interactional expectations and conform to the value of legality. 
Brunnée and Toope define legality in terms of eight criteria.76 On this view, norms 
of international law should comply with these eight criteria of legality.  
 A downside of Brunnée and Toope’s interactional account of international 
law is that it does not consider enacted law a distinct form of international legal 
norms. Brunnée and Toope maintain that all legal norms are interactional in nature 
because these norms exist on the basis of the interactional expectations of actors who 
follow these norms. Therefore, Brunnée and Toope do not consider enacted law a 
distinct form of international law: ‘it is not enough to cast socially shared 
understandings in legal form; they cannot simply be ‘posited’. Positive law may be 
an element of interactional law, often even an important element, but it is not 
necessarily coextensive with it.’77 However, this line of reasoning is unconvincing.78 
International organizations also establish legal norms, in particular in order to 
                                                 
74 Selznick 1961; 1969; Nonet and Selznick 2001. 
75 Brunnée and Toope 2010. 
76 These eight criteria are derived from Fuller’s notion of the internal morality of law. See Fuller 1969. 
77 Brunnée and Toope 2010, 69. 
78 See also Van der Burg 2014, 109-110. 
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coordinate social interactions. Enacted forms of law in international law include 
decisions issued by courts and legal norms enacted by international organizations, 
such as, for example, the European Union. International organizations are able to 
coordinate social relations on the international level by further developing 
interactional expectations through enacted laws. For example, EU institutions may 
aim to solve coordination problems in international trade between member states 
when social interactions can develop in disparate ways. These coordination 
problems may be resolved by EU institutions by enacting legal norms that improve 
the conditions for all member states. EU institutions may, for example, improve the 
conditions for all member states when they gain an advantage in international trade 
vis-à-vis non-EU members. Therefore, enacted law is best considered a distinct form 
of international law.  
 Nevertheless, Brunnée and Toope’s interactional account of international 
law illustrates that international legal norms can be seen as both a means and an 
end-in-themselves. On their view, the normative force of legal norms cannot be 
reduced to their compliance with the eight criteria of legality.79 International legal 
norms may be invoked in light of the values embedded in the practice of 
international law. Or as Brunnée and Toope explain: ‘Fidelity is generated, and in 
our terminology obligation is felt, because adherence to the eight criteria of legality 
(a ‘practice of legality’) produces law that is legitimate in the eyes of the persons to 
whom it is addressed.’80 Nevertheless, in many cases legal norms may be followed 
in light of other values. Take, for example, EU law. Member states may incorporate 
or give effect to EU law because these legal norms adhere to the criteria of legality. 
However, member states may also incorporate or give effect to EU law because these 
legal norms establish a common market. On this view, economic interests contribute 
to determining whether EU law should be followed. The importance of other, non-
legal, values in law may also be illustrated in light of the relative insignificance of 
                                                 
79 ‘Explaining commitment is not the same as explaining compliance. We argue that commitment does 
indeed pull towards compliance. However, ‘compliance pull’ does not predict whether actors will in fact 
comply, or explain exhaustively why they do or do not comply.’ Brunnée and Toope 2010, 92. 
80 Brunnée and Toope 2010, 27. 
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the value of justice in international law. Ratner’s notion of the thin justice of 
international law is insightful here. His account of international law illustrates that 
international legal norms may further political values that are not central to the 
social practice of international law. Ratner’s thin conception of justice refers to a 
commitment to international peace between states and respect for basic human 
rights.81 Based on an extensive study of international law, Ratner argues that many 
fields of international law fail to comply with even a thin conception of justice.82 
Justice should therefore not be considered a master ideal of international law. 
However, legality should be considered the master ideal of international law. 
  
5 A pragmatist account of the intertwinement between legal 
orders 
 
In this section, I develop a pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders. 
I will argue that legal orders should be understood as legal sub-practices, and that 
the intertwinement of legal orders should be seen in terms of intersecting legal sub-
practices. On this view, norms and officials may become authoritative when they are 
congruent to the interactional expectations of citizens and officials in a particular 
sub-practice. Additionally, I will assess the strengths and weaknesses of my 
pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders. 
 
5.1 Intersecting sub-practices 
 
At the outset, it is important to highlight that pragmatist legal theories conceptualize 
law in terms of practices and sub-practices. This raises the question whether a 
pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders can be formulated. In order 
to understand how legal orders are understood from the perspective of pragmatist 
                                                 
81 Ratner 2015, 89-90. 
82 Ratner 2015, 410-415. 
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legal theories, a distinction should be made between social practices and their sub-
practices. Legal pragmatists maintain that law should be conceptualized as a social 
practice that is oriented towards a central point. In its functional dimension, law 
contributes to social ordering. In its ideal dimension, law is oriented towards the 
value of legality, and in some cases also the value of justice. Legal sub-practices may 
be identified by highlighting the types of social relations that law regulates. On this 
view, public and private law can be understood as legal sub-practices. Moreover, 
the variance in significance of law’s central point should also be taken into account. 
For example, adjudication should be distinguished from legislation because the 
value of legality plays a more prominent role in judicial decision-making, while the 
legislative process is more oriented towards political values. 83 
 When seen in this light, legal orders should be seen as sub-practices in the 
social practice of law. They are centered on particular social relations, informed by 
implicit interactional expectations, and sustained by citizens and officials. Instead of 
thinking about law in terms of legal orders, law should be conceptualized in terms 
of legal sub-practices and their relations to each other. Relations between sub-
practices exist when individuals or officials perceive multiple legal norms and 
officials relevant to their social interactions. For example, within the context of a 
single legal order the sub-practices of private and public law may be considered of 
relevance to social interactions from the perspective of a citizen or an official. 
Relations between legal sub-practices may also encompass different legal orders. For 
example, legal norms and officials of EU law may be invoked as authoritative in the 
context of a domestic legal order. This raises the question how legal norms and 
officials of different legal orders may become important to how individuals view 
themselves and their behavior. 
 De Sousa Santos’ notion of interlegality may be used as a starting point to 
illustrate how legal norms and officials of multiple legal sub-practices may be 
authoritative. Although De Sousa Santos introduces the notion of interlegality in the 
context of his postmodern legal theory, this notion provides a helpful starting point 
                                                 
83 Taekema 2003, 190-191. 
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of how a pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders may be further 
developed. The notion of interlegality entails that individuals consider different 
legal norms and officials authoritative in their social interactions. Individuals follow 
and invoke legal norms and officials of a multitude of sub-practices that they 
consider authoritative. On this view, it is of no real importance to which legal order 
a norm or official belongs. De Sousa Santos explains interlegality as ‘different legal 
spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed in our minds, as much as in our 
actions, either on occasions of qualitative leaps or sweeping crises in our life 
trajectories, or in the dull routine of eventless everyday life.’84 De Sousa Santos’ 
notion of interlegality highlights that legal norms and officials of different legal 
orders may be considered authoritative in light of the interactional expectations that 
individuals have. Norms and officials of a multitude of legal orders are followed 
because they are congruent to the interactional expectations of a citizen or official.85 
 De Sousa Santos’ notion of interlegality illustrates how a multitude of legal 
norms and officials may be considered authoritative in a particular context. Different 
legal orders may intersect because multiple legal norms and official support social 
interactions. Or as De Sousa Santos explains: ‘[o]ur legal life is constituted by an 
intersection of different legal orders, that is, by interlegality.'86 A downside of De 
Sousa Santos’ account of interlegality, is that law is reduced solely to a means to 
further particular ends. Hoekema captures this point well: ‘[t]he notion of 
interlegality gets its full vigour only if we firmly commit ourselves to an important 
change in epistemological outlook. This is the change towards the taking into 
account of the selective use of legal orders by concrete persons as a resource for the 
promotion of their interests.’87 On this view, individuals invoke a particular norm to 
pursue their interests or they may turn to an official that will likely support their 
interests.88 However, in a pragmatist account of law, legal norms and officials should 
                                                 
84 De Sousa Santos 1995, 473. 
85 See, for example, on interlegality in terms of customary and state law, Simon Thomas 2017; religious 
norms and state law, Bano 2012; international human rights and informal norms, McConnachie 2014. 
86 De Sousa Santos 1995, 473. 
87 Hoekema 2005, 11. See also Eckert 2014 and Taekema 2018. 
88 Von Benda-Beckmann 1981; Eckert 2014. 
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not merely be seen as an instrument. Law is a social practice that also has a distinct 
point. To clarify this argument, it is helpful to use Cotterrell’s distinction between 
instrumentalist and expressivist socio-legal theories of law.89 Instrumentalist socio-
legal theories see law’s normative force in terms of its instrumental use. Individuals 
view law as an instrument to further their ends. Norms or officials are seen as a 
means to further values that are external to law. Expressivist conceptions locate the 
normative force of law in the values and ideals that are embedded in the practice of 
law. This means that individuals follow legal norms or appeal to officials in light of 
legal values and ideals. 
 Legal pragmatist legal theories take a middle position between 
instrumentalist and expressivist socio-legal theories.90 Law cannot be seen solely as 
an instrument because instrumental use of law requires individuals to reflect on the 
values and ideals that are implicit in the practice of law. Take, for example, the 
enactment of traffic laws by a legislative official. These traffic laws will not be 
considered authoritative when they impede on the principles of legality such as 
retroactivity and non-contradiction.91 Legislation also furthers values that are not 
central to the social practice of law. Traffic laws may also contribute to a clean 
environment, for example. Thus, the normative force of law cannot be reduced to 
values and ideals that are embedded in its practice, nor should it be located solely in 
values and ideals that are not distinctly legal. However, the normative force of law 
does not only follow from values that are implicit in law and other social practices. 
In most cases law is habitually followed. This means that purposive use of law is 
restricted to cases where a norm or exercise of official authority is considered 
problematic. In these cases, context is important to evaluate whether a norm of 
official should be considered authoritative. For example, new traffic laws may 
conform to the principles of retroactivity and non-contradiction, but fail to stabilize 
interactional expectations when these norms do not build further on the expectations 
                                                 
89 Cotterrell 2018, 206. 
90 Taekema 2017, 127-128; Cotterrell 2018, 212-214. 
91 On these principles in relation to legality, see Fuller 1969.  
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of traffic users. Thus, whether law is considered authoritative also depends on a 
contextual argument that takes into account interactional expectations. 
When seen in this light, the intersections of legal sub-practices remain 
largely implicit. The boundaries between legal sub-practices become visible when 
conflicts arise between legal norms or the authority of an official is contested.92 The 
Benthem, Kleyn and Salah Sheekh cases may serve as an illustration of the boundaries 
between the Dutch law and the European Convention on human rights.93 In these 
cases, the Dutch Council of State and the European Court of Human Rights have 
different normative views on how the relations between executive, judicial and 
legislative officials should take shape. In Benthem and Kleyn the dual function of the 
Council of State was scrutinized in light of the right to a fair trial. In these decisions, 
the Strasbourg Court is critical of the Council of State because it fulfills both an 
advisory role in the Dutch legislative process and an adjudicative role in 
administrative law cases. In Salah Sheekh the Strasbourg Court also scrutinized the 
Council of State because it did not rely on information other than the executive 
government, thus failing to fully assess the asylum case at hand. In these decisions, 
the European Court of Human Rights deems the relation between the Council of 
State and executive and legislative officials in the Dutch legal order problematic. The 
Strasbourg Court values a stricter separation between the legislative, executive and 
adjudicative functions of officials in national legal orders. Thus, the boundaries 
between the Dutch legal order and the legal order of the Council of Europe became 
visible because contestation arose. 
 The Benthem, Kleyn and Salah Sheekh decisions illustrate how interactional 
expectations play a persistent role in how the normative force of a norm or official 
is perceived. Norms and officials are considered authoritative when they are 
congruent with the interactional expectations of individuals in a particular legal sub-
practice. Historically, the constitutional role of the Dutch Council of State 
                                                 
92 See also Taekema 2018. 
93 Benthem v The Netherlands App no 8848/80 (ECtHR, 23 October 1985); Kleyn and others v The Netherlands 
App no 39343/98; 39651/98; 43147/98; 46664/99 (ECtHR, 6 May 2003); Salah Sheekh v The Netherlands App 
no 1948/04 (ECtHR, 11 January 2007). 
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encompasses two functions. Firstly, the Council of State fulfills an advisory role in 
the legislative process. And secondly, the Council of State acts as a court in 
administrative law cases.94 Following these decisions of the Strasbourg Court, 
legislation was introduced to make a more clear distinction between the advisory 
and adjudicative functions of the Council of State. Nevertheless, the Council of State 
remains to have a dual constitutional role in the Dutch legal order. Despite these 
decisions, no widespread contestation has surfaced in the Dutch legal order that calls 
into question the authority of the Dutch Council of State.95 This illustrates that 
interactional expectations play a persistent role in how citizens and officials perceive 
the authority of norms and officials in a legal order. In due course, interactional 
expectations concerning the Council of State may change. For example, Dutch 
citizens may instigate such a change by persistently challenging the role of the 
Council of State. Nevertheless, the Council of State is generally perceived as a 
legitimate official in the Dutch legal order.  
 
5.2 The strengths and weaknesses of a pragmatist account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders 
 
In a pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders, citizens and officials 
are informed by norms of a multitude of legal sub-practices. Legal sub-practices 
intersect when norms from different sub-practices support social interactions. In 
most cases, these legal norms are habitually followed because they are congruent to 
interactional expectations of citizens and officials in a legal order. For example, 
norms from different domestic and international legal sub-practices are considered 
to have normative force when their meaning and scope fit the expectations of 
citizens and officials. This means that in most cases norms are not deliberately 
incorporated or given effect in a legal order. Legal norms emerge in social relations 
of a particular sub-practice when these norms are congruent to interactional 
                                                 
94 These two functions are enshrined in the Dutch constitution. See article 73. 
95 De Wet 2008. 
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expectations. However, in some cases, norms from one legal sub-practice may be 
purposively invoked in another sub-practice. For example, citizens may appeal to 
norms of a sub-practice of international law in the context of a domestic legal order. 
The value-ladenness of law and its contextual nature determine the normative force 
of these legal norms. On the one hand, the values and ideals embedded in a 
particular legal sub-practice limit the purposive use of legal norms. When norms of 
international law violate values and ideals that are central to the domestic legal 
order, their normative force will be rejected. Moreover, the context in which a legal 
norm is invoked also determines its normative force. These norms may be congruent 
to the interactional expectations of officials and citizens in the domestic legal order. 
Thus, reception encompasses both the tacit emergence of a legal norm and the 
deliberate appeal to a legal norm from another legal sub-practice.  
 Legal pragmatists accept that some degree of incoherence is inherent to law 
as a social practice. Consider, for example, Fuller’s typology of interactional and 
enacted forms of law. Interactional legal norms that emerge from horizontal 
relations between citizens may be in tension with enacted legal norms that have been 
formulated by officials. This type of incoherence is inherent to the practice of law as 
there is no settled hierarchy between interactional and enacted forms of law. 
Nevertheless, incoherence in the practice of law does necessarily lead to conflicts 
between legal norms. Whether incoherence between interactional and enacted forms 
of law constitutes a conflict, depends on whether this incoherence is perceived as 
problematic. For example, citizens may turn to officials to contest the incoherence 
between interactional and enacted forms of law in a legal order. From a legal 
pragmatist perspective, norm conflicts are resolved in a contextual and ad-hoc way. 
Following Dewey, legal norms are seen as working hypotheses. They offer workable 
solutions to problems that have been encountered in the past.96 On this view, 
conflicts between legal norms may be resolved by considering what workable 
solution is justified in light of the orientation towards legal values and ideals. For 
example, courts or legislatures may attempt to resolve incoherence between 
interactional and enacted forms of law by enacting new legal norms. Officials may 
                                                 
96 Dewey 1998. 
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also give room for the emergence of interactional legal norms that can overcome a 
conflict between norms. Nevertheless, resolving conflicts between legal norms is an 
open-ended process. Whether conflicts are resolved depends on whether a workable 
solution can be found that sustain interactional expectations within the context in 
which the conflict arose. 
 Interactional expectations are also central to the acceptance or contestation 
of the authority of officials. Officials are considered authoritative when their exercise 
of authority is congruent with the interactional expectations of citizens and officials. 
For example, an official in international law may become authoritative in other legal 
sub-practices because its exercise of authority is congruent to interactional 
expectations of citizens and officials in these sub-practices. The authority of an 
official is contested when its exercise of authority does not fit in existing interactional 
expectations of citizens and officials in other legal orders. The Benthem, Kleyn and 
Salah Sheekh cases illustrate that interactional expectations are inherently contextual 
and thus may differ in sub-practices. In these cases, the constitutional role of the 
Dutch Council of State vis-à-vis other Dutch officials was contested by the European 
Court of Human Rights. From the point of view of the Strasbourg Court, the Dutch 
Council of State should not fulfil a role as a legislative advisor and high court in 
administrative law cases. When considered in the context of Dutch constitutional 
law the Council of State has legitimately fulfilled this role, playing both a part in the 
legislative process and in the adjudication of administrative law cases. This 
illustrates that the acceptance or contestation of the authority of an official is bound 
by the contextual expectations of citizens and officials within a legal order. Given 
the inherently contextual nature of interactional expectations officials may not 
always be accepted as authoritative in other legal sub-practices. 
 The main strength of a pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders is its contextually informed argument on the normative force of legal norms 
and officials. Norms and officials of a multitude of sub-practices inform social 
interactions. The intertwinement of legal orders should primarily be seen as an 
implicit practice in which norms and officials of different legal orders have 
normative force. Norm conflicts and the contestation between officials may be 
resolved by considering how interactional expectations can be sustained in the 
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absence of further incoherence. However, resolving frictions between legal orders in 
context has its limits. Because interactional expectations are inherently contextual 
frictions between legal orders cannot always be resolved. The Benthem, Kleyn and 
Salah Sheekh cases illustrate the contextual nature of interactional expectations in a 
legal order. A weakness of a pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders is that it reduces the interconnections between legal orders largely to an 
implicit practice. Only when norm conflicts emerge or when the authority of an 
official is contested, will the boundaries between different sub-practices become 
clear. For example, in the Benthem, Kleyn and Salah Sheekh cases the boundaries 
between the sub-practices of Dutch constitutional law and the European Convention 
on Human Rights are apparent because the authority of the Strasbourg Court is not 
fully accepted. However, what the boundaries between these sub-practices are in the 
absence of conflict or contestation remains ambiguous. Thus, in a pragmatist account 
of the intertwinement of legal orders the interconnections between legal orders 
remain largely implicit. 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have explored Karl Llewellyn and Philip Selznick’s legal theories 
to construct a pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders. I have 
argued that Llewellyn and Selznick incorporate insights from the social sciences to 
construct a socio-legal theory. Moreover, their socio-legal theories should be situated 
against the background of the pragmatist idea of the entanglement of fact and value. 
In legal pragmatist legal theories, law is conceptualized as social practice in which a 
functional and ideal dimension can be identified. Although both dimensions are 
addressed in Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories, they each emphasize a 
particular dimension of law. Llewellyn shows how adjudicating disputes, managing 
expectations, attributing authority, establishing common goals and 
institutionalizing these law-jobs contribute to social ordering; law’s functional 
dimension. Selznick’s legal theory emphasizes law’s ideal dimension. Embedded in 
the social practice of law are values and ideals. Llewellyn and Selznick pay little 
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attention to legal norms. I relied on Fuller’s typology of interactional and enacted 
law to explain how legal norms develop in social interactions. Officials have a 
coordinative function, they aim to sustain and further develop interactional 
expectations between citizens through legal norms. 
 Legal pragmatists like Llewellyn and Selznick have not considered how 
international law should be conceptualized. However, international law can be 
explained using their legal theories. I have argued that the central value of 
international law is legality, the reduction of arbitrary exercise of power. Based on 
my exploration of the work of Llewellyn, Selznick and Fuller, I have argued that the 
intertwinement of legal orders should be understood in terms of intersecting legal 
sub-practices. The inherently contextual nature of a pragmatist account of the 
relations between legal orders explains why legal norms and officials are perceived 
as legitimate. However, in a pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders 
the interconnections between legal orders are largely implicit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
Chapter 5 
Making sense of the intertwinement of legal 
orders: justificatory and interactional dimensions 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters of this study, I have critically reconstructed positivist, 
interpretive and pragmatist accounts of the intertwinement of legal orders. These 
accounts provide illuminating insights on the interconnections and frictions 
between legal orders. However, none of these accounts have been able to provide a 
fully convincing explanation. Therefore, in this chapter I will formulate a novel 
account of the intertwinement of legal orders that synthesizes the relative strengths 
of these positivist, interpretive and pragmatist legal theories. In my view, a more 
convincing account of the intertwinement of legal orders should explain how valid 
legal norms are identified in light of persistent disagreement and why officials may 
persistently diverge in their exercise of authority, but without disavowing the notion 
of a legal order as such. 
 In this chapter, I will first summarize the strengths and weaknesses of my 
positivist, interpretive and pragmatist accounts of the intertwinement of legal 
orders. By exploring the strengths and weaknesses of these accounts I can 
demonstrate what challenges a more convincing theoretical account of the 
interconnections and frictions between legal orders should address (section 2). I will 
first focus on the notion of legal validity (section 3). Even though validity criteria 
may seem to exist in practice, identifying a valid legal norm requires one to rely on 
a more abstract justification of a norm. In some cases, this justification needs to be 
made explicit in order to address disagreement on the validity of a legal norm of 
another legal order. Moreover, disagreement on the validity of a legal norm can also 
be addressed by considering whether a legal norm fits in existing patterns of 
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interactional expectation between citizens and officials in a legal order. I will then 
turn to the notion of legal authority. I will argue that the exercise of legitimate power 
by officials is best understood on the basis of a content-dependent account of legal 
authority (section 4). I will maintain that relations between officials of different legal 
orders should be seen as part of a joint project in which officials share their authority. 
The acceptance of a claim to authority is dependent on its relation with the shared 
goals of this joint project. Moreover, in order to fully make sense of how officials of 
different legal orders exercise their authority in relation to each other, interactional 
expectations should also be taken into account. Finally, I will reflect on how future 
research may build further on this study (section 5).  
 
2 Towards a novel account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders 
 
In this section, I will first outline the relative strengths and weaknesses of my 
positivist, interpretive and pragmatist accounts of the intertwinement of legal 
orders. From these relative strengths and weaknesses, I will draw out two challenges 
that a novel account should address. In chapter 2, I have critically reconstructed a 
positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders based on Hart’s legal theory. 
Hart conceptualizes law in terms of rule-governed practice in which primary and 
secondary rules can be identified. A legal order consists of primary rules that are 
generally followed by citizens and secondary rules of change, adjudication and 
recognition that are accepted as standards by officials. In my positivist account of 
the intertwinement of legal orders, rules of external recognition explain why a norm 
of another legal order is incorporated or given effect. Norm conflicts that may arise 
after incorporation can be resolved on the basis of the supreme and ultimate rule of 
recognition of a legal order. However, my positivist account is unable to explain how 
conflicting norms that are valid simultaneously are resolved. On this view, 
conflicting primary rules may be valid in different legal orders. In my positivist 
account of the intertwinement of legal orders, officials exercise their authority by 
following secondary rules of change, adjudication and recognition that are internal 
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to a legal order. The exercise of authority by officials of other legal orders is accepted 
when secondary rules internal to a legal order are followed. This means that no 
relations between officials of different legal orders exist in a positivist account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders. 
 In chapter 3, I have explored Dworkin’s legal theory to critically reconstruct 
an interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders. Central to Dworkin’s 
interpretive legal theory is the notion of integrity. In light of integrity we aim to 
apply legal norms consistently and informed by a coherent justification. For 
example, when judges decide hard cases, they aim to reach a decision that fits in the 
existing body of case law and is justified in light of the underlying principles. In my 
interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders, I have introduced the 
notion of integrity as a constructive filter to explain the interconnections and 
frictions between legal orders. The strength of my interpretive account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders is its ability to explain the complex relations between 
legal orders even when frictions arise. Legal norms are incorporated or given effect 
in a legal order when they can be made consistent and coherent. Conflicts between 
legal norms may be resolved in a more abstract justification of these legal norms. 
However, persistent conflicts between different legal norms cannot be articulated. 
In my interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders relations between 
officials of different legal orders are seen as part of a joint project in which they share 
authority. This explains why officials may accept or contest the authority of officials 
of other legal orders. Nonetheless, my interpretive account is unable to make sense 
of why officials may persistently exercise their authority differently in a joint project. 
 In chapter 4, Llewellyn and Selznick’s pragmatist legal theories were central 
in my pragmatist account of the interrelations and frictions between legal orders. 
Llewellyn and Selznick conceptualize law as a social practice that revolves around a 
functional and ideal dimension. Law’s functional dimension explains how law 
contributes to social ordering, while the ideal dimension highlights the values and 
ideals embedded in the practice of law. I have argued that from the perspective of 
pragmatist legal theories the intertwinement of legal orders should be understood 
in terms of intersecting legal sub-practices. On this view, multiple legal norms of 
different legal sub-practices are considered authoritative. The contextual nature of 
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my pragmatist account can explain why legal norms are considered authoritative. 
This contextual account also explains why the exercise of authority by an official is 
accepted. However, the reception of legal norms and the acceptance of authority of 
officials remains a largely implicit practice in a pragmatist account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders. 
 From these relative strengths and weaknesses two challenges can be drawn 
out that a novel account of the intertwinement of legal orders should address. 
Firstly, a theoretical account of the notion of legal validity is needed that explains 
how valid legal norms can be identified even when persistent disagreement exists 
on the question under which conditions norms of other legal orders are valid. Hart’s 
positivist legal theory may explain the reception of legal norms when agreement 
exists under which conditions legal norms should be considered valid. However, 
Hart’s positivist legal theory cannot explain how valid legal norms are identified in 
light of disagreement; while Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory cannot fully explain 
why such disagreement may persist. Pragmatist legal theories explain how 
disagreement on the validity of a legal norm may be rooted in the interactional 
expectations of citizens and officials, but lack a clear notion of legal order when these 
frictions do not arise. Thus, a theoretical account of the notion of legal validity is 
needed that addresses why disagreement on validity criteria may persist that does 
not abandon the notion of legal order altogether. Secondly, a theoretical account of 
the notion of legal authority is needed that reveals how officials of different legal 
orders exercise authority in relation to each other even when they diverge on how 
legitimate power should be exercised. Hart’s positivist legal theory is unable to 
conceptualize the relations between officials of different legal orders as such. 
Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory explains why officials of different legal orders 
exercise their authority as part of a joint project, but is unable to make sense of why 
officials may persistently diverge in how they exercise their authority relative to 
each other. My reconstruction of Llewellyn and Selznick’s pragmatist brings to light 
how interactional expectations play a role in the contestation of an official’s 
authority. However, it is unclear in pragmatist legal theories how interconnections 
between legal orders exist without disregarding the notion of legal order as such.  
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 In the following sections, I will develop a novel theoretical account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders that addresses these two challenges. This account 
departs from a positivist understanding of law in two crucial respects. Firstly, I will 
argue that in intertwined legal orders valid legal norms cannot be identified solely 
on the basis of social facts. Generally accepted validity criteria do not explain how 
we recognize valid legal norms in a legal order. Secondly, I will maintain that the 
authority of officials in intertwined legal orders cannot be understood solely in 
content-independent terms. In order to understand relations between officials of 
different legal orders a content-dependent account is needed that takes into account 
how officials substantively exercise their power. 
 My theoretical account of the intertwinement of legal orders will provide a 
more convincing legal theoretical framework from which the complex relations 
between legal orders can be understood when compared to conventionalist legal 
theories.97 On this view, law is what people generally accept as law. However, 
conventionalist legal theories are unable to provide a precise account of what law is 
and cannot explain how we should make sense of law when people conceptualize 
law differently. In the following sections, I will argue that legal validity and 
authority is best understood in light of law’s justificatory and interactional 
dimensions. On this view, valid legal norms may not always be identified on the 
basis of generally accepted validity criteria. These validity criteria are contestable. 
Nonetheless, the validity of a legal norm may be justified in light of the underlying 
values of a legal order or the interactional expectations between citizens and 
officials. I will also maintain that the authority of officials should be understood in 
content-dependent terms. In my view, officials have a dual commitment when they 
exercise their authority. One the one hand, officials are part of shared practices with 
officials of other legal orders. On the other hand, officials are part of the practice 
internal to their legal order. The justificatory and interactional dimensions of 
authority explain how officials exercise their power across different legal orders. 
 
                                                 
97 Tamanaha 2001. For example, Berman’s theory of global legal pluralism relies on a conventionalist 
understanding of law. Berman 2012, 56.  
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3 The contestability of legal validity 
 
When lawyers discuss a judicial decision or a provision of an Act of Parliament, they 
normally assume that they are referring to valid legal sources. For example, when a 
decision is informed by relevant case law, we have good reasons to follow it. 
Similarly, we generally maintain that Acts of Parliament should be followed when 
the appropriate procedures have been followed by the legislature. The conditions 
under which we should consider a judicial decision or Act of Parliament valid may 
also be called the grounds of law.98 Based on the grounds of law we can determine 
the validity of a legal norm. Invalid legal norms do not need to be followed because 
they lack the binding character of valid legal norms. This common understanding of 
legal validity can also be found in positivist legal theories.99 Legal positivists 
consider the grounds of law to function as a set of generally accepted criteria. Hart, 
for example, maintains that we identify valid legal norms by following the rule of 
recognition. This rule of recognition is conventional in nature.100 Officials follow the 
rule of recognition because they generally agree on the validity criteria that follow 
from this rule.101 This view may also be extended to the recognition of valid legal 
norms of other legal orders. In chapter 2, I have introduced the notion of a rule of 
external recognition in my positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders 
to explain how legal norms of other legal orders are recognized as valid. 
 The claim that we can identify valid legal norms of other legal orders based 
solely on conventional criteria is unconvincing because a general agreement on these 
                                                 
98 Dworkin 1986, 4. 
99 Raz 2009b, 41-45. 
100 Hart 1994, 255. Conventionalist accounts of law have also been defended in Coleman 2001; Den 
Hartogh 2002; Marmor 2001; 2009. According to Dickson, Hart declared the rule of recognition to be 
conventional in nature in his postscript to The Concept of Law. See, Dickson 2007. See, for example, Green 
1999 and Dickson 2007 who are critical of the conventionalist dimension of Hart’s positivist legal theory. 
101 ‘Hart’s position—widely misunderstood and mistakenly criticized—is that law is made possible by an 
interdependent convergence of behavior and attitude: a kind of convention or social practice that we might 
characterize as an “agreement” among officials on the criteria for membership in the category “law”.’ 
Coleman 2001, 75. 
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criteria does not always exist. This point may be illustrated with a hypothetical 
example that concerns the validity of international legal norms in a domestic legal 
order. Imagine, for example, that in a domestic legal order legislation has been 
enacted by the legislature and that the provisions of this act are applied by national 
courts. Following the enactment of these norms in the domestic legal order a treaty 
has been signed and ratified by the state. An international court has jurisdiction over 
cases of alleged treaty violations. This international court has decided on complaints 
of applicants who argue that the state has violated its treaty obligations. Assume 
that officials in the domestic legal order have recognized the validity of the act, and 
that the international court has recognized the validity of the treaty provisions. 
 Many would argue that in this example the validity of the treaty provisions 
in the domestic legal order depends on the generally accepted validity criteria that 
are followed by officials in that legal order. On this view, officials incorporate or give 
effect to treaty provisions when the state has signed and ratified the treaty. A 
constitution may include provisions that stipulate under which conditions treaty 
provisions gain validity within the domestic legal order and when international 
legal norms should trump domestic law.102 Let us assume that a number of judges in 
the domestic legal order have applied the treaty provisions and rely on the case law 
of the international court when interpreting these legal norms. This signals that 
judges have recognized the validity of the treaty provisions in the domestic legal 
order. However, if no other officials apply the treaty provisions, can we still 
maintain that there is general agreement about the conditions under which legal 
norms of other legal orders are valid? This casts doubt on the view that a general 
agreement on the validity criteria of legal norms of other legal orders always exists. 
In some cases, there may be no general agreement among officials on the validity 
criteria of legal norms of other legal orders. 
                                                 
102 For example, article 94 of the Dutch constitution stipulates that international legal norms should trump 
domestic law if these norms should be considered binding on all persons: ‘Statutory regulations in force 
within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or 
of resolutions by international institutions that are binding on all persons.’ 
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 My hypothetical example may be considered redundant. It could be argued 
that validity criteria do not need to be explicitly endorsed by all officials in a legal 
order. On this view, generally accepted validity criteria exist to identify valid legal 
norms, but they may often remain implicit in practice.103 However, the claim that we 
can identify valid legal norms of other legal orders based on implicit validity criteria 
is nonetheless unconvincing because these criteria are contestable. Disagreement on 
the validity criteria of legal norms of other legal orders may arise between officials, 
signaling the contestability of the grounds of law. The Solange, Maastricht and Lisbon 
decisions illustrate this point.104 In the past, officials acting on behalf of the German 
state have signed and ratified the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, the predecessor of the European Union. Following the landmark case 
of Costa/ENEL, the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the 
secondary legislation that follows from this treaty should trump domestic law.105 
However, not all German officials are committed to giving unrestricted effect to EU 
law in the German legal order. Although the German state has signed and ratified 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, courts have objected to 
the supposed unrestricted effect of EU law. For example, in the Solange decisions the 
German Federal Constitutional Court argued that secondary EU legislation can only 
be considered valid in the German legal order insofar as it does not violate the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the German constitution. In the Maastricht and 
Lisbon decisions, the Federal Constitutional Court argued on the basis of other 
grounds that the supremacy of EU law may be restricted in the German legal order. 
Thus, the view that officials in the German legal order generally agree under which 
conditions EU law should have effect in the German legal order is implausible. Even 
though conventional validity criteria may seem to exist in practice, disagreement 
may arise on the question under which conditions legal norms of other legal orders 
should be considered valid. 
                                                 
103 On the relation between the practice of identifying valid legal norms and the rule of recognition, see 
Coleman 2001, 77-83.  
104 BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) (Solange I); 73, 339 (1986) (Solange II); 102, 147 (2000) (Bananas); 89, 155 (1993) 
(Maastricht); 123, 267 (2009) (Lisbon). 
105 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
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 Critics may also object to my claim on the contestability of the grounds of 
law and argue that officials only disagree in exceptional cases whether a legal norm 
should be considered valid. Indeed, it is plausible that in most cases we will have an 
intuitive sense of what the grounds of law are for legal norms. Otherwise this would 
mean that officials always disagree on whether a norm should be considered legally 
valid. However, it should be stressed that an absence of widespread disagreement 
does not prove the existence of conventional validity criteria. The Solange, Maastricht 
and Lisbon decisions illustrate that we may think of legal validity in terms of 
conventional criteria, but this view is unable to explain why we disagree on the 
validity of a legal norm. Conventional validity criteria only explain how valid legal 
norms are identified when we generally agree on such criteria. Officials will 
generally aim to determine the validity of a legal norm even though disagreement 
has surfaced that concern the grounds of law. An account of legal validity is 
therefore needed that is also able to explain how valid legal norms are identified in 
the face of disagreement on the grounds of law.106 
 The contestability of conventional validity criteria brings to light that we 
may deeply disagree on what the grounds of law entail in a legal order. In order to 
resolve disagreement concerning the grounds of law one needs to determine how 
validity criteria are embedded in a more general justification of law. Questions, such 
as, for example, “Do we have a general obligation to give effect to legal norms of 
other legal orders?” and “Should norms of other legal orders be given effect when 
they violate fundamental rights?” can only be answered by constructing a 
justification of the validity of a legal norm. Or as Dworkin explains: ‘[w]e construct 
a conception of law – an account of the grounds needed to support a claim of right 
enforceable on demand in that way – by finding a justification of those practices in 
a larger integrated network of political value.’107 Dworkin provides an argument 
how such questions can be answered. When officials claim that a legal norm should 
be considered valid, they maintain that this norm fits in an existing body of law and 
is supported by its underlying values and ideals. Thus, the recognition of valid law 
                                                 
106 On the limited explanatory force of rules of recognition, see also Waldron 2009. 
107 Dworkin 2011, 405 
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implies a justificatory claim in which we locate a norm in a body of case law, 
legislation and other legal norms, and their underlying values and ideals. A 
justificatory ascent may resolve conflicts between different norms because it assigns 
relative weight to legal norms in a more abstract justification.108 This argument, in 
turn, may be embedded in a more abstract justification of law’s central point.109 
  The contestability of conventional validity criteria also follows from the 
interactional underpinnings of legal norms. As legal pragmatists have argued, legal 
norms emerge and shape social interactions. Take, for example, Fuller’s typology of 
enacted and interactional law.110 This typology illustrates why some legal norms 
emerge in the vertical relations between officials and citizens, while other legal 
norms emerge in the horizontal relations between different citizens. Understanding 
the differences between enacted and interactional law requires one to take into 
account how legal norms emerge from and shape social interactions. Fuller’s 
typology of enacted and interactional law cannot be constructed solely on the basis 
of a justificatory ascent in which these legal norms are considered part of a practice 
that has a central point. The validity of a legal norm also depends on the interactional 
expectations between citizens and officials in a legal order. For example, whether a 
norm from another legal order should be considered valid is dependent on the 
expectations of citizens and officials concerning its meaning and scope. Contrasted 
with Dworkin’s justificatory ascent, this justification of the validity of a legal norm 
can be called an interactional descent. An interactional descent may resolve 
disagreement concerning the validity of a legal norm because it provides a 
contextual argument of why a legal norm may fit in existing patterns of interactional 
expectations between citizens and officials. 
 It should be stressed that my account of legal validity does not deny that we 
often seem to rely on generally accepted criteria to determine the validity of legal 
norms of other legal orders. These criteria may be found in case law or legislation. 
                                                 
108 Dworkin 2011, 53. 
109 On the most general level, law can be understood as a social practice aimed towards the values of 
legality and justice. Dworkin 1986; Nonet and Selznick 2001. 
110 Postema 1999. 
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However, these legal sources do not adequately explain why disagreement may 
arise on the validity of a legal norm of another legal order. For example, many 
officials will rely on provisions of their constitution to determine under which 
conditions legal norms of international law are valid. These constitutional 
provisions can be seen as an expression of conventional validity criteria. Although 
constitutional provisions may seem to express general validity criteria, they are 
contestable along justificatory and interactional lines. Constitutional provisions may 
invite disagreement under which conditions legal norms of other legal orders should 
be considered valid, how these legal norms should be ranked and how conflicts 
between legal norms of different legal orders should be resolved. When 
disagreement arises on why a legal norm should be recognized as valid, arguments 
need to be put forward that justify the validity or invalidity of that norm. In my 
view, this disagreement may be addressed on the basis of a justification that takes 
into account the orientation of legal norms towards legal values and ideals or a 
contextually informed justification that explains how legal norms sustain 
interactional expectations. Thus, disagreement invites a justificatory ascent or an 
interactional descent that go beyond the provisions that are considered to express 
the validity criteria in question. 
 One could infer from my account of validity that this notion should be 
understood to be gradual in nature. A justificatory ascent explains why a legal norm 
is considered valid against the background of the central values of law. For example, 
legal norms may be considered valid in light of a justification of their underlying 
values and ideals. The realization of these values and ideals is a matter of degree. 
This would imply that the validity of a legal norm is a matter of degree too. A similar 
argument can be made for the interactional dimension of the grounds of law. Legal 
norms have normative force when they support the interactional expectations of 
citizens and officials. Nevertheless, not all legal norms are congruent to the 
interactional expectation of citizens and officials in a legal order. In some cases, legal 
norms are not followed because they do not fit the interactional expectations of 
citizens and officials. These legal norms can be considered a dead letter because 
without a connection to existing interactional expectations officials and citizens will 
disregard these legal norms. Thus, the gradual nature of the notion of legal validity 
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seems to follow from the tension between the justificatory and interactional 
dimensions of the grounds of law. An interactional descent explains why a legal 
norm is considered valid because it fits current interactional expectations between 
citizens and officials. Nevertheless, an interactional descent may not always fully 
justify why a legal norm should be considered valid. Legal norms that emerge from 
social interactions will be considered invalid when they are contrary to legal values 
or ideals embedded in the practice of a legal order. On the other hand, a justificatory 
ascent may explain why a legal norm has normative force in light of the values and 
ideals embedded in legal practice. Nevertheless, if this legal norm does not fit with 
the interactional expectations of citizens and officials it will be considered dead 
letter.  
 However, I maintain that validity cannot be fully understood to be gradual 
in nature. A norm may become legally valid because its normative force is invoked 
in light of values and principles embedded in the practice of a legal order or for the 
reason that this norm conforms to the interactional expectations of citizens and 
officials. On this view, the weight of the justificatory and interactional dimensions 
of the grounds of law may change over time. Nonetheless, validity is also an 
inherently synchronic notion. Whether a norm should be considered legally valid 
depends on a decision that is taken at a particular point in time and in a particular 
context of a legal order. For example, imagine a judge who needs to determine 
whether a norm is legally valid. He may pursue a justificatory ascent to determine 
whether a legal norm can be justified in light of its underlying legal values. He may 
also consider an interactional descent to determine whether the norm is congruent 
to the interactional expectations of citizens and officials. The judge may 
acknowledge that the legal norm is now more justified along justificatory or 
interactional lines than before. Nonetheless, he needs to take a decision whether the 
legal norm should be considered valid or invalid. At a given point in a time and 
given the particular context in a legal order, the judge needs to decide on whether a 
norm should be considered legally valid. In some cases, the justificatory and 
interactional dimensions may point in different directions. Nevertheless, a judge 
will need to reach a decision that is best justified in light of these dimensions. In my 
view, this decision should not be considered indeterminate because the justificatory 
147 
 
and interactional dimensions of the grounds of law cannot be fully distinguished. 
Interactional expectations are partly based on the values and ideals that are 
embedded in the practice of law and social interactions often give expression to 
values and ideals. Thus, decisions on the validity of a legal norm should find a 
balance in the tension between the justificatory and interactional dimensions of the 
grounds of law. 
 An example concerning the human rights regimes of the European Union 
and the Council of Europe may illustrate the tension between the justificatory and 
interactional dimensions of the grounds of law. The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights requires that human rights enshrined in the Charter should provide the same 
level of protection in terms of meaning and scope as the European Convention on 
Human Rights.111 This means that the legal norms of the Convention have been given 
effect in the EU legal order. When considered in light of the justificatory dimension 
of legal validity, the harmonization of these human rights regimes suggests that the 
Convention rights may easily be applied in the context of the EU legal order. 
However, even though these human rights regimes are harmonized to a great 
degree, both in terms of legal norms and values, frictions between these human 
rights regimes have surfaced. In advisory opinion 2/13, the Luxembourg Court argued 
that the EU accession to the Convention would impede on the foundations of EU 
law. 
 The interactional dimension of legal validity may explain why these 
frictions arise even though these legal norms have been harmonized to a great 
degree. The Luxembourg Court interprets and applies EU law in relation to other 
EU officials, the officials in the member states and their citizens. The Strasbourg 
Court, on the other hand, interprets the Convention rights against the background 
of different interactional expectations. The European Court of Human Rights 
primarily reviews individual complaints of Convention violations. For example, in 
the Bosphorus and Avotiņš decisions, the European Court of Human Rights 
considered that it would not review whether a member state has violated the 
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Convention when giving effect to EU law, if EU human rights protection does not 
fall below the level of protection of the European Convention on Human Rights.112 
However, in advisory 2/13 opinion, the Luxembourg Court argued that EU accession 
would impede on the autonomy of EU law.113 In my view, this illustrates how the 
justificatory and interactional dimensions of the grounds of law may point in 
different directions. The justificatory dimension points toward further 
interconnections between the human rights regimes of the European Union and the 
Council of Europe, while the interactional dimension highlight the frictions that may 
arise between these legal orders. 
 
4 The content-dependency of legal authority 
 
Up until this point, I have focused on how the validity of legal norms should be 
understood in intertwined legal orders. I will now turn to the question how the 
authority of legal officials should be conceptualized in light of the intertwinement 
of legal orders. The notion of legal authority explains the role of officials who apply, 
enact or amend legal norms. When discussing the notion of legal authority legal 
philosophers generally distinguish between citizens and officials. In some legal 
theories the distinction between citizens and officials carries important weight. Hart, 
for example, argues that officials need to follow secondary rules of change, 
adjudication and recognition for law to exist.114 In other legal theories the distinction 
between citizens and officials has less importance. For example, in Dworkin’s 
interpretive legal theory citizens and officials have an equal obligation to consider 
which rights and obligations follow from valid law.115 However, in constructing my 
account of legal authority I will focus primarily on officials given their practical 
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importance. For example, courts are important in a legal order because they claim to 
have the authority to resolve disputes through legally binding decisions. 
 An account of the notion of legal authority makes sense of the conditions 
under which we consider the exercise of authority by officials to be justified. This 
means that we should accept a claim to authority when it entails a legitimate exercise 
of power. Legal authority is often understood as content-independent. This means 
that the legitimate exercise of power is not dependent on how it is substantively 
exercised. This common understanding of legal authority is prevalent in positivist 
legal theories.116 In this conception of authority, directives are followed because they 
follow from officials as such. Raz, for example, locates the authority of officials in 
their reason-giving ability. Officials provide better overall reasons to citizens who 
follow their directives when compared to citizens who need to rely on their own 
practical reasoning to determine their behaviour. Raz therefore calls his account of 
authority the service conception of authority. His service conception of authority is 
built on three theses. Firstly, the exercise of power by an official should aim to 
exclude a number of reasons to act or refrain from acting in a particular way. Raz 
calls this the pre-emption thesis.117 Secondly, the exercise of power by an official 
should be based on reasons that are relevant to the practical reasoning of citizens. 
Raz calls this the dependence thesis.118 Thirdly, Raz maintains that the exercise of 
authority should make it more likely that those affected will follow the directives. 
This means that citizens do not need to determine themselves how they should act. 
Raz calls this the normal justification thesis of his service conception of authority.119  
 Although it seems sensible to consider the authority of officials to be 
content-independent, this view should be deemed unpersuasive. Firstly, it is 
important to highlight that content-independent accounts of authority often go hand 
in hand with the claim that valid legal norms can be identified on the basis of social 
facts alone. Or as Schauer succinctly puts it: ‘Law’s subjects are expected to obey the 
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rules and precedents because of their source and status, regardless of whether they 
are persuaded by the content of their reasoning, and even if they are not persuaded 
by the content of their reasoning.’120 Raz, for example, argues that the identification 
of valid legal norms is solely dependent on social sources. No moral considerations 
are of relevance when officials determine the validity of a legal norm.121 However, 
in the previous section I have argued that this view should be considered 
unpersuasive. At first sight it may seem that valid legal norms may be identified on 
the basis of generally accepted validity criteria. Nevertheless, these criteria are 
contestable and may require further justification that touches upon the justificatory 
and interactional dimensions of the grounds of law. 
 Another reason why the authority of officials should not be considered 
content-independent is that such an account of legal authority is unable to make 
sense of how relations exist between officials across different legal orders. Take Raz’s 
service conception of authority as an example. Roughan explains that Raz’s account 
of legal authority is plagued by two problems. Firstly, she maintains that Raz’s 
service conception of legal authority does not explain how citizens should rank 
officials that each legitimately claim authority. Citizens may be confronted with 
officials that claim authority without a clear understanding how to order these 
claims. Roughan calls this the rankings problem because Raz’s account of authority 
does not enable citizens to categorize officials in terms of a hierarchy.122 Secondly, 
Roughan also maintains that Raz’s account of legal authority suffers from an 
identification problem. in Raz’s service conception of authority it is unclear how 
citizens should determine the authority of an official when he is confronted with 
different claims to authority. In some cases, citizens may attempt to determine the 
authority of an official by considering all relevant reasons to exercise their power. 
However, in light of Raz’s pre-emptive thesis this type of practical reasoning should 
be excluded. Moreover, in other cases it will take an unreasonable length of time for 
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citizens to adequately determine the authority of an official.123 The rankings and 
identification problems call into question the adequacy of a content-independent 
account of legal authority to make sense of the relations between officials of different 
legal orders. 
 Roughan’s diagnosis of the problems of Raz’s content-independent account 
of authority is convincing. However, her own account of legal authority is in need 
of a more convincing content-dependent justification. Roughan maintains that an 
adequate account of legal authority is relative: ‘[r]elative authority here means more 
than simply concurrent or co-existing or comparable authority; rather it is authority 
whose legitimacy is mutually constitutive and mutually constraining between two 
persons or bodies which prima facie have the standing of authority, but which 
cannot alone have independent legitimacy because of the existence of the other and 
the need for interaction.’124 However, Roughan’s account of authority does not 
explain why the exercise of power by officials should be deemed legitimate as such, 
other than that officials should cooperate with each other. Rodriguez-Blanco has 
pointed out that Roughan’s relative account of authority needs to be grounded in 
order to avoid infinite regress.125 Take, for example, the exercise of authority of two 
parents over a child. In Roughan’s account the authority of the parents are relative 
to each other, meaning that their exercise of power is constrained by considerations 
of cooperation. However, in order to cooperate, parents need to consider what 
justifies their authority. Otherwise, this may lead to an infinite regress in which 
parents refer to each other as individuals who claim to exercise legitimate power. 
Rodriguez-Blanco therefore points out that Roughan is in need of a justification that 
adequately explains parenthood as such. On the basis of this justification parents 
may consider how they should cooperate in their exercise of authority.126 Thus, a 
more convincing content-dependent justification is needed that explains how legal 
authority may be exercised under relative conditions. A content-dependent account 
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of authority can provide an account of the conditions under which the legitimate 
exercise of power by officials across different legal orders is justified. 
 In order to develop a content-dependent account of authority I will further 
build on Dworkin’s account of legal authority. From the perspective of Dworkin’s 
legal theory, the authority of officials follows from their commitment to consistency 
with previous directives and coherence with the underlying values of their decisions 
in a shared practice. This has been further elaborated in Kyritsis’ Dworkinian 
account of the relations between courts and legislatures. Kyritsis argues that courts 
and legislatures can be seen as officials in a joint project.127 The authority of officials 
is dependent on their commitment to the aims of this joint project and their 
institutional role that they adopt to pursue these aims. Courts and legislatures 
‘participate in a joint institutional project aimed at governing. They share the 
authority to govern. But their relationship is truly one of shared authority only to the 
extent that it is structured in a way that serves the point of the joint project; for this 
to be the case, it is necessary – though not sufficient – that the project accord with 
principles of political morality regarding the proper allocation of government 
power.’128 Kyritsis illustrates these relations of shared authority with the doctrine of 
constitutional review. From the perspective of his Dworkinian account of legal 
authority, constitutional review should not be seen as a restriction on the authority 
of the legislature. Instead, constitutional review should be understood as part of the 
joint project in which legislative and adjudicative officials share the authority to 
legitimately exercise power in a system of checks and balances.129 Thus, a content-
dependent account of authority sees the exercise of authority in light of the 
commitment of officials of different legal orders towards the shared goals of a joint 
project. 
 My content-dependent account of legal authority could be confronted with 
a powerful objection at the outset. Based on Dworkin’s own legal theory critics may 
argue that the exercise of authority by officials is necessarily embedded in the 
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political morality of a particular legal order. This would imply that the exercise of 
legitimate power cannot extend across different legal orders because legal authority 
is necessarily grounded in a practice of a particular legal order. Although Dworkin’s 
legal theory entails that the exercise of authority should be seen in light of the 
political morality of a particular legal order, this does not mean that officials of 
different legal orders cannot be considered part of a shared practice. In my 
reconstruction of Dworkin’s legal theory, I have argued, for example, that the 
commitment of officials to integrity in a legal order may compel them to reach 
decisions that are informed by decisions from officials of other legal orders. 
Relations between officials of different legal orders can be understood in terms of a 
shared practice in which these officials exercise their authority in light of a central 
point.130 
 EU law can be used to demonstrate how officials of different legal orders 
may be considered part of a shared practice in which authority is exercised. Take, 
for example, national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union. These 
officials are part of the EU legal order and the legal orders of the EU member states. 
However, conceptualizing national courts solely as part of domestic legal orders 
does not explain how national courts exercise their authority on matters of EU law. 
The relations between national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
make better sense when these officials are seen as part of a practice in which they 
are oriented towards shared goals, such as, for example, an internal market, the rule 
of law and democracy. The Court of Justice contributes to this shared commitment 
by explaining the scope and meaning of EU legal norms through the preliminary 
ruling procedure, while national courts contribute to this practice by reviewing the 
validity of domestic law in light of EU legal norms. On this view, national courts and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union contribute to underlying values of the 
EU legal order and the legal orders of the member states. When national courts and 
the Luxembourg Court are seen as part of a practice oriented towards an internal 
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market, the rule of law and democracy, they share the authority to legitimately 
exercise power in matters of EU law. 
 It should be highlighted that in intertwined legal orders officials have a dual 
commitment. On the one hand, officials are part of shared practices with officials of 
other legal orders. On the other hand, officials are also committed to the practice 
internal to their own legal order. In EU law, for example, the exercise of authority 
by domestic officials is part of a shared practice with EU officials. These domestic 
officials are also committed to the practice of their own legal order. Therefore, an 
institutional constraint exists for officials that are committed to joint projects such as 
EU law. The dual commitment of officials may lead to differences in normative 
views on how authority should be exercised. For example, officials of national and 
international legal orders may be committed to the protection of fundamental rights, 
but may at some point diverge on how a particular right should be interpreted or 
applied. These differences may exist within a shared practice in which officials of 
different legal orders take part insofar these differences can be accounted for in the 
officials’ conception of the dimensions of fit and justification. This dual commitment 
can be upheld when the exercise of power of officials of other legal orders can be 
made consistent with previous decisions and coherent with the underlying values 
of these decisions in a particular legal order. The Solange, Maastricht and Lisbon 
decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court illustrate that this institutional 
constraint may stand in the way of this dual commitment.131 For example, in the 
Solange I decision, the Federal Constitutional Court rejected the authority of EU 
officials because their exercise of authority do not satisfy the institutional constraints 
of fundamental rights protection in the German legal order. Only when these 
constraints have been satisfied is the authority of EU officials accepted. Although 
the Federal Constitutional Court now considers that EU law and its institutions 
respect the fundamental rights of the German constitution, the dual commitment of 
German officials remains. 
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 In my account of legal authority officials have a dual commitment when 
they exercise their power. However, this does not fully explain why officials may 
exercise their authority differently. For example, why do national courts accept the 
European Court of Justice as the primary arbiter on the scope and meaning of EU 
legal norms? In his interpretive account of EU law, Letsas suggests that this question 
can be answered by considering how officials in the legal orders of the EU member 
states conceptualize the moral point of this practice: ‘[w]hat matters is that all courts 
converge in following the same boundaries, regardless of who set them. Once some or 
most courts have set a boundary, then later courts have a reason to follow it, not 
because the former courts had ultimate authority to set boundaries, but because 
moral reasons of coordination and efficacy require so.’132 This highlights the 
importance of interactional expectations in how national courts and the European 
Court of Justice understand their role when they exercise their authority. Letsas 
implies that interactional expectations follow from the underlying moral point of EU 
law.133 However, in my view, the interactional dimension of law cannot be reduced 
to its justificatory dimension. The role of the European Court of Justice as the 
primary arbiter of EU law cannot be fully explained by considering how officials in 
the legal orders of the EU member states conceptualize their dual commitment to 
authority. Even though officials in the legal orders of the EU member states may be 
committed to the joint project of EU law, this does not necessarily imply that they 
will exercise their authority uniformly. Interactional expectations give insight into 
how officials exercise their authority in a given context. 
 In my view, interactional expectations explain why officials exercise their 
authority differently, even though they are part of a shared practice. Given the 
                                                 
132 Letsas 2012, 100. Letsas distinguishes between the exercise of authority concerning fundamental rights 
and other matters, such as, for example, the internal market. He maintains that fundamental rights should 
always be respected given their overriding moral importance, while the exercise of authority by officials 
in others areas also requires them to consider how they should exercise their power legitimately in 
relation to each other. I do not wish to determine here whether fundamental rights have this overriding 
moral importance. For a critique of this argument, see, for example, Waldron 1999. 
133 Kyritsis makes a similar point when he argues that cooperation between officials of different legal 
orders may be morally required. See, Kyritsis 2015, 162. 
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contextual foundations of interactional expectations it is very likely that officials of 
different legal orders will never exert their authority uniformly. Interactional 
expectations emerge and are supported in the practice of a particular legal order. For 
example, national courts and the European Court of Human Rights may be seen as 
part of a shared practice committed to the protection of fundamental rights. In this 
shared practice, national officials and the Strasbourg Court exercise their authority 
in light of a shared goal of a joint project; the protection of human rights. In this 
practice, interactional expectations give further shape to how officials exercise their 
authority. For example, in Benthem, Kleyn and Salah Sheekh, the Dutch Council of 
State and the Strasbourg Court differed in normative views on how the Convention 
should be interpreted.134 Nevertheless, following each of these decisions, the Dutch 
government took measures to ensure that the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights was given effect in the Dutch legal order. This also illustrates the 
tension between law’s interactional and justificatory dimensions. In order for 
officials in the Dutch legal order to be part of a shared practice committed to the 
protection of fundamental rights, they must also take into account how other 
officials, such as, for example, the European Court of Human Rights, conceptualize 
the central point of this practice. If no measures had been taken to give effect to these 
decisions in the Dutch legal order, the Strasbourg Court would have further 
scrutinized the Council of State. Interactional expectations may explain why officials 
exercise their authority differently. Nevertheless, in order for officials of different 
legal orders to be part of a shared practice, they must also take into account how 
officials in that practice conceptualize its central point. 
 
 
 
                                                 
134 Benthem v The Netherlands App no 8848/80 (ECtHR, 23 October 1985); Kleyn and others v The Netherlands 
App no 39343/98; 39651/98; 43147/98; 46664/99 (ECtHR, 6 May 2003); Salah Sheekh v The Netherlands App 
no 1948/04 (ECtHR, 11 January 2007). See also Procola v Luxembourg App no 14570/89 (ECtHR, 28 
September 1995). 
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5 Looking ahead: future lines of research 
 
In the previous sections, I have sought to make sense of the complex relations 
between legal orders from the perspective of my non-positivist account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders. In this section, I will sketch potential lines of future 
research that may build on this study. The first line of research concerns the critical 
reconstruction of other legal theories in light of the intertwinement of legal orders. 
For example, Kelsen’s positivist legal theory and Luhmann’s socio-legal theory may 
shed a very different light on the interconnections and frictions between legal 
orders.135 However, reflective equilibrium is not an adequate method to critically 
reconstruct these theories. As I have argued in chapter 1, using the method of 
reflective equilibrium on these legal theories will either lead to a rejection of the 
intertwinement of legal orders as such or a rejection of their basic tenets. An 
alternative method should be used to critically reconstruct legal theories that assert 
the autonomy of legal orders. Foundationalist methods from the field of ethics may 
be used, for example, to critically reconstruct these legal theories without 
abandoning their central tenets. Further research is needed on the methodology of 
theory reconstruction in order to assess how legal theories may be critically 
reconstructed on the basis of this method. Although a methodology debate in the 
field of jurisprudence has surfaced, the topic of theory reconstruction is notably 
absent.136 Thus, before other legal theories may be critically reconstructed in light of 
the intertwinement of legal orders, further research is needed on the methodology 
of theory reconstruction in jurisprudence.  
 A second line of research may explore how my non-positivist 
understanding of law may be further developed to bridge the gap between different 
disciplines in legal academia. My central claim that legal validity and authority in 
intertwined legal orders should be understood in light of its justificatory and 
interactional dimensions may be further developed to construct an argument that 
                                                 
135 Kelsen 1945; Luhmann 2004. 
136 See, for example, the contributions in Banas; Dyrda and Gizbert-Studnicki 2016. 
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seeks to create common ground between legal philosophers and socio-legal scholars. 
Often, theories of legal philosophers and socio-legal scholars are pitted against each 
other. On this view, the object of study, concepts, and methods of legal philosophers 
and socio-legal scholars are seen as radically different. However, a non-positivist 
understanding of law may be further developed in order for sociologically informed 
theorists and legal scholars to support each other’s theories.137 Postema’s 
characterization of jurisprudence as a sociable science may help to illustrate my 
point. Postema distinguishes between the internal and external social character of 
jurisprudence: ‘[i]t is ‘externally sociable’ in respects of its openness to interaction 
and partnership with other modes of inquiry and it is ‘internally sociable’ in respect 
of its synechist methodological orientation or mentality.’138 This study contributes to 
an internally sociable jurisprudence because my critical reconstruction of legal 
theories is aimed at broadening their explanatory scope to incorporate international 
law and the intertwinement of legal orders. My novel account of legal validity and 
authority may be applied to other contexts and connected to sociological, historical 
and legal theories. This will contribute to an externally sociable jurisprudence 
because my non-positivist understanding of law may be further developed in 
cooperation with other disciplines in legal academia. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have developed a theoretical account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders that centres on the notions of legal validity and authority. This account 
synthesizes the relative strengths of my positivist, interpretive and pragmatist 
accounts of the intertwinement of legal orders that I have critically reconstructed in 
the previous chapters. My novel theoretical account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders I have defended two central claims. Firstly, I have argued that legal validity 
should be seen as a contestable notion. Validity criteria may inform us under which 
                                                 
137 Taekema and Van der Burg 2014; Cotterrell 2018. 
138 Postema 2016, 29. 
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conditions legal norms should be considered valid, but these criteria are contestable. 
Why legal norms of another legal order should be considered valid depends on a 
justification that explains in which light the recognition of legal norms of other legal 
orders should be understood. Moreover, interactional expectations may also help to 
ground a legal norm in existing patterns of social relations. Secondly, I have argued 
that legal authority should be understood as a content-dependent notion. On this 
view, the legitimacy of an official is dependent on how it substantively exercises its 
authority. I have explored Raz’s content-independent account of authority to 
illustrate why a substantive conception of authority is needed. In my view, the 
exercise of legitimate power by officials of different legal orders should be seen as 
part of a practice in which the exercise of authority is aimed towards the shared goals 
of this practice. Interactional expectations help to make sense of how officials 
exercise their authority differently. Claims to authority may be contested when 
citizens and officials have opposing interactional expectations. Finally, I have 
explored two possible lines of future research that may be further developed on the 
basis of this study. Firstly, further research is needed on the methodology of critical 
reconstruction in the field of jurisprudence. A different method of critical 
reconstruction is needed for legal theories that consider law an autonomous practice. 
Secondly, further research will reveal how my non-positivist understanding of law 
legal theory can help to integrate theories from socio-legal scholars and legal 
philosophers.
  
 
161 
 
Bibliography  
 
 
Adams, Maurice, and Gerhard van der Schyff. 2017. “Constitutional Culture in the 
Netherlands: A Sober Affair.” In Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging 
Idealism and Realism, edited by Maurice Adams, Anne Meuwese, and Ernst Hirsch 
Ballin, 358-385. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Adler, Matthew, and Kenneth Himma, eds. 2009. The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. 
Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Alter, Karen. 2001. Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an 
International Rule of Law in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Alter, Karen and Kal Raustiala. 2018. “The Rise of International Regime 
Complexity.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 14: 329-349. 
Austin, John. 1995. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Baehr, Jason. 2016. “A Priori and A Posteriori.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/apriori/  
Banas, Pawel, Adam Dyrda, and Thomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, eds. 2016. 
Metaphilosophy of Law. London: Hart. 
Bano, Samia. 2012. Muslim Women and Shari'ah Councils: Transcending the Boundaries 
of Community and Law. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Berman, Paul Schiff. 2012. Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond 
Borders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Berman, Paul Schiff. 2013. “How legal pluralism is and is not distinct from 
liberalism: A response to Alexis Galán and Dennis Patterson.” International Journal 
of Constitutional law 11 (3): 801-808. 
162 
 
Berman, Paul Schiff. 2016. “The Evolution of Global Legal Pluralism.” In Authority 
in Transnational Legal Theory: Theorising Across Disciplines, edited by Roger Cotterrell 
and Maksymilian Del Mar, 151-188. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Bernstein, Richard. 2010. The Pragmatic Turn. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Besson, Samantha. 2010. “Theorizing the Sources of International law.” In The 
Philosophy of International Law, edited by Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, 163-
185. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bratman, Michael. 1992. “Shared Cooperative Activity.” Philosophical Review 101 (2): 
327-341. 
Brunnée, Jutta, and Stephen Toope. 2010. Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: 
An Interactional Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Çali, Basak. 2009. “On Interpretivism and International Law.” European Journal of 
International Law 20 (3): 805-822. 
Christiano, Thomas. 2016. “Ronald Dworkin, State Consent, and Progressive 
Cosmopolitanism.” In The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin, edited by Wil Waluchow and 
Stefan Sciaraffa, 49-70. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Coleman, Jules. 1998. Markets, Morals, and the Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Coleman, Jules. 2001. The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to 
Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cotterrell, Roger. 2003. The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction To Legal 
Philosophy. London: LexisNexis. 
Cotterrell, Roger. 2018. Sociological Jurisprudence: Juristic Thought and Social Inquiry. 
London: Routledge. 
Coyle, Sean. 2017. Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide. Oxford: Hart. 
Craig, Paul. 2010. The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
163 
 
Culver, Keith, and Michael Giudice. 2010. Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General 
Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Daniels, Norman. 1996. Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and 
Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
De Been, Wouter. 2008. Legal Realism Regained: Saving Realism from Critical Acclaim. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
De Sousa Santos, Boaventura. 1995. Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and 
Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition. New York: Routledge. 
De Wet, Erika 2008. “The Reception Process in the Netherlands and Belgium.” In A 
Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, edited by Helen 
Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, 229-310. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Den Hartogh, Govert. 2002. Mutual Expectations: A Conventionalist Theory of Law. The 
Hague: Kluwer. 
Dewey, John. 2008. “The Quest for Certainty.” In John Dewey The Later Works, 1925-
1953: Volume 4: 1929, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. 1-250. Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press.  
Dewey, John. 1998. “Logical Method and Law.” In The Essential Dewey Volume 1: 
Pragmatism, Education, Democracy, edited by Larry Hickman and Thomas Alexander, 
355-362. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Dickson, Julie. 2001. Evaluation and Legal Theory. Oxford: Hart. 
Dickson, Julie. 2007. “Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule?” Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 27 (3): 373-402. 
Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh. 2006. “A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and 
the Growing European Human Rights Acquis.” Common Market Law Review 43 (3): 
629-665. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 1978. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
164 
 
Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law’s Empire. Oxford: Hart. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 1996. “Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It.” Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 25 (2): 87-139. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 2004. “Ronald Dworkin Replies.” In Dworkin and his Critics: With 
Replies by Dworkin, edited by Justine Burley, 337-395. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 2006. Justice in Robes. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 2008. “Response.” In Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of 
Ronald Dworkin, edited by Scott Hershovitz, 291-311. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press,. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 2011. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 2013. “A New Philosophy for International Law.” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 41 (1): 2-30. 
Eckert, Julia. 2014. “What is the context in “Law in Context”?” In Concepts of Law: 
Comparative, Jurisprudential, and Social Science Perspectives, edited by Seán Donlan and 
Lukas Urscheler, 225-236. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Ehrenberg, Kenneth. 2016. The Functions of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eleftheriadis, Pavlos. 2010. “Pluralism and Integrity.” Ratio Juris 23 (3): 365-389. 
Faraguna, Pietro. 2017. “Constitutional Identity in the EU – A Shield or Sword?” 
German Law Journal 18 (7): 1617-1640. 
Fuller, Lon. 1958. “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart.” 
Harvard Law Review 71 (4): 630-672. 
Fuller, Lon. (1969). The Morality of Law. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Fuller, Lon. 1981. “Human Interaction and the Law.” In The Principles of Social Order: 
Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller, edited by Kenneth Winston, 211-246. Durham: Duke 
University Press,. 
165 
 
Gardner, John. 2012. Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Giudice, Michael. 2013. “Hart and Kelsen on International Law.” In Oxford Studies in 
Philosophy of Law: Volume 2, edited by Leslie Green and Brian Leiter, 148-174. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Giudice, Michael. 2015. Understanding the Nature of Law: A Case for Constructive 
Conceptual Explanation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Glas, Lize and Jasper Krommendijk. 2017. “From Opinion 2/13 to Avotiņš: Recent 
Developments in the Relationship between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg 
Courts.” Human Rights Law Review 17 (3): 567-587. 
Gragl, Paul. 2013. The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Oxford: Hart. 
Green, Leslie. 1999. “Positivism and Conventionalism.” Canadian Journal of Law & 
Jurisprudence 12 (1): 35-52. 
Grey, Thomas. 1998. “Freestanding Legal Pragmatism.” In The Revival of Pragmatism: 
New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture, edited by Morris Dickstein, 254-274. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Guest, Stephen. 2013. Ronald Dworkin. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Halpin, Andrew. 2014. “The Creation and Use of Concepts of Law When 
Confronting Legal and Normative Plurality.” In Concepts of Law: Comparative, 
Jurisprudential, and Social Science Perspectives, edited by Seán Donlan and Lukas 
Urscheler, 169-192. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Hart, H.L.A. 1982. “Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons.” In Essays on 
Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy, edited by H.L.A. Hart, 243-268. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hart, H.L.A. 1983a. “Introduction.” In Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, edited 
by H.L.A. Hart, 1-18. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
166 
 
Hart, H.L.A. 1983b. “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence.” In Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy, edited by H.L.A. Hart, 21-48. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hart, H.L.A. 1983c. “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals.” In Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy, edited by H.L.A. Hart, 49-87. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hart, H.L.A. 1983d. “Problems of the Philosophy of law.” In Essays in Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy, edited by H.L.A. Hart, 88-119. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hart, H.L.A. 1983e. “Jhering’s Heaven of Concepts and Modern Analytical 
Jurisprudence.” In Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, edited by H.L.A. Hart, 265-
277. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hart, H.L.A. 1983f. “Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law.” In Essays in Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy, edited by H.L.A. Hart, 309-342. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hart, H.L.A. 1994. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hartwig, Matthias. 2005. “Much Ado About Human Rights: The Federal 
Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human Rights.” German Law 
Journal 6 (5): 869-894. 
Hoekema, André. 2005. “European Legal Encounters between Minority and 
Majority Culture: Cases of Interlegality.” The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial 
Law 37: 1-28. 
Huls, Nick. 2012. “The Ebb and Flow of Judicial Leadership in the Netherlands.” 
Utrecht Law Review 8 (2): 129-138. 
International Law Commission. 2006. “Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law.” 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CN.4/L.682  
Jovanović, Miodrag. 2015. “Dworkin on International Law: Not Much of a Legacy?” 
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 28 (2): 443-460. 
167 
 
Keller, Helen, and Alec Stone Sweet. 2008. “Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on 
National Legal Systems.” In A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National 
Legal Systems, edited by Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, 677-712. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kelsen, Hans. 1945. General Theory of Law and State. New York: Russell & Russell. 
Kingsbury, Benedict, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart. 2005. “The Emergence of 
Global Administrative Law.” Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (3-4): 15-61. 
Krisch, Nico. 2010. Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational 
Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Krisch, Nico. 2017. “Liquid authority in global governance.” International Theory 9 
(2): 237-260. 
Krygier, Martin. 2012. Philip Selznick: Ideals in the World. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Kyritsis, Dimitrios. 2015. Shared Authority: Courts and Legislatures in Legal Theory. 
Oxford: Hart. 
Kyritsis, Dimitrios. 2017. Where Our Protection Lies: Separation of Powers and 
Constitutional Review. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kumm, Mattias. 1999. “Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: 
Three Conceptions of the Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional 
Court and the European Court of Justice.” Common Market Law Review 36 (2): 351-
386. 
Lamond, Grant. 2013. “The Rule of Recognition and the Foundations of a Legal 
System.” In Reading HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law, edited by Luís Duarte d'Almeida, 
James Edwards, and Andrea Dolcetti, 97-122. Oxford: Hart.  
Leiter, Brian. 2007. Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and 
Naturalism in Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Letsas, George. 2007. A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
168 
 
Letsas, George. 2012. “Harmonic Law: The Case Against Pluralism and Dialogue.” 
In Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law, edited by Julie Dickson and 
Pavlos Eleftheriadis, 77-108. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Letsas, George. 2013. “The ECHR as a Living Instrument: its Meaning and 
Legitimacy.” In Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, 
European and Global Context, edited by Andreas Føllesdal, Birgit Peters, and Geir 
Ulfstein, 106-141. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Llewellyn, Karl. 1940. “The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-jobs: The Problem of 
Juristic Method.” Yale Law Journal 49 (8): 1355-1400. 
Llewellyn, Karl, and Edward Hoebel. 1941. The Cheyenne Way. Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press. 
Luhmann, Niklas. 2004. Law as a social system. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
MacCormick, Neil. 1999. Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the 
European Commonwealth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
MacCormick, Neil. 2008. H.L.A. Hart. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Marmor, Andrei. 2001. Positive Law and Objective Values. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Marmor, Andrei. 2009. Social Conventions: From Language to Law. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
McConnachie, Kirsten. 2014. Governing Refugees: Justice, Order and Legal Pluralism. 
New York: Routledge. 
Merton, Robert. 1968. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press. 
Michaels, Ralf. 2017. “Law and Recognition: Towards a Relational Concept of Law.” 
In In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence, edited by Nicole Roughan and Andrew 
Halpin, 90-115. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Murphy, Liam. 2017. “Law Beyond the State: Some Philosophical Questions.” 
European Journal of International Law 28 (1): 203-232. 
169 
 
Nonet, Philippe, and Philip Selznick. 2001. Law and Society in Transition: Towards 
Responsive Law. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
Oomen, Barbara. 2016. “A Serious Case of Strasbourg-bashing? An Evaluation of the 
Debates on the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Netherlands.” International Journal of Human Rights 20 (3): 407-425. 
Payandeh, Mehrad. 2010. “The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of 
H.L.A. Hart.” The European Journal of International Law 21 (4): 967-995. 
Payandeh, Mehrad. 2011. “Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell: 
Contextualizing the Relationship between the German Constitutional Court and the 
EU Court of Justice.” Common Market Law Review 48 (1): 9-38. 
Palombella, Gianluigi. 2015. “Principles and Disagreements in International Law 
(with a View from Dworkin's Legal Theory).” In General Principles of Law: The Role of 
the Judiciary, edited by Laura Pineschi, 3-21. Dordrecht: Springer.  
Posner, Richard. 2003. Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy. London: Harvard University 
Press. 
Postema, Gerald. 1982. “Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law.” 
The Journal of Legal Studies 11 (1): 165-203. 
Postema, Gerald. 1987. “"Protestant" Interpretation and Social Practices.” Law and 
Philosophy 6 (3): 283-319. 
Postema, Gerald. 1999. “Implicit Law.” In Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law 
and Institutional Design, edited by Willem Witteveen and Wibren van der Burg, 255-
275. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.  
Postema, Gerald. 2004. “Integrity: Justice in Workclothes.” In Dworkin and his Critics: 
With Replies by Dworkin, edited by Justine Burley, 291-318. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Postema, Gerald. 2016. “Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science.” In Metaphilosophy of 
Law, edited by Banas, Pawel, Adam Dyrda, and Thomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, 9-36. 
London: Hart. 
Prost, Mario. 2012. The Concept of Unity in Public International Law. Oxford: Hart. 
170 
 
Putnam, Hilary. 2002. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Ratner, Steven. 2015. The Thin Justice of International Law: A Moral Reckoning of the Law 
of Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Raz, Joseph. 1999. Practical Reasons and Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Raz, Joseph. 2009a. Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and 
Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Raz, Joseph. 2009b. The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rawls, John. 1999a. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Rawls, John. 1999b. “The Independence of Moral Theory.” In John Rawls: Collected 
Papers, edited by Samuel Freeman, 286-302. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Robertson, Michael. 2017. “More Reasons Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal 
Philosophy.” Ratio Juris 30 (4): 403-416. 
Rodriguez-Blanco, Veronica. 2016. “Book Review: Nicole Roughan, Authorities: 
Conflicts, Cooperation and Transnational Legal Theory.” Modern Law Review 79 (1): 
193-201. 
Rorty, Richard. 2009. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Roughan, Nicole. 2013. Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal 
Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rundle, Kristen. 2012. Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller. 
Oxford: Hart. 
Scarffe, Eric. 2016. ““A New Philosophy for International Law” and Dworkin’s 
Political Realism.” Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 29 (1): 191-213. 
171 
 
Schauer, Frederick. 2009. Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal 
Reasoning. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Selznick, Philip. 1961. “Sociology and Natural law.” Natural Law Forum 6: 84-108. 
Selznick, Philip (with Philippe Nonet and Howard Vollmer). 1969. Law, Society, and 
Industrial Justice. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Selznick, Philip. 1992. The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of 
Community. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Shapiro, Scott. 2007. “The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the 
Perplexed.” In Ronald Dworkin, edited by Arthur Ripstein, 22-55. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Shapiro, Scott. 2011. Legality. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press.  
Simon Thomas, Marc. 2017. The Challenge of Legal Pluralism: Local dispute settlement 
and the Indian-state relationship in Ecuador. New York: Routledge. 
Stavropoulos, Nicos. 1996. Objectivity in Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Taekema, Sanne. 2003. The Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory. The Hague: Kluwer. 
Taekema, Sanne. 2011. “Private Law as an Open Legal Order: Understanding 
Contract and Tort as Interactional Law.” Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 43 (2): 
140-149. 
Taekema, Sanne. 2017. “The Many Uses of Law: Interactional Law as a Bridge 
between Instrumentalism and Law’s Values.” In In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence, 
edited by Nicole Roughan and Andrew Halpin, 116-135. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Taekema, Sanne. 2018. “Between or Beyond Legal Orders: Questioning the Concept 
of Legal Order in Light of Interlegality.” https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078574  
Taekema, Sanne, and Wibren van der Burg. 2014. “Towards a Fruitful Cooperation 
between Legal Philosophy, Legal Sociology and Doctrinal Research: How Legal 
172 
 
Interactionism May Bridge Unproductive Oppositions.” In Law, Society and 
Community: Socio-Legal Essays in Honour of Roger Cotterrell, edited by Richard Nobles 
and David Schiff, 129-145. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Tamanaha, Brian. 1999. Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and a Social Theory of 
Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tamanaha, Brian. 2001. A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Tamanaha, Brian. 2017. A Realistic Theory of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Twining, William. 2000. Globalisation and Legal Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Twining, William. 2009. General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global 
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Van der Burg, Wibren and Theo van Willigenburg, eds. 1998. Reflective Equilibrium: 
Essays in Honour of Robert Heeger. London: Kluwer. 
Van der Burg, Wibren. 2014. The Dynamics of Law and Morality: A Pluralist Account of 
Legal Interactionism. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Van Hoecke, Mark. 1984. What is Legal Theory? Leuven: Acco. 
Van Hoecke, Mark, and François Ost. 1993. “Epistemological Perspectives in Legal 
Theory.” Ratio Juris 6 (1): 30-47. 
Von Bogdandy, Armin. 2008. “Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: on the 
relationship between international and domestic constitutional law.” International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 6 (3-4): 397-413. 
Von Bogdandy, Armin, Matthias Goldmann, and Ingo Venzke. 2017. “From Public 
International to International Public Law: Translating World Public Opinion into 
International Public Authority.” European Journal of International Law 28 (1): 115-145. 
173 
 
Von Bogdandy, Armin, and Stephan Schill. 2011. “Overcoming absolute primacy: 
Respect for national identity under the Lisbon Treaty” Common Market Law Review 
48 (5): 1417-1453. 
Von Daniels, Daniel (2010). The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective. 
Farnham: Ashgate. 
Waldron, Jeremy. 1999. Law and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Waldron, Jeremy. 2004. “The Rule of Law as a Theater of Debate.” In Dworkin and his 
Critics: With Replies by Dworkin, edited by Justine Burley, 319-336. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Waldron, Jeremy. 2008. “Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?” In Exploring Law's 
Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, edited by Scott Hershovitz, 155-181. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Waldron, Jeremy. 2009. “Who Needs Rules of Recognition?” In The Rule of 
Recognition and the U.S. Constitution, edited by Matthew Adler and Kenneth Himma, 
327-350. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Waldron, Jeremy. 2012. “Partly Laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign Law in 
American Courts. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Waldron, Jeremy. 2013. “International Law: ‘A Relatively Small and Unimportant’ 
Part of Jurisprudence?” In Reading HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law, edited by Luís 
Duarte d'Almeida, James Edwards, and Andrea Dolcetti, 209-223. Oxford: Hart. 
Walker, Neil. 2014. Intimations of Global Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Weatherill, Stephen. 2016. Law and Values in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Weiler, Joseph. 2017. “The Transformation of Europe.” In The Transformation of 
Europe: Twenty-Five Years On, edited by Miguel Maduro and Marlene Wind, 1-99. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Winston, Kenneth. 1988. “Is/Ought Redux: The Pragmatist Context of Lon Fuller's 
Conception of Law.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 8 (3): 329-349. 
174 
 
Young, Margaret. 2012, ed. 2012. Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing 
Fragmentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Zeegers, Nicolle, Willem Witteveen, and Bart van Klink, eds. 2005. Social and 
Symbolic Effects of Legislation under the Rule of Law. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press. 
Zürn, Michael. 2018. A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and 
Contestation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
175 
 
Summary 
 
 
In European liberal democracies a plurality of legal orders exist. These legal orders 
are also highly intertwined. The intertwinement of legal orders raises theoretical 
questions. Lawyers in intertwined legal orders may be confronted with these 
questions. For example, should legal norms of other legal orders trump domestic 
constitutional law? And why do judges sometimes rely on the authority of officials 
of other legal orders when they exercise their authority? Theories of jurisprudence 
may provide answers to these questions. However, many available legal theories do 
not provide an adequate account of the complex relations between legal orders. A 
better understanding of the intertwinement of legal orders may be reached by 
critically reconstructing theories of jurisprudence. Moreover, by introducing new 
elements to these legal theories, answers may be formulated to the theoretical 
questions that are raised by the complex relations between legal orders. Therefore, 
in this study, I investigate how a critical reconstruction of theories of jurisprudence 
may contribute to a better understanding of the intertwinement of legal orders in 
European liberal democracies. 
 In my view, the intertwinement of legal orders should be defined in terms 
of interconnection and friction. Interconnections between legal orders exist when a 
norm of one legal order is incorporated or given effect in another legal order. This 
also includes giving effect to an interpretation of a legal norm of another legal order. 
Interconnections also exist when officials rely on the authority of officials of other 
legal orders. For example, a judge in a domestic legal order may rely on the authority 
of international courts when reaching his decision. Frictions between legal orders 
exist when conflicts between norms emerge. Frictions between legal orders also exist 
when officials reject the authority of officials of other legal orders. Based on 
examples from positive law, I maintain that the intertwinement of legal orders raises 
theoretical questions that concern the validity of legal norms and the authority of 
officials. Many available theories from the analytical, normative and socio-legal 
traditions of jurisprudence are unable to account for the intertwinement of legal 
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orders. A critical reconstruction of legal theories may provide more adequate 
accounts of the intertwinement of legal orders. In this study, I identify the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of a positivist, interpretive and pragmatist account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders. 
 In my positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders, I critically 
reconstruct H.L.A. Hart’s positivist legal theory. Hart’s positivist legal theory should 
be seen as part of the analytical tradition of jurisprudence. Central to Hart’s legal 
theory is the distinction between primary and secondary rules. Primary rules create 
obligations and are followed by citizens. Secondary rules are followed by officials. 
Officials follow rules of recognition to identify valid primary rules. They follow rules 
of adjudication when disputes concerning primary rules are resolved. Officials 
follow rules of change when new primary rules are introduced. In my positivist 
account of the intertwinement of legal orders, I introduce the notion of rules of 
external recognition to explain why norms of other legal orders are incorporated or 
given effect. Conflicts between norms of different legal orders may be resolved on 
the basis of the rule of recognition. However, in my positivist account of the 
intertwinement of legal orders, it is unclear how conflicts between norms of different 
legal orders are resolved that are valid simultaneously. Moreover, it is unclear how 
relations between officials of different legal orders should be explained in my 
positivist account of the intertwinement of legal orders. 
 In my interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders, I critically 
reconstruct Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive legal theory. Dworkin’s legal theory 
should be situated in the normative tradition of jurisprudence. Dworkin’s 
interpretive legal theory centers on the idea that we interpret legal norms in light of 
the value of integrity. The value of integrity requires lawyers to interpret legal norms 
consistently in light of existing law and coherent in light of the values of political 
morality. In my interpretive account of the intertwinement of legal orders, I argue 
that integrity should be understood as a constructive filter. The value of integrity 
explains how legal norms of other legal orders are made consistent in light of 
existing law and coherent in light of the values of political morality of a legal order. 
The notion of integrity also explains why officials may accept or contest the authority 
of officials of other legal orders. Officials of different legal orders may be part of a 
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practice in which they share their authority. However, persistent conflicts between 
legal norms or persistent contestation of the authority of officials remains 
unexplained in my interpretive account. 
 My pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal orders is critically 
reconstructed on the basis of the pragmatist legal theories of Karl Llewellyn and 
Philip Selznick. Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories are best considered part of 
the socio-legal tradition of jurisprudence. In Llewellyn and Selznick’s legal theories 
law is understood as a social practice that contributes to social ordering and is 
oriented towards legal values and ideals. Based on the work of Lon Fuller, I maintain 
that legal norms are rooted in interactional expectations. In my pragmatist account 
of the intertwinement of legal orders, I argue that legal orders should be understood 
as interconnected sub-practices. Legal norms and officials of different sub-practices 
may have normative force in light of the interactional expectations and the values of 
a legal order. In my pragmatist account, the interconnections between legal orders 
is an implicit practice. The boundaries between different legal orders emerge when 
conflicts between legal norms arise or when the authority of an of official is 
contested. A weakness of my pragmatist account of the intertwinement of legal 
orders, is that it blurs the notion of legal order. 
 My positivist, interpretive and pragmatists accounts of the complex 
relations between legal orders have relative strengths and weaknesses. In the last 
part of this research, I construct a more convincing understanding of the 
intertwinement of legal orders based on my interpretive and pragmatist accounts. I 
maintain that validity is best understood as a contestable notion in which 
justificatory and interactional dimensions should be distinguished. Moreover, I also 
argue that the authority of officials should be understood in content-dependent 
terms. Officials of different legal orders may be part of a shared practice. Officials 
exercise their authority in light of the interactional expectations and values of his 
legal order and these shared practices. 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
Europese liberale democratieën worden gekenmerkt door een pluraliteit aan 
rechtsordes. Deze rechtsordes zijn in toenemende mate met elkaar vervlochten. De 
vervlechting van rechtsordes roept theoretische vragen op waar juristen in deze 
rechtsordes mee geconfronteerd kunnen worden. Dienen bijvoorbeeld rechtsregels 
van andere rechtsordes voorrang te hebben op grondwettelijke normen? En waarom 
baseert een rechter zich soms op het gezag van rechterlijke organen in andere 
rechtsordes? Rechtstheorieën kunnen antwoorden op deze vragen bieden. Echter, 
veel huidige rechtstheorieën hebben onvoldoende oog voor de complexe relaties 
tussen rechtsordes. Een kritische reconstructie van deze rechtstheorieën kan 
bijdragen aan een beter begrip van de vervlechting van rechtsordes. Door nieuwe 
elementen toe te voegen aan bestaande rechtstheorieën kunnen antwoorden 
geformuleerd worden op de theoretische vragen die de complexe relaties tussen 
rechtsordes oproepen. In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik daarom hoe een kritische 
reconstructie van huidige rechtstheorieën kan bijdragen aan een beter begrip van de 
vervlechting van rechtsordes in Europese liberale democratieën.  
 In dit onderzoek definieer ik de vervlechting van rechtsordes als de 
interconnectie en frictie tussen rechtsordes. Interconnecties tussen rechtsordes 
bestaan wanneer rechtsregels worden geïncorporeerd of toegepast uit een andere 
rechtsorde. De interpretatie van een norm uit een andere rechtsorde kan ook worden 
toegepast. Interconnecties tussen rechtsordes bestaan ook wanneer 
overheidsorganen zich beroepen op het gezag van overheidsorganen uit andere 
rechtsordes. Een nationale rechter kan zich bijvoorbeeld beroepen op rechtspraak 
van internationale rechterlijke organen. Fricties tussen rechtsordes ontstaan 
wanneer rechtsregels van verschillende rechtsordes conflicteren of wanneer 
overheidsorganen het gezag van organen uit andere rechtsordes afwijzen. Aan de 
hand van voorbeelden uit het positieve recht betoog ik dat de vervlechting van 
rechtsordes theoretische vragen oproept over de geldigheid van rechtsregels en het 
gezag van overheidsorganen. Bestaande rechtstheorieën uit de analytische, 
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normatieve en sociologische tradities binnen de rechtsfilosofie kunnen de complexe 
relaties tussen rechtsordes niet afdoende verklaren. Echter, door bestaande 
rechtstheorieën kritisch te reconstrueren, kunnen betere verklaringen voor de 
vervlechting van rechtsordes gevonden worden. In dit onderzoek identificeer ik de 
sterke en zwakke aspecten van een positivistische, interpretatieve en pragmatische 
verklaring van de vervlechting van rechtsordes. 
 Een rechtspositivistische verklaring van de vervlechting van rechtsordes 
construeer ik op basis van de rechtstheorie van H.L.A. Hart. Harts positivistische 
rechtstheorie dient gesitueerd te worden in de analytische traditie van de 
rechtsfilosofie. Van groot belang in Harts rechtstheorie is het onderscheid tussen 
primaire en secundaire regels. Primaire regels creëren juridische rechten en 
verplichtingen. Deze primaire regels worden gevolgd door burgers. Secundaire 
regels worden gevolgd door overheidsorganen. Op basis van herkenningsregels 
kunnen overheidsorganen geldige primaire regels identificeren. Geschillen over 
primaire regels worden opgelost op basis van rechtspraakregels. Nieuwe primaire 
regels worden gemaakt op grond van veranderingsregels. In mijn 
rechtspositivistische verklaring van de vervlechting van rechtsordes introduceer ik 
het begrip externe herkenningsregels. Externe herkenningsregels verklaren waarom 
rechtsregels uit andere rechtsordes geïncorporeerd of toegepast worden. Conflicten 
tussen rechtsregels binnen in een rechtsorde kunnen opgelost worden op basis van 
herkenningsregels. Echter, het is onduidelijk hoe conflicten opgelost worden tussen 
rechtsregels die in verschillende rechtsordes geldig zijn. Een ander zwak aspect van 
mijn rechtspositivistische verklaring van de vervlechting van rechtsordes ziet op 
overheidsorganen. Relaties tussen overheidsorganen van verschillende rechtsordes 
kunnen niet goed verklaard worden in een rechtspositivistische verklaring. 
 Een interpretatieve verklaring van de vervlechting van rechtsordes 
construeer ik aan de hand van de rechtstheorie van Ronald Dworkin. Dworkins 
interpretatieve rechtstheorie behoort tot de normatieve traditie binnen de 
rechtsfilosofie. In zijn rechtstheorie stelt Dworkin dat we rechtsregels toepassen in 
het licht van het ideaal van integriteit. Het ideaal van integriteit houdt in dat de 
toepassing van een rechtsregels consistent dient te zijn en gerechtvaardigd in het 
licht van de onderliggende waarden van het recht. In mijn interpretatieve verklaring 
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van de vervlechting van rechtsordes betoog ik dat integriteit begrepen moet worden 
als een constructieve filter. Het ideaal van integriteit verklaart hoe rechtsregels 
consistent gemaakt worden in het licht van het geldende recht en coherent op basis 
van de onderliggende waarden van een rechtsorde. De notie van integriteit als 
constructieve filter kan ook verklaren waarom overheidsorganen het gezag van 
andere overheidsorganen accepteren of afwijzen. Overheidsorganen van 
verschillende rechtsordes kunnen deel uitmaken van een gedeelde praktijk waarin 
zij gezag delen. Een zwak aspect van mijn interpretatieve verklaring is de 
afwezigheid van een overtuigende uitleg van aanhoudende conflicten tussen 
rechtsregels en onenigheid over het gezag van overheidsorganen van andere 
rechtsordes.  
 In mijn pragmatische verklaring van de vervlechting van rechtsordes staan 
de pragmatische rechtstheorieën van Karl Llewellyn en Philip Selznick centraal. De 
rechtstheorieën van Llewellyn en Selznick behoren tot de sociologische traditie in 
rechtsfilosofie. Llewellyn en Selznick menen dat het recht begrepen moet worden 
als een sociale praktijk. Recht is zowel een ordeningsmechanisme, als een praktijk 
waarin waarden en idealen ingebed zijn. Op basis van het werk van Fuller betoog ik 
tevens dat in een pragmatisch rechtsbegrip interactionele verwachtingen een 
belangrijke basis vormen voor de normatieve gelding van rechtsregels. In mijn 
pragmatische verklaring van de vervlechting van rechtsordes betoog ik dat 
rechtsordes begrepen moeten worden als sub-praktijken die met elkaar verbonden 
zijn. Rechtsregels en overheidsorganen van verschillende sub-praktijken kunnen 
normatieve gelding hebben omdat ze aansluiten bij de interactionale verwachtingen 
en de waarden en idealen binnen een rechtsorde. In mijn pragmatische verklaring is 
de interactie tussen rechtsordes in beginsel een impliciete praktijk. Het onderscheid 
tussen verschillende rechtsordes wordt duidelijk als conflicten tussen rechtsregels 
ontstaan of als het gezag van een overheidsorgaan betwist wordt. Een zwak aspect 
van mijn pragmatische verklaring is daarom dat het rechtsorde begrip deels 
vervaagt. 
 Mijn positivistische, interpretatieve en pragmatische verklaringen hebben 
relatieve sterke en zwakke punten. In het laatste deel van dit onderzoek bied ik een 
meer overtuigende verklaring van de vervlechting van rechtsordes door de relatieve 
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sterke aspecten van mijn interpretatieve en pragmatische verklaringen te 
synthetiseren. In mijn eigen theoretische verklaring van de complexe relaties tussen 
rechtsordes dient rechtsgeldigheid opgevat te worden als een betwistbaar begrip. 
Daarnaast betoog ik dat het gezag van overheidsorganen afhankelijk is van de 
inhoud van juridische besluiten. Overheidsorganen van verschillende rechtsordes 
kunnen deel uitmaken van een gedeelde praktijk. Een overheidsorgaan oefent gezag 
uit in het licht van de interactionale verwachtingen en waarden van zijn eigen 
rechtsorde en van gedeelde praktijken. 
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